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I. INTRODUCTION
For the present quarrel is so inflamed by the warm heads of ei-
ther faction, and the pretensions somewhere or other so exorbitant,
as not to admit the least overtures of accommodation.'
Whales capture the public's imagination like no other wild an-
imal.2 They have played a central role in "the social construction
of modern ecological thought."3 Indeed, the survival of whales has
been a symbol of the environmental movement since the latter
quarter of the twentieth century, when the "slogan 'save the
whales' was a call to arms to save the planet from humanity's fol-
*Professor Babcock is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for Public Repre-
sentation at Georgetown University Law School.
1. ANNE FADIMAN, AT LARGE AND AT SMALL 90 (2007) (quoting Jonathan Swift, The
Battle of the Books, in THE WORKS OFJONATHAN Swwr 100 (W.P. Nimmo et al. eds., 1902)
(1990)).
2. See Alison Rieser, Wiales, Whaling, and the Warming Oceans, 36 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L.
REV. 401, 401 (2009) ("The great whales have long been a symbol of humanity's relation-
ship to the oceans."); see also Peter J. Stoett, Of Whales and People: Normative Theory, Symbol-
ism, and the IWC, 8J. INT'L. WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 151, 154 (2005) ("It is no exaggeration to
say that even nations with no coasts or history of the whaling conflict or repeated exposure
to Free Willy and other Hollywoodisms consider the whale the standard-bearer for nature in
the epic of its assault by man."). This love for whales has its roots in "the Western social
construction of childhood." Id. at 159.
3. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 153 ("[T] he whaling story often is perceived as one of
the central pillars in the social construction of modern ecological thought."); id. at 173
("It is tempting to conclude that the whaling story has led us inexorably down the path
toward what [some] have termed ecocentrism."). For a definition of ecocentrism that also
resonates with the "whale story, see id. at 172, n.40 (using Matthew Paterson's definition of
ecocentrism in Green Politics, in SCorr BURCHILL ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 277, 281 (2001), and writing that the term "recognizes the 'full range of hu-
man interests in the nonhuman world[;] it recognizes the interests of the nonhuman
community ... the interests of future generations ... [and] adopts a holistic rather than
atomistic perspective-that is, it values populations, species, ecosystems and the ecosphere
as a whole as well as individual organisms'").
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ly. "4 Stories about whale conservation implicate cultural clashes,
interspecies morality, and global politics.5 They offer lessons in
how not to manage a natural resource, 6 and simultaneously show
how both governmental and individual activism can overcome this
mismanagement and give whales a chance at survival.7 These sto-
ries also show that the current international approach for the con-
servation of whales administered by the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) has failed to prevent substantial declines in
whale stocks to a point where the survival of some species is uncer-
tain. Major whaling countries like Norway, Russia, Japan, and Ice-
land have either opted out of this regulatory regime or taken ad-
vantage of various loopholes in the International Convention on
the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) allowing the unregulated take
of whales for scientific research or subsistence purposes.
A recent commentary in Nature proposed a market-based alter-
4. Rieser, supra note 2, at 401; see also Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling
Commission and the Elusive Great White Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 375, 376 (2009) ("The fight by Environmental Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions ('ENGOs') to preserve whales is considered to be the first modem, global environ-
mental campaign, and in many ways the whale is still regarded as the symbol of the ENGO
trans-national movement."); Stoett, supra note 2, at 156 ("Ethical positions are built on the
edifice of symbols; the latter construe meaning from the former, and vice-versa. Symbols
move people from one intellectual space to another; they give bearing and guidance; they
shift in composition and appearance with time and experience. They are both agential
and structural, influential in their contextual presence. They define ethical parameters,
whether they are viewed in written or photographic or sculptured form, and whether they
concretize religion, political sovereignty, or social movements. They make sense of and
explain ethics, because they serve as accessible referents. The whale has evolved in this so-
cially constructed manner to represent different things to different people, and this is po-
litically fascinating as the normative context of the IWC evolves as well.").
5. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 155 ("[T]he whaling story is one of the more prolific
episodes, complete with its conflict of cultural orientation, the central role of symbolism
played by the whale itself, and the many associated questions pertaining to the morality of
interspecies conduct, aboriginal exemptions, the conservationist/preservationist conflict,
the humane killing debate, and other factors. The tale is not immune to power politics,
either: Indeed, the symbolism of the postcommercial whale is amplified by rigid and sus-
tained, if problematic, American commitment.").
6. See Adrienne M. Ruffle, Note, Resurrecting the International Whaling Commission: Sug-
gestions to Strengthen the Conservatio Effnt, 27 BROOK J. INT'L L. 639, 644 (2002) ("[The]
historic overexploitation of whales" is one of "the most infamous examples of human
mismanagement of the earth's natural resources."); see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 161
("The whaling story was a case of extreme predation."); id. ("[I]t is difficult to escape the
conclusion that, as a signifying event, the whaling story evokes little less than a destructive
period of temporary insanity in human nature relations.").
7. See Stoett,.supra note 2, at 153 ("[The whaling story] is certainly is one of the main
lesson blueprints common for how not to manage a resource, but at the same time for how
mismanagement can be overcome with vigorous activism and the support of key states.").
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native to the current ineffective international regulatory program.8
Under the authors' proposal, the IWC would administer "a care-
fully controlled global market" in whale shares.9 Member nations
would receive allowances to hunt whales at "sustainable harvest
levels" and could trade shares authorizing the killing or preserva-
tion of whales. 10 The number of available shares would depend on
the global status of various whale populations as determined by the
IWC.II Some shares could be held back for future auction, with the
proceeds going to conservation efforts (not necessarily whale re-
lated). Countries could use the shares to allow whales to be killed,
hold them indefinitely for future use, or retire them permanently.
Conservationists and whalers in member nations would have an
opportunity to bid on these shares, unless their countries retired
them permanently.12 Strikingly, this proposal is the first time any-
one has suggested safeguarding an otherwise protected species by
killing some of its members. 13
In the current climate of regulatory failure, the authors' mar-
ket-based approach has obvious appeal.'4 But something about the
proposal, which allows whales to be killed, is troubling, even if its
purpose is to save more whales.'5 This Article suggests that what is
8. Christopher Costelli, Steven Gaines & Leah R. Gerber, Conservation Science: A Mar-
ket Approach to Saving Whales, 481 NATuRE 139 (2012), available at
http:www.nature.com/nature/journal/v481/n7380/full/481139a.html; see also Juliet
Eilperin, Researchers Propose Putting a Price on Whales, WASH. POSt (Jan. 11. 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/researchers-propose-putting-a-
price-on-whales/2012/01/10/gQAHSH8qP.story.html (describing the proposal).
9. Costelli et al., supra note 8, at 3.
10. Id. at 4; see also Eilperin, supra note 8, at 1. According to the proposal's authors,
allowing the quotas to be traded "would not necessarily lead to whale deaths or national
caps on takes." Costelli et al., supra note 8, at 4.
11. Costelli et al., supra note 8, at 4. The economists' proposal is quite similar to In-
ternational Fishery Quotas. For an article describing the positive and negative features of
such programs, see Kirsten Engel & Dean Lueck, Introduction: Property Rights and the Envi-
ronmen, 50 ARiz. L. REv. 373, 377 (2008) (identifying some of the costs of imposing a
property rights regime on natural resources and noting they are not without complexities,
such as those "inherent in matching a property rights regime to a particular natural re-
source").
12. Costelli et al., supra note 8, at 2.
13. But see Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §1539(a) (2012) (allowing the take of
an endangered species under certain limited circumstances pursuant to incidental take
permits).
14. See Eilperin, supra note 8, at 2-3 (quoting Robert N. Stavins, Director, Harvard
Environmental Economics Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, as saying,
"If the world could devise a way to monitor and enforce these whaling quotas, it could
help keep whale hunting in check.").
15. SeeStoett, supra note 2, at 164 ("In favoring popular mammals such as whales for
[Vol. 32:3
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troubling is that the proposal is immoral-that it is morally wrong
to kill whales under any circumstances, even to save a greater
number. I instead advocate a different tool to stop whale hunting:
using international environmental groups to promote an emergent
international whale preservation norm in whaling nations by en-
couraging them to change their self-image as whale-eating cul-
tures. Whales are useful subjects for examining the role of ethics in
guiding decisions about species conservation, as the debates over
their fate are prototypical of normative debates surrounding con-
servation of other species, and often "intractable problems" like
those surrounding whales can only be solved through ethical dis-
course."16
To explore this idea, Part II of this Article discusses the current
status of whales and surveys the threats to their survival from hunt-
ing. Part III then briefly chronicles the international effort to regu-
late whale hunting, focusing on the creation of the IWC and the
1982 ban on commercial whale hunting. Part IV describes the
structural and non-structural problems that have contributed to
the ineffectiveness of the IWC, such as exemptions that have al-
lowed unregulated whale killing to continue and debilitating in-
ternal conflicts between whaling and non-whaling member na-
tions.
Part V examines the question of whether whales have an inher-
ent right to life, potential sources of that right, and the conse-
quences of recognizing its existence. When confronted with such
an entitlement, the Nature authors' proposal is found wanting.' 7
protection beyond the mere fact of their rarity, we make certain assumptions operational:
that whales are intelligent, magnificent, capable of teaching us much in terms of marine
biology and perhaps even sociobiology, and-not least important-capable of attracting
tourists."); see also MichaelJ. Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets,
Address at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11 & 12, 1998), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HuMAN VALUES 104 ("Once we characterize the good at stake, it is always a further ques-
tion whether, or in what respect, market valuation and exchange diminishes of corrupts
the character of that good."). But see Stoett, supra note 2, at 164 ("Whales are special.
However, this does not mean that they are necessarily unhuntable.").
16. See Alexander Gillespie, Whaling under a Scientific Auspice: The Ethics of Scienti/ic
Research Whaling Operations, 3 J. INT'L WILDuFE L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2002) ("Interest in ethical
analysis of standards arises from recognition that solutions to intractable problems can on-
ly be achieved through ethical discourse.").
17. This Article does not examine valuation and other problems inherent in the
economists' proposal except to the extent that they relate to or shed light on its moral di-
mensions, although the author believes these issues may be equally debilitating. For an
article that examine these and other problems involved in designing property regimes to
protect resources, see Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50
72013]
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Finding that a market-based approach to protecting whales from
extinction is ethically problematic because it allows whales to be
killed, however, leaves unaddressed the problem of how to stop the
slaughter of whales. Therefore, in Part VI the Article turns to a top-
ic I have addressed previously' 8-the use of norms to fill gaps in
law. This Part discusses norms in general and whaling norms in
particular. In Part VII the Article shows how international envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), using a
mixture of public information campaigns, boycotts, and direct ac-
tion to publicize the cruelty of whaling, might help disseminate an
emergent global whale preservation norm to whaling nations by
encouraging their citizens to change their self image as whale-
eating cultures. Although norm change in whaling countries could
be difficult, the strength of the anti-animal cruelty norm in coun-
tries like Japan, the robustness of the international whale preserva-
tion norm, and the decreasing economic importance of whaling
make it possible. Part VIII concludes.
II. THE CURRENT POPULATION STATUS OF WHALES AND THE IMPACT
OF HUNTING
The story of whaling is indicative of not only poor shared re-
source management but unbridled, frontier-style exploitation of
the commons. 19
Whales have been hunted by humans for hundreds of years as a
ARIz. L. REv. 511, 537 (2008) ("[W]e almost certainly lack the resources-and probably
the political will-to actually design property rights in marine fisheries that will be eco-
nomically optimal in the near-term, let alone the long-term. Changes in tastes and prefer-
ences, new information, and technological developments mean that optimal harvest levels
and methods will change over time."); id. ("[W]e should expect that different countries,
and regions within individual countries, will make different choices, due to heterogeneous
preferences and environmental conditions, among other factors."); id. at 543 ("[O]ptimal
arrangement of property rights depends heavily on the context.").
18. See generally Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the En-
vironment: Moving Toward a Nero Environmental Nonn, 33 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV. 117 (2009)
[hereinafter Babcock, A Nero Environmental Norm]; Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism
Provides Theoretical Support for Making Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 515 (2009); Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civ-
ic Republican Moment for Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE ENvrL.
L. REV. 1 (2009) (hereinafter Babcock, Global Climate Change); Hope M. Babcock, Responsi-
ble Environmental Behavior, Energy Conservation, and Compact Fluorescent Bulbs: You Can Lead a
Horse to Water, But Can You Make It Drink?, 37 HOFSTRA L.J. 943 (2009).
19. Stoett, supra note 2, at 152.
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valuable source of food and fuel.20 Because whales reproduce slow-
ly, reach maturity late, travel in small pods, and are largely found
on the high seas where they are available to anyone who can find
and kill them,21 they have been especially vulnerable to hunting
pressures.22 The assumption that the resources of the marine envi-
ronment were limitless and that economic growth was not de-
pendent on nature and its ability to produce basic resources fuel-
ing that growth led to a kind of unregulated "frontier economics"
when it came to whale hunting.23 Because whales are migratory,
only a regime of international regulation could protect them, but
none existed for much of the period in which whales were hunted
almost to extinction.24 In the years before international regulation,
the unbridled hunting of whales led to the commercial extinction
of many whale specieS25 and left others on the verge of extinc-
20. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 640 ("For centuries, whales provided valuable natural
resources in the form of food and fuel to the world's population, and the whaling industry
contributed substantially to the economic wealth of countries such as Norway, England,
The Netherlands, the U.S.,Japan and Russia.").
21. See David S. Lessoff, Note, Jonah Swallows the Whale: An Examination ofAmerican
and International Failures to Adequately Irtect Whales from Impending Extinction, 11 J. ENVTL. L.
& LITIG. 413, 415 (1996) ("Whales spend the majority of their lives on the high seas, an
area in which resources are openly available to all nations.").
22. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 666 (" [This is] especially true in the instant case, given
the-migration patterns of whales throughout the world's oceans, low rates of reproduction,
late onset of sexual maturity and small populations."); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at
391 ( "The industry operated on a 'boom to bust financial cycle,' driven by the need to
maximize financial returns; short-term exploitation was enhanced by the biological nature
of whales, which are slow to mature compared to fish stocks.").
23. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 391 ("[Tlhe idea of 'frontier economics,' with no
oversight of whaling practices, defined the whaling industry. Whalers assumed that the
marine environment consisted of virtually limitless resources and that economic growth
could be decoupled from nature.").
24. SeeJaye Ellis, Fisheries Conservation in an Anarchical System: A Comparison of Rational
Choice and Constructivist Perspectives, 3 J. INT'L L & INT'L REL. 1, 11 (2007) ("[S]tates must
cooperate to create a web of conservation and management measures, as well as proce-
dures for implementation and enforcement of those measures, that stretches across the
high seas. This international structure must be complemented and reinforced by domestic
rules and procedures."); Ronald J. Haskell, Jr., Abandoning Whale Conservation Initiatives in
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 11 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 551,
587 (1987) ("Whale regulation and conservation require a collective international effort
due to the extra-territorial nature of whale populations and the international right of every
nation to freedom of the high seas. These theoretical underpinnings are the IWC's foun-
dation.").
25. See William C.G. Burns, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda
of the International Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans?, 6J. INT'L. WILDLUFE
L. & POL'Y 255, 256 (2004) ("Between 1.5 and 2 million whales were taken in the Southern
Hemisphere during the 20th century alone, driving blue, fin, and humpback whales to
commercial extinction."); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 391 ("[Hunting] led to the
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tion. 26 The advent of more lethal and efficient methods of killing
whales in the early twentieth century, such as exploding harpoons
and factory ships, accelerated their slaughter.27
The decimation of great whale populations has been stagger-
ing: blue whales have been reduced to "1% of their pre-
exploitation levels, humpback whales to less than 5%, and fin
whales to approximately 15%."28 Repeated reports on the precari-
ous survival of certain whale species by the Convention on the In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) had no effect
on the pace of the slaughter. 29 Even when it was known that whale
stocks were rapidly declining and with them the fate of the whaling
inevitable extinction of coastal whale stocks."); Mark Detsky, Comment, Developments in
Conservation and Living Resources: The Mu*y Sea Over the Magmificent Whale, COLO. J. INT'L.
ENvrL. L. & POL'Y, 2002 Yearbook, at 37 ("Some whale populations have experienced the
largest reward the UNCLOS could offer-a recovery from near extinction.").
26. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 644-45 ("[H]umpback whale stocks are now estimated
at only 1% of their pre-whaling levels. Some researchers believe that four of the nine spe-
cies of great whales are "severely endangered" and that two of these species have been
rendered commercially extinct.").
27. See id. at 645 ("[The] early twentieth century witnessed the development of the
modern whaling industry and the subsequent devastation of whale stocks throughout the
world. During this period, scientific and technological advancements such as steam en-
gines and exploding harpoon guns led to more efficient kills over a larger geographic area
and damaged whale populations almost to the brink of extinction."); id. (describing facto-
ry ships as a "processing plant at sea" enabling "an entire whale" to "be hunted, captured
and processed even before the ship entered port"); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 390
("These new whaling technologies enshrined exploitationist practices as the global stand-
ard.").
28. Burns, supra note 25, at 265-66; see also Ruffle, supra note 6, at 644 ("Prior to the
development of the commercial whaling industry in the thirteenth century, approximately
four million whales populated the world's oceans. In 1975, that figure was only slightly
larger than two million, of which about 1.2 million were sufficiently mature for capture.");
id. ("Before the advent of the commercial whaling industry, for example, an estimated
210,000 blue whales, the largest of the whale species, roamed the oceans. At present, scien-
tific evidence indicates that the population of blue whales may have decreased to approx-
imately 450 animals.").
29. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 649-50 ("In 1977, the first report of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species ("CITES") was released. The report character-
ized certain whales already protected by the IWC as 'endangered species.'"); id. at 650
("1981, CITES had identified more species of whales as being in danger of extinction than
the IWC had even recognized as a 'protected species.'"); see also Donald K Anton, Antarctic
iWaling: Australia's Attempt to Protect Whales in the Southern Ocean, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
319, 322 (2009) ("Humpback whales are listed as Annex I species (most threatened) un-
der the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. Fin whales are listed as
endangered on the World Conservation Union (IUCN)."); Lessoff, supra note 21, at 417
("More whales were killed in the first forty years of the twentieth century than in the pre-
vious four hundred years.").
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industry,30 the pressure to continue hunting whales remained.s'
While hunting whales is not the only threat to their survival,32 it is
the activity that galvanized efforts to protect them and drew the at-
tention of the Nature authors.
III. INCREASING INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE SURVIVAL
OF WHALES
The world's whale stocks are a truly international resource in that
they belong to no one single nation, nor to a group of nations,
but rather they are wards of the entire world.33
A. Early Efforts to Protect Whales from Commercial Hunting
The unrelenting decline of whales led to international conser-
vation efforts to preserve whale stocks as early as 1918.34 Several of
these early international attempts, including one proposal by the
whaling industry to protect the price of whale oil, failed when ma-
30. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 154 ("Whaling was doomed as a commercial activity
because of a rate of diminishing return.").
31. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 390 (noting that even after declining whale stocks
became apparent, "whaling continued at ever increasing rates, threatening the species as a
whole. Robert Ellickson points out that prior to this point, there might well have been a
short-term economic incentive for states to continue excessive hunting to prevent other
whaling nations from exploiting this resource").
32. See, e.g. Richard Cadell, By-Catch Mitigation and Protection of Cetaceans: Recent Devel-
opments in EC Law, 8 J. INT'L. WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 241, 241 (2005); see also Burns, suira
note 25, at 262-66. On the effects of entanglements, habitat degradation, and climate
change, see Rieser, supra note 2, at 405. On the threat posed by climate change, see id. at
407; Susan C. Alker, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to Conserva-
tion, 44 UCLA L. REV. 568 (1996-1997); Stoett, supra note 2, at 163. On the effect of pollu-
tants on whales see Burns, supra note 25, at 267. On the threats posed by whale watching,
see Burns, supra note 25, at 265. The whale watching industry is a rapidly growing tourist
industry; see Burns, supra note 25, at 264-65; Detsky, supra note 25, at 42 ("Whale watching
is arguably more profitable than whaling. The Icelandic whale-watch industry estimates
'the direct value of whale watching in Iceland at $8 million a year, while whaling yielded
only $3-4 million a year in 1986-1989.' Plus, 'more than one third of tourists to Iceland
went whale watching last summer.'").
33. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 397 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson).
34. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 645 ("[M]any countries ... soon recognized that the
economic success of their whaling efforts depended largely on worldwide availability of
whale stocks. Limited attempts to regulate whaling were instituted as early as 1918."). The
decline even came to the attention of the League of Nations because of the potential col-
lapse of the whaling industry. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 392 ("The imminent collapse
of the whaling industry became an issue of global concern with even the League of Nations
becoming involved.").
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jor whaling nations refused to sign them.35 Ironically, Norway and
Iceland, two of the most aggressive modern whaling countries,
were among the first to pass domestic laws limiting whale hunt-
ing. However, the exploitation of whales continued through the
1930s essentially unabated37 because it was in "the economic inter-
est of whalers to continue harvesting what was perceived by many
to be a 'free' resource, to be taken as quickly as technology al-
lowed."3 8
By 1948, the number of whales killed annually had soared to
43,378 Blue Whale Units (BWUs). 3A BWU is the equivalent of 1
blue whale, 2 fin whales, 2 V2 humpback whales, or 6 sei whales-a'
ratio based on the relative oil yield of the individual species. The
measurement is used by the IWC."4 This alarmed conservationists
and those in the whaling industry who recognized that the extinc-
tion of great whales would mean the end of their livelihoods. This
created "a powerful convergence of interests."4' There was also a
growing sense that whales should be viewed not as the property of
individual countries but as "a global resource."4 2
35. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 393-95 (discussing the 1931 and 1937 international
Conventions to regulate whaling and the reasons for their failure). Whaling companies
created an International Association through -which they controlled the production of
whale oil. See id. at 394 ("Whaling companies created a regime of mutual production re-
straint, known as the International Association of Whaling Companies, to stabilize world
oil prices by limiting production of whale oil."). It also failed when major whaling compa-
nies refused to join. See id. (explaining that the refusal of British and Norwegian compa-
nies to join the cartel, along with the refusal of others to change their behavior, "led to the
Association collapsing, like many voluntary arrangements").
36. See id. at 392 ("In 1902 Norway passed a law strictly limiting its whaling compa-
nies' activities with the aim of conserving whale stocks as a valuable state asset. The new law
stipulated that each whaling station was to have only one catcher and the stations must be
fifty miles apart. Iceland was the first state to put in place a domestic whaling moratorium
on whaling-for twenty years, starting from 1915.").
37. Id. at 395 ("The problem remained that, despite these added paper protections,
the exploitation of whales in the 1930s continued virtually unchecked."); see id. at 396 ("By
the 1937-38 season the number of whales killed internationally by whalers had risen to
54,664.").
38. Id. at 396.
39. Id. at 397.
40. SEVERAL STOCKS, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/docrep/96215E/96215e07.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
41. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 397 ("The concomitant decrease in whale stocks
alarmed environmentalists and those who saw this example of over-fishing as leading to
not only the extinction of whales, but also to the extinction of the whaling industry. This
formed a powerful convergence of interests.").
42. See id. at 397 (noting a "burgeoning understanding that whales should no longer
be seen as the property of individual states, but as a global resource.").
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B. The International Whaling Convention and Other Protective Efforts
In 1946, fifteen nations signed the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) to stop the overfishing of
whales.43 The following year, under the terms of the Convention,
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established to
assist whaling nations in maintaining whale markets." The IWC
now has eighty-nine members, and meets annually. The Conven-
tion is the principal legal document governing the whaling prac-
tices of member states.45 The Convention's jurisdictional reach is
very broad, extending from the high seas into a country's territori-
al and even inland waters.46
The first three decades of the IWC's history were dominated by
members with strong whaling industries who blocked all efforts to
establish sustainable whale hunt quotas.47 Until the late 1960s, the
IWC functioned like a "whaling cartel,"* a "whaler's club,"49 ena-
43. See Detsky, supra note 25, at 36 ("In 1946, nations signing the International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling agreed to control the catch operations of the whale
fishery because of 'over-fishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after
another to such a degree that it is essential to protect all species of whales from further
over-fishing.'"); Anthony L.I. Moffa, Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case
Study of Anti-Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean, 37 YALE J. INT'L. L. 201, 205 (2012)
("The ICRW was drafted in 1946 with fifteen state parties and has subsequently been
amended."). Prior to the Convention, other international organizations, such as the Whal-
ing Committee, created the "disastrous" precedent of allowing whaling nations to regulate
themselves. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 392.
44. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, with Schedule of Whal-
ing Regulations, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; see also Haskell, supra note 24,
at 555 ("In 1946, Congress promoted the creation of a multinational body to assist whaling
nations in maintaining a stable market for whale goods. The International Committee on
the Regulation of Whaling ('ICRW') was convened and acknowledged by the United States
under the Whaling Convention Act of 1949."); id. at 553-54 ("Congress initiated the adop-
tion of the present international regulatory structure and, from time to time, enhanced
compliance with the international regulations through supplemental domestic legislation
which provided the enforcement power lacking in the international regulations. The goal
of both international and domestic conservation legislation is the maintenance of econom-
ically viable whale stocks.").
45. Moffa, supra note 43, at 205.
46. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 658 ("IWC was given authority over all waters in which
whaling is carried on by factory ships, land stations or whale catchers."); id. ("[the IWC's]
authority extends inside states' 200-mile exclusive economic zone ('EEZ') and even into
territorial seas and inland waterways.").
47. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 21, 47 (1991). -
48. See Ruffle supra note 6, at 640-41 ("The International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling.. . was initially created as a whaling cartel in response to these devastating
statistics to ensure the sustainable development of whale stocks throughout the world.");
see also Stuart R. Harrop, From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and
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bling whale stocks to be consistently "over-exploited" and leading
to the commercial extinction of several species of great whales. 0
The unbridled hunting of whales during this period led to the
classification of six out of eleven species of great whales as endan-
gered and a decline in Antarctic baleen species by over 96% from
their pre-exploitation levels.5' By the 1960s, a combination of a
drop in great whale stocks, which reduced the economic incentives
for whaling,52 and the "beginning of the global anti-whaling
movement,"53 enabled the IWC to adopt a new management pro-
tocol that reduced whale quotas.54 In 1972, the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment ("The Stockholm Con-
ference") recommended a ten-year moratorium on whaling to al-
lhe International Waling Commission, 6 J. INT'L. WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 79, 88 (2003) ("The
IWC operate[s] like an industrial cartel carving up trade empires within a regime free of
competition and anti-trust regulation.").
49. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 402.
50. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 648. The quotas on killing whales had the perverse effect
of initiating a technological race to build the most efficient ways of killing whales, leading
critics to refer to this period as the "Whaling Olympics." Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 401;
see also Haskell, supra note 24, at 553-54 ("Historically, economic protectionism prompted
whaling nations to agree on harvest quotas. Later advances in whaling technology, in con-
junction with the attendant increase in profitability of whale harvesting, severely dimin-
ished whale populations.").
51. See Burns, supra note 25, at 257 ("The ICRW's history over its first three decades
was highly discouraging, with the parties engaged in commercial whaling operations con-
sistently ignoring the recommendations of the IWC's Scientific Committee and opting for
wholly unsustainable quotas on most species of great whales."); id. ("The legacy of these
excesses has been tragic. Some Antarctic baleen species have declined by over 96% from
pre-exploitation levels, with 6 of 11 great whale species currently classified as endangered
or vulnerable even 30 or more years after exploitation has ceased."). The Soviet Union was
the most egregious violator: their whaling fleets between 1948 and 1973 "killed a vast
number of the world's 'ostensibly protected whale populations'" and then under-reported
to the IWC the number of whales killed. See id. at 260 ("[T]he USSR officially reported
killing only 2,710 humpback whales to the IWC rather than the 48,477 its industry actually
killed"); id. ("[T]he USSR's false reporting was so drastic and pervasive that some experts
believe it accounts for the persistent inaccuracy of the IWC Scientific Committee's fore-
casts of whale populations, on which the catch limits were based.").
52. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 401 ("An unintended consequence of the new,
deadlier ships, however, was a significant increase in the cost of outfitting a whaling fleet.
By 1960, some nations had ceased whaling on economic grounds, due to the prohibitive
capital costs against returns.").
53. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 648.
54. See Burns, supra note 25, at 258 ("In the 1960s, the IWC began to turn the cor-
ner. The diminution of the stocks of great whale species substantially reduced the econom-
ic incentive for whaling. This facilitated the adoption of the IWC's New Management Pro-
cedure, a management regime that ultimately reduced quotas to less than 20 percent of
catches during the first historical phase of the IWC.").
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low whale stocks to recover,55 and Maurice Strong, the Secretary
General of the United Nations, made an appeal at the IWC's an-
nual meeting to protect whales.56 That same year the United States
listed eight species of whales as endangered and introduced a reso-
lution at the IWC banning the killing of whales for ten years, which
passed overwhelmingly.5 7 However, objections by the IWC's scien-
tific committee led to its eventual demise.58 In 1975, the IWC
adopted a "selective moratorium," calling for the management of
whales under a maximum sustainable yield concept with reduced
quotas for whales, but a lack of reliable scientific data on the status
of whales hampered the program's effectiveness.-9
Between 1979 and 1983 membership on the IWC grew to forty-
one countries, many of whom were opposed to whale hunting or
55. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 649.
56. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 408 ("At the 1972 IWC meeting in London, Mau-
rice Strong, the U.N. Secretary-General put to members the case that as the just-completed
U.N. Conference on Human Environment had resolved that there should be a ten-year
moratorium on all commercial whaling, the IWC should address the issue.").
57. See id. at 404 ("[T]he United States due to domestic pressure decided to put
eight types of whales on the domestic Endangered Species List and that, as a country, it
would no longer issue licenses for its whalers to hunt. This defection by the United States
from the whalers' faction would prove a critical factor in the normative battles ahead...
."). The United States introduced a resolution at the IWC calling for a ten-year moratori-
tim on the killing of whales, which passed overwhelmingly indicating a new global consen-
sus on protecting whales at least for the short term to allow stocks to rebound. See id. at 405
("The passing of the motion by such an overwhelming margin indicates that saving the
whales was now perceived by much of the world as an issue of critical importance."); id. at
408 ("Such a moratorium on whaling was initially perceived as a conservationist measure
that would allow stocks to recover over time.").
58. See id. at 408 ("The Scientific Committee argued successfully that a blanket ban
should not be imposed since whaling was better regulated at the individual species level,
and a moratorium would lead to a reduced research program on whales and possibly the
unregulated taking of whales. The IWC voted the motion down . . . .").
59. See id. at 409-10 (calling a 1972 New Management Procedure to manage whale
stocks by using "Maximum Sustainable Yield" "ineffective in preventing the exploitation
of whales due to poor biological data on whale species and their decline"). On the topic of
the problems of the IWC's Science Committee, see id. at 403 (referring to a committee of
three independent scientists, and later four, who acted as ineffective norm "entrepre-
neurs" in support of quotas "to protect scientifically determined, fragile whale stocks,"
"temporary moratoriums," and efforts "to reduce the overall catch" because "[t] hey were
small in number ... and their advice was merely advisory"); id. at 403-04 ("[C]etologists
also lacked the theoretical models and a consensus amongst themselves as to the correct
policy prescriptions, without which they could not plausibly convince whaling states to
abandon exploitationist practices."); id. at 404 ("[The cetelogists] were unable to link
their arguments with higher values that would persuade whaling states to adopt conserva-
tionist practices."); id. at 410 ("Despite being allowed to attend as observers by the IWC in
1977, cetologists were unable to speak with a unified voice, fracturing over questions of
'uncertainty' when applied to whale stocks.").
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had serious doubts about it.60 Two United Nations organizations
and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature also
began participating in IWC proceedings.6' By 1981, the whale pro-
tection outlook reflected in the Stockholm Conference62 as well as
in CITES' regulation63 and in the United Nations Convention of
the Law of the Sea4 had become dominant on the IWC.65
60. Bums, supra note 25, at 258; see also Keiko Hirata, Why Japan Supports Whaling, 8J.
INT'L. WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 129, 131 (2005) ("[A]n increasing number of nonwhaling and
antiwhaling states have joined the IWC since the 1970s."); id. (noting that "antiwhaling
states have become dominant within the IWC"); Ruffle, supra note 6, at 648 ("[A] number
of non-whaling and anti-whaling states joined the Convention and eventually gained a ma-
jority over a dwindling number of pro-whaling nations.");. Ruffle also notes the change in
the United States from a major whaling country to one strongly opposed to whaling. See
id., supra note 6, at 648-49 (The United States, which had been a major whaling country
"became [a] strong anti-whaling component[] of the Commission.").
61. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 408-09 (referring to the addition in 1974 of dele-
gates from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Na-
tions Environment Programme, and the International Union for the Conservation of Na-
ture who formally participated in IWC meetings and "paved the way for alternative non-
state arguments to be presented.").
62. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 39 ("[T]he Stockholm Conference may
be seen as marking a pivotal point between conservationism and protectionism, a view re-
flected in the words of Dr. Robert M. White, who spoke for the United States: 'World
whale stocks must be regarded as the heritage of all mankind....'").
63. See id. at 41 ("In 1977 the secretariat of the Convention on the International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) transmitted the report of its first meeting, high-
lighting the characterization of certain whales as endangered species, to the IWC.").
D'Amato and Chopra note particularly the importance of the CITES ban on killing whales
because parties to the Convention generally adhere to it. Id. at 47 ("CITES prohibitions on
the covert or overt trade in whales and whale derivatives have been effective.").
64. Id. at 36 ("The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Requests States
to prescribe, by all means available to them, those methods for the capture and killing of
marine life, especially of whales and seals, which will spare them suffering to the greatest
extent possible. This resolution reflects changing perceptions about whales outside the
IWC and recognition of the principle of more humane treatment of whales and other ma-
rine life."); see also Detsky, supra note 25, at 36 ("Since 1994, whale conservation has been
put under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
('UNCLOS')."); Ruffle, supra note 6, at 650 ("[The] United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea ('UNCLOS'), completed in 1982, provided inter alia that '[s]tates shall co-
operate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of [whales]
shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for the con-
servation, management and study.'").
65. See Ruffle, supra note 6 at 650 ("By 1981, it became clear that the protectionist
sentiment articulated in the Stockholm Conference, the CITES regulations and UNCLOS
had gained dominance within the IWC."); see also D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 40
("By 1977, the protectionist sentiment appears to have emerged as dominant over that
favoring conservation and its precursor, regulation.").
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C. The 1982 Moratorium Against Commercial Hunting of Great Whales
and Other Efforts to Protect Whales
In 1982, the addition of member states opposed to whaling
combined with the dire condition of great whales (the Blue, Bow-
head, Fin, Bryde's, Right, Humpback, Sei, Gray, Sperm, and Minke
whales) enabled the IWC to issue a moratorium on their commer-
cial hunting.66 To gain the eventual agreement of Japan and Nor-
way, the IWC gave the countries three years to come into compli-
ance and exempted aboriginal hunting.67 In 1986, the IWC
expanded the moratorium to cover the commercial catch of all
types of whales in all whaling areas.68 The policy shift toward whale
preservation on the IWC and other parties69 reflected both a grow-
66. Bums, supra note 25, at 258; see abo Haskell, supra note 24, at 562 ("[The] 1981
IWC Schedule contained a zero quota for the Western Division stock of Northern Pacific
sperm whales for the 1982 season. In 1982, the IWC enacted a five-year moratorium on all
commercial whaling to begin in the 1985-86 season and last until 1990."); Ruffle, sura
note 6, at 648 ("[T]he second period, from the 1981 moratorium until the present, repre-
sents the transformation of the IWC from an agency solely concerned with the regulation
of whale stocks for sustained development and future harvest to an agency with an envi-
ronmental conscience."). Prior to 1982, the IWC took some preliminary steps to ban the
killing of certain species of whales. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 41-42 ("[T]he
1977 meeting [of the IWC] instituted an outright ban on aboriginal whaling of the Arctic
bowhead whale, which was acknowledged to be the most endangered whale species. How-
ever ... it was lifted at the request of the United States where various indigenous groups
had instituted legal action in the courts alleging denial of their constitutional rights. Since
the United States had been the principal proponent of the moratorium, its request for
permission to allow aboriginal whaling weakened its general stance."); id. at 42 ("[I]n
1979, when the membership of the IWC had expanded to twenty-three, Australia and the
United States proposed a worldwide ban on commercial whaling.").
67. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 416-17 ("[In 1982,) [wlhaling states were granted
a three-year grace period to phase out their hunts to lessen the economic impact of the
moratorium in order to comply with the IWC preamble. However, the ban exempted abo-
riginal subsistence whaling-particularly the endangered bowhead species, hunted by the
Inuit in the Arctic regions.").
68. See Moffa, supra note 43, at 205 ("[In] 1986, the ICRW ... included in the
Schedule a ban on commercial whaling of any type, setting and maintaining annual catch
limits of zero in all regions for all types of whales."); see abo D'Amato & Chopra, sup'ra note
47, at 48 ("Virtually all commercial whaling activity has now ceased. However this ban only
applies to great whales (the ten largest species).").
69. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 42 ("The new policy, the commissioner
said, represents a 'change in emphasis from one of the conservative utilization of whale
stocks to promoting a policy of banning whaling and protecting whale populations.'").
The European Economic Community supported the moratorium by enacting its own ban
on the importation of whale parts. See id. at 46 ("The European Economic Community at
about the same time may have helped to enforce the moratorium. A regulation entitled
Common Rules for Imports of Whales or Other Cetacean Products established an EEC ban
as ofJanuary 1, 1982."); id. (saying that since the IWC does not include nonstate parties,
the ban "resulted from the ECC's obligations to CITES" not to any discussions within the
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ing public revulsion toward whaling and the availability of substi-
tute products. 0 By 1990, all commercial whaling of great whales
had ceased.' Although intended to be a temporary ban while
whale populations rebounded, the moratorium has remained in
effect.72 However, the continuing violation of the ban by several
whaling countries, including Canada, led the IWC to call upon
Canada to stop its commercial whaling. 7 The IWC also established
two whaling sanctuaries.74
However, charges of membership packing by both sides in the
debate over killing whales75 and the refusal of major whaling na-
IWC).
70. See id. at 42 (citing "a growing community conviction of the immorality of whal-
ing, the imminent availability of substitutes for whale products, the inhumane way that
whales are killed, and the risks to the maintenance-and even survival-of some species"); id.
at 39 ("[T]he International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN), however, pointed out that 'the use of a resource belonging to all nations for the
marginal benefit of relatively few people seemed unjustified.'").
71. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 421.
72. See Burns; supra note 25, at 266 ("The IWC in recent years has become increas-
ingly conscious of its duty of care toward such severely depleted species and popula-
tions.").
73. See id. at 266 ("[T]he IWC called upon Canada to cease hunting of endangered
bowhead whales in the eastern Canadian Arctic, calling for efforts to reduce the threats to
western North Atlantic right whales, including entanglement in fishing gears and collisions
with vessels, and expressing its concern about activities that threatened western North Pa-
cific gray whales, such as oil seismic exploration in their feeding grounds.").
74. See Burns, supra note 25, at 269 ("The IWC has established two sanctuaries to
date, in the Indian and Southern Oceans, but rejected proposals over the past few years
for sanctuaries in the South Atlantic and the South Pacific."); see also Gillespie, supra note
16, at 41 ("The Indian Ocean was declared a sanctuary in 1979. In 1992, France proposed
a Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary and the IWC voted in favour of the sanctuary in
1994."); Moffa, supra note 43, at 205 ("The IWC established in 1994 a whale sanctuary in
the Southern Ocean.... Japan objected to the sanctuary's creation with respect only to
Antarctic minke whale stocks."); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 443 ("The creation of the
Southern Hemisphere Sanctuary represents a highwater mark in the attempt to preserve
whales through the mechanism of sanctuaries."). But see Emily Alpert, International Group
Harpoons Whale-Ilaven Proposa4 GREENWIRE (July 3, 2012),
http:www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2012/07/03/13 (describing the IWC's defeat of a
recent proposal sponsored by several South American countries to establish a whale sanc-
tuary in the South Atlantic Ocean with Japan, China, Norway, Russia, and Norway voting
against the proposal).
75. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 413 ("While it is impossible to be certain which
actors put in place a plan to 'stack' the IWC, an examination of the membership list of that
period reveals that this is in fact what happened, with countries like Switzerland and the
Seychelles joining the IWC."). Japan has also added anti-whaling member nations who
have blocked the creation of new whale sanctuaries and are working on the IWC to lifting
the moratorium on commercial hunting. See Burns, supra note 25, at 275 (saying Japan's
effort "assures continued gridlock at the IWC"); see also Ruffle, supra note 6, at 647 ("(1)
participation in the IWC is not limited only to states involved in commercial whaling; and
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tions like Norway to join 76 have marred the IWC's reputation,
while the threat of withdrawal by countries like Japan77 and actual
withdrawal by Canada78 and Iceland79 have prevented the IWC
(2) the whaling controversy is a direct consequence of the influx into the IWC of conserva-
tion-minded nations during the 1970's.").
76. See Detsky, supra note 25, at 38 ("Norway never joined the IWC because of its de-
sire to continue commercial whaling, and permits a national take of 674 whales annual-
ly."); see also Gail Osherenko, EnvironmentalfJustice and the International Whaling Commission:
Mobly-Dick ReviSited, 8 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 221, 226-27 (2005) ("Norway and Ice-
land both have used the scientific exemption to allow limited hunting of whales by shore-
based fleets, and Norway resumed commercial whaling in recent years under the objection
it filed to the initial moratorium."). The story of Norway's continued whaling is enmeshed
in that country's presidential politics. SeeJ. Baird Callicott, Whaling in Sand County: A Dia-
lectical Hunt for Land Ethical Answers to Questions about the Morality of Nonoegian Minke Male
Catching, 8 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1997) ("In 1986, the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) declared a moratorium on commercial whaling. In the spring
of 1993, Norway's Brundtland Administration-hoping to reverse its declining popularity
in an election year-defied the moratorium and unilaterally allowed Norwegian whalers
to take 160 minke whales. The political ploy was successful; Gro Harlem Brundtland was
reelected. Accordingly, during the summer of 1993, Norwegians killed 153 minjce
whales."). But see id. at 21 ("By obdurately asserting a right on behalf of its citizens to kill
minke whales, the Brundtland Administration may be spending precious moral capital.").
Underlying Brundtland's decision was national pride. See id. at 2 ("Somehow, Norwegian
national pride seems bound up with the right to kill whales."); id. at 17 (noting that "Nor-
wegians justify whaling, especially minke whaling, by just such an argument as made by
Leopold to justify this hunting as a biological and cultural birthright from tradition and
culture. Perhaps it is a matter of appropriate attitude and intention."). Biology may have
also contributed to Norway's pro-whaling stance. See id. at 2-3 ("[M]odem commercial
whalers did not concentrate their efforts on minkes until the mid-1970s - after the pre-
ferred species populations had become so depleted and capture technologies so improved
that minke whales were worth pursuing. Fortunately, the minke whale came through this
decade of global persecution numerically diminished, but not endangered. Therefore,
some believe that further killing can and should be sustained.").
77. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 402 ("[During the] period from 1948 to 1960
states continued to argue mainly over quota allocations, backed by grandstanding threats
of withdrawal from the IWC."). See also Hirata, supra note 60, at 138 ("Minoru Morimoto,
Japan's chief delegate to the IWC, announced during the 2003 IWC meeting that Japan
might withhold IWC membership dues. Japan is the largest contributor to the IWC, ac-
counting for 8.6 percent of the Commission's operational funds."); id. ("Japan might boy-
cott IWC committees, or withdraw from the IWC and form a separate prowhaling commis-
sion, claiming that the IWC has been hijacked by the antiwhaling members."); id. at 149
("If the IWC adopts more resolutions to restrict whaling, Japan may leave the organiza-
tion."); Osherenko, supra note 76, at 238-39 ("Given the current make-up of and U.S.
dominance in the IWC, it is likely that whaling nations will withdraw from membership
and use their own regional agreements to regulate continued use and consumption of
whales while the IWC becomes a club of antiwhaling nations which, without legal jurisdic-
tion over nonmember nations, will exert its influence through increasingly coercive eco-
nomic sanctions.").
78. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 417.
79. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 417 n.80 ("The Government of Iceland withdrew from
the IWC in 1992 after the IWC voted not to lift the moratorium after its first ten years. It
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from taking more aggressive efforts to protect whales.8 o The Con-
vention's exemptions for lethal scientific research on whales and
aboriginal hunting, which whaling countries like Japan and Nor-
way have continued to exploit,8 have weakened whatever moral
suasion the Convention initially had. Japan's use of the Conven-
tion's "opt out" clause and research exemption has made the
moratorium virtually ineffective against it.82 For these and other
reasons, some believe that the IWC's whale preservation agenda is
hanging on only "by a slim thread."83 The next Part of the Article
takes a closer look at these problems.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
REGULATION OF WHALING AND WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION
HAVE PREVENTED THE IWC FROM PROTECTING WHALES
As a regime that failed to achieve its basic objective of ensuring
then entered into an agreement creating the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission
with Norway, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland. Iceland 'rejoined' in 2002 after a special
meeting and vote allowing Iceland to 're-adhere' to the ICRW with a reservation on the
moratorium after 2006.").
80. See id. at 417 ("The reluctance of some anti-whaling states to sanction Japan for
its scientific whaling program is likely due at least in part to the fear that Japan will with-
draw from the IWC and abrogate the treaty, creating its own management body to set quo-
tas for whaling."); see also ErikJaap Molenaar, Comment, Marine Mammals: The Role of Eth-
ics and Ecosystem Considerations, 6 J. INT'L WILDLIFE & POL'Y 31, 43 (2003) ("The
conservation cause is likely to suffer if States withdraw from, or operate outside, interna-
tional regulatory bodies, or establish competing bodies.").
81. See Detsky, supra note 25, at 36-37 (describing the three exceptions to the mora-
torium); id. at 41-42 (noting that "[s]hortly after its readmission to the IWC, Iceland an-
nounced its intent to resume scientific whaling. The Icelandic government, in an official
statement, took the following position: Iceland cannot accept the attempts of some coun-
tries to impose their own cultural attitudes toward whales upon others.").
82. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 651 ("Japan's objection effectively rendered the IWC
powerless to enforce the moratorium against the country pursuant to the opt-out provision
of the ICRW."); see also Rieser, supra note 2, at 417 ("As Japan has grown increasingly frus-
trated by the IWC's failure to adopt the Revised Management Procedure and lift the com-
mercial whaling moratorium, it has expanded the scope of its research whaling program in
both the number and species of whales permitted to be killed.").
83. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 420 ("While preservationism is now ascendant, it
hangs by a slim thread that is challenged yearly at IWC meetings by those seeking to roll
back the ban."); id. at 427 ("At the 2006 IWC meeting,.. . the 'St. Kitts and Nevis Declara-
tion' [was introduced] which demanded a return to a literal interpretation of the ICRW
and its conservationist principles, as well as a rejection of the ban."). St. Kitts and the
Grenedines argued that resumption of whaling was a moral issue and questioned what
about whales made them "so special that they should not be killed." Id. at 431. The resolu-
tion passed by one vote, representing the first time anti-whaling countries had lost in four-
teen years. Id. at 427-28. See also Molenaar, supra note 80, at 42 ("The 55th Annual Meeting
of the IWC once again gave rise to speculations about a competitor of the IWC.").
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a sustainable fishery, the IWC can serve as a cautionary tale for
other governance regimes, providing testament to the need for set-
ting catch limits that are truly precautionary; for not disregarding
scientific advice; for requiring verifiable and timely reporting of all
catch and other data, supported by an effective compliance and in-
fractions program; and for a mechanism for resolving disagree-
ments over treaty interpretation that does not rely on an objection
or opt-out clause.84
There is little question that the International Convention on
the Regulation of Whaling serves an important function by reflect-
ing the "points of international consensus on the regulation of
whaling."85 Indeed, some attribute the Convention's creation to
the dawning of a new era, in which nations recognized an interna-
tional responsibility to protect environmental resources.86 While
the IWC is recognized as the only international organization with
any competence on the subject of whales,87 fundamental flaws in
the Convention and problems with its implementation have made
the regulatory regime largely ineffective.8
A. Structural Problems with the Convention
There are three structural problems with the Convention: an
opt-out provision that enables nations who dissent from an IWC
resolution to ignore it; exemptions for scientific research and abo-
riginal hunting; and inadequate enforcement authority. Each of
these problems is discussed below.
84. Rieser, supra note 2, at 423 n.112.
85. Moffa, supra note 43, at 204-05; see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 172
("[F]rustrations of the IWC aside, it serves to keep a vital human-nature relationship
somewhere on the international agenda.").
86. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 641 ("The ICRW, along with several others like it, sig-
nified the start of an era in which states would become cognizant of the existence of envi-
ronmental commitments beyond their own territories.").
87. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 44 ("[T]he IWC is still perceived as the main, if
not only, global international organization with competence over large whales."); see also
Osherenko, supra note 76, at 224 ("[The ICRW] has become, however, the primary inter-
national agreement for protection of 13 species of 'great whales.'"); Ruffle, supra note 6, at
641 (The IWC has been the "sole international body with the authority to regulate com-
mercial whaling operations around the world.").
88. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 641 ("The ICRW has served as an important instru-
ment calling the world's attention to the historic overexploitation of whales. Yet, its credi-
bility has been marred by a series of failures in protecting the animals from further exploi-
tation.").
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1. The opt-out provision.
One of the Convention's structural flaws is an opt-out provision
allowing individual member nations to ignore the IWC's regula-
tions by filing a "timely objection."89 The opt-out provision makes
it "virtually impossible" for the IWC to regulate the activities of
members who elect to use it," and by filing an objection dissenting
members can delay and often defeat implementation of the dis-
puted regulation if enough countries object.9' Whaling countries,
whose use of the provision increased after the 1986 ban on com-
mercial whaling came into effect,92 have used the provision to
block the imposition of hunting quotas by the IWC and efforts to
impose humane killing practices.98
89. See id. at 642 ("A member nation in opposition to any amendment instituted by
the IWC need only file a timely objection to be considered exempt from that regula-
tion."); see also Haskell, supra note 24, at 557 (noting the lack of "criteria or guidelines lim-
iting a nation's right to opt out of a newly passed schedule amendment"); Nagtzaam, supra
note 4, at 399-400 ("[The IWC rules] also allow dissenting states to opt out of any decision
arrived at within the IWC by filing an objection within ninety days and applying for an ex-
emption under Article V(3), a loophole that would allow rogue whaling states significant
wiggle room on evading IWC directives.").
90. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 642; see also Lessoff, supra note 21, at 421 (citing as an ex-
ample of the ability of the opt out provision to impose its regulations on truculent nations,
the attempt in 1983 to set a five-year moratorium on all commercial whaling beginning two
years later "in an effort to facilitate the regeneration of the depleted whale stocks and to
allow the scientific community adequate time to accurately assess the whale populations")
The objection ofJapan, the Soviet Union, and Norway, and the filing of timely objections
mean that "the IWC was powerless to enforce its moratorium against these nations." Id.
91. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 652 ("[A] ny country that disagrees with a particular
IWC regulation may, by filing an objection, delay its implementation and exempt itself
from the regulation pursuant to the opt-out clause of the ICRW."); see also Haskell, supra
note 24, at 557 n.44, citing James E. Scharff, The International Management of Whales, Dol-
phins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Agreement, 6 Ecology L.Q. 323, 364 (1978) (describ-
ing the collapse of the IWC's effort to protect the Antarctic stock of blue whales afterJa-
pan's objection was followed by other nations).
92. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 642 ("[A~s the focus of the Commission's agenda
shifted from sustainable development of the natural resource represented by whales to
complete conservation of dwindling whale stocks in the late 1970's, pro-whaling nations
began to explore ways to subvert compliance with IWC regulations and capitalize on the
profitability of whale meat and byproducts in their own markets.").
93. See id. at 654 ("[Mlembers have used the objection procedure to avoid otherwise
applicable quotas, to reject the classification of stocks where it would reduce whaling activ-
ities and to ignore IWC imposed standards on humane killing."). The opt-out provision
deprives the IWC from using sanctions as a means of dissuading other countries from em-
ulating bad behavior by signaling that engaging in non-conforming behavior has costs. See
Ellis, supra note 24, at 17 ("Sanctions can be used to deprive actors of the benefits of de-
fection or to signal to actors that certain costs will be associated with particular courses of
action.").
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While the opt-out provision reflects the international legal
principle that sovereign states can only be bound by what they
have explicitly consented to,9 4 in practice, it epitomizes the IWC's
lack of enforcement powers.95 "By giving whaling countries carte
blanche to ignore IWC regulations rather than face potentially un-
pleasant ramifications," 96 the opt-out provision leaves the 1WC with
little authority to impose its regulations on countries who continue
to whale commercially and prevents the IWC from protecting
whales.97
2. Exemptions for scientific research and subsistence hunting.
a. The scientific research exemption.
Article VIII of the Convention allows member states to issue
permits to kill whales in the interest of scientific research.98 Alt-
94. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 654; see also Ellis, supra note 24, at 6 ("In the absence of a
central legislator with the authority to impose rules, states must consent to be bound.");
Molenaar, supra note 80, at 35 ("One of the main cornerstones on which international law
is built is the sovereign equality of States and the concomitant principle that States cannot
be bound against their will. Conversely, decisions taken at the national level are, in princi-
ple, binding on all nationals of that State. On the other hand, individuals are usually not
directly involved in the domestic decision-making process, but only indirectly by voting
during periodic elections. At the international level, States only rarely delegate such deci-
sion-making power to an international body. And if they do, they usually have the possibil-
ity to terminate this delegation, for instance by discontinuing membership in the interna-
tional body. More or less the same applies to particular rules laid down in treaties. For
instance, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES Convention) and the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling expressly allow for the Parties to enter reservations to specific rules.").
However, this freedom of states to bind themselves while increasing the chances the nation
will agree to the norm, simultaneously may lead to norm violations. See Ruffle, supra note
6, at 665 ("[A]llowing states to bind themselves to international agreements that preserve
their national sovereignty tends to increase the likelihood that a state will agree to the
norm, it will also increase the possibility of seriously undermining the norm's enforce-
ment.").
95. See Haskell, supra note 24, at 557 ("The provision recognizes the IWC's lack of
enforcement power and assumes lawful exemption in international politics is preferred to
unlawful and nonpunishable flaunting by dissenting member nations.").
96. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 654.
97. See Haskell, supra note 24, at 557 ("[T]he IWC, as it responds to the whale's
plight with conservation regulations, is increasingly stifled by the lawful invocation of the
"opt-out" provision, leaving the IWC powerless to effect its goals."); see also Molenaar, su-
pra note 80, at 42 ("Measures such as these entitle States to withdraw from, or continue to
engage in the exploitation of marine mammals outside international regulatory bodies.").
98. Gillespie, supra note 16, at 34; see aLso Lessoff, supra note 21, at 422-23 ("The le-
gality of harvesting whales under the guise of 'scientific research' is not affected by the In-
ternational Whaling Convention. Accordingly, one of the largest issues regarding the IWC
is the harvesting of whales for so called research purposes."); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at
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bough the IWC reviews each permit for its scientific soundness, the
ultimate decision to issue a permit is the prerogative of individual
countries.9 As early as 1985, the IWC introduced a resolution lim-
iting scientific research to non-lethal hunting of whales where
feasibletoo and subsequently turned down lethal research permit
applications from Korea, Japan, Norway, and Iceland on scientific
unsoundness grounds.01 Norway eventually withdrew its applica-
tion,102 leavingJapan as the principal whaling nation still engaging
429 ("Under the ICRW, states are allowed to issue their own scientific permits to hunt
whales and the IWC has few powers to prevent such permits for activities it might regard as
scientifically dubious-a loophole whaling states have ruthlessly exploited."); id. ("Japan,
Iceland, Russia, and Norway have continued to award themselves scientific permits in the
face of global condemnation of the twisting of the term 'scientific.'").
99. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 656 ("All permits must be submitted to the IWC's Sci-
entific Committee for review to determine whether the study is methodologically sound,
but the country retains the ultimate responsibility for issuance."); see also Moffa, supra note
43, at 206 ("'[A]ny Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special
permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific re-
search ... exempt from the operation of this Convention.'" (quoting International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 8, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S.
361)).
100. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 430 ("[In 1985, a] new resolution was adopted by
consensus, whereby IWC members agreed to carry out research, wherever feasible,
through non-lethal methods and with the goal of rational management of whale stocks.");
see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 36 (referring to the IWC and arguing that "with the de-
velopment of modern scientific techniques it is not necessary to kill whales to obtain the
information that is needed for initial implementation of the Revised Management Proce-
dure for a particular stock").
101. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 430 ("Following the 1986 decision to review per-
mits, Iceland, the Republic of Korea, and Japan all submitted proposals to be allowed to
catch whales under a scientific permit. All three requests were turned down by the IWC,
citing, in the case of Korea that it would not contribute information that answers signifi-
cant management questions, while arguing that Iceland's request did not meet the 1986
criteria."); id. (noting that Norway and Iceland's special permit applications were "reject-
ed by the IWC"); see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 37 ("The IWC passed several resolu-
tions asking the Norwegian government to reconsider its special permit program."); id. at
38 ("The Icelandic Programme (1986-1989) ... did not specify how the data would be
used for management or conservation. Accordingly, the IWC issued a series of resolutions
recommending 'that the Government of Iceland revoke and refrain from issuing special
permits to its nationals ... until the uncertainties identified [by] the Scientific Committee
... have been resolved.'"); Hirata, supra note 60, at 137-38 ("At the 2003 IWC annual
meeting, Japan's request for a coastal catch of 150 minke whales-triple its previous re-
quest-was rebuffed, together with other requests such as setting up a new hunting
ground for 150 Bryde's whales in the northwestern Pacific."); id. at 138 ("[T]he IWC ap-
proved a nonbinding resolution to ban Japan from conducting its scientific whaling pro-
gram in the Antarctic Ocean . . .. "). Norway, Iceland, and Japan's insistence on continu-
ing to hunt whales under the pretext of scientific research has made them "rogue states in
the eyes of much of the world." Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 422.
102. See Nagtzaam, s-ura note 4, at 431 ("Norway decided not to ask for a scientific
permit leavingJapan isolated as the only state still claiming that whaling is a scientific activ-
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in killing whales under this exemption. 03 In 1995, the IWC passed
a resolution introduced by the United Kingdom on behalf of eight
other non-whaling nations limiting scientific research whaling to
non-lethal methods.04 The IWC passed successive resolutions ex-
pressing regret that Japan was continuing to carry on lethal re-
search and later "deep concern" that scientific research permits
were enabling Japan to kill whales for commercial purposes de-
spite the ban on commercial whaling. 05 However, under the terms
ity."); see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 37 ("Norwegian research has focused on collect-
ing data for use in developing mathematical models of the Barents Sea ecosystem ... to
improve management of fisheries."). But see id. ("Despite such strongly expressed con-
cerns on the part of the IWC, Norway made only minor changes in its programme. Its lack
of response resulted in a continual series of similar resolutions."); Osherenko, supra note
76, at 236 ("Iceland, also an island nation with a high degree of dependency on the fish-
ing industry, announced its intent to resume scientific whaling in 2003.").
103. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 38 ("The failure to satisfy the criteria of the IWC
resolutions on Special Permits and Scientific Research also led to criticism of the research
programs in Korea and the former Soviet Union. Both nations have subsequently sus-
pended these programs."); id. ("[T]he only country actively conducting and expanding
scientific whaling operations isJapan."); see also Lessoff, supra note 21, at 423 ("While both
Japan and Iceland continue to exploit this loophole in the name of 'scientific research,' it
is Japan which is drawing the most international attention."); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at
432 ("Despite being virtually alone within the IWC, Japan continues to take whales for
'scientific purposes' over the objections of other IWC members.").
104. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 431 ("In 1995 the United Kingdom-acting on
behalf of Australia, Brazil, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, South Africa and the
United States-introduced a resolution that research should be conducted primarily by
non-lethal methods, and lethal methods should only be used in 'exceptional' circumstanc-
es, in order to address vitally important scientific questions."). The resolution passed. Id
see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 43 (referring to "the Commission's preference for the
use of non-lethal techniques in scientific research," and relating, "[The IWC's special
permit resolution] stipulates that the killing of cetaceans should be permitted only in ex-
ceptional circumstances where the questions address critically important issues that cannot be an-
swered by the analysis of existing data or use of non-lethal research techniques" (emphasis
in original)); id. at 36 ("In the mid-1990s, the issue of scientific whaling became more con-
tentious asJapan continued to conduct lethal whaling operations within the recently estab-
lished Southern Ocean Whale sanctuary. Accordingly, in 1996 the IWC Commission re-
solved that 'Contracting governments should undertake ... the conduct of a program of
research in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary using non-lethal methods and ... refrain from
issuing special permits for research involving the killing of cetaceans in such sanctuar-
ies.'").
105. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 431; see also Detsky, supra note 25, at 37 ("Japan, as
the largest voice for resumption of the commercial take of whales, consistently has held
the position that it is allowed to take whales for scientific purposes, and then sell the
commercially viable products of the take."); Gillespie, supra note 16, at 40 ("Because the
criteria for justifying lethal research had not been fully met, the IWC passed another reso-
lution inviting the Japanese government to reconsider the proposed take of Minke
whales."); Hirata, supra note 60, at 133 ("The IWC then formally recommended thatJapan
withdraw its scientific research proposal. In response, Japan revised its proposal and an-
nounced that it would start research in the Antarctic in the 1987-1988 season by taking a
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of the Convention, the IWC was powerless to do anything about
Japan's behavior. 06 Japan's continued whaling in the Southern
Ocean under a scientific research permit after 1986107 prompted
Australia in 2010 to institute proceedings against the country in
the International Court ofJustice. 08
Japan is the largest user of the scientific research exemption,
having killed over 3,500 whales under the exemption since the ban
against commercial whaling came into effect in 1986;'0 its take of
reduced number of minke whales."); id. at 134 ("Despite the IWC's criticism of the Japa-
nese action,Japan carried out and even expanded theJARPA program.").
106. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 416-17 ("[T]he United States and other IWC mem-
ber states have consistently opposed the scientific whaling programs but have had little
recourse under the terms of the ICRW.").
107. Moffa, supra note 43, at 205; see also Detsky, supra note 25, at 36-37 ("Japan has
taken thousands of whales, under the scientific research exception, from the Southern
Ocean Whale Sanctuary."); Gillespie, supra note 16, at 41 ("The Japanese vociferously op-
posed the designation of the Southern Ocean as a sanctuary since it is the primary site for
their whaling operations."); id. ("(Japan] has voted with its feet by continuing to conduct
scientific whaling operations in the region, even in the face of numerous resolutions by
the IWC parties calling upon it to respect the sanctuary."); Hirata, supra note 60, at 133
("This sanctuary targeted Japan, which had been trying to resume commercial whaling in
the southern ocean area."); Nagtzaarn, supra note 4, at 442 ("Japan ... lodged an objec-
tion [to the Australian sanctuary] and thus can still legally hunt minke whales in the re-
gion as well as continue to try to eliminate the sanctuary exception.").
108. See Moffa, supra note 43, at 207 ("The Australian government-joined by twen-
ty-nine other nations and the European Commission-filed in 2010 an Application Insti-
tuting Proceedings in the International Court ofJustice (ICJ)."); see aLso Anton, supra note
29, at 332 ("The dispute has harsh overtones of nationalism and a desire to 'win' against
Japan in some sort of international 'competition.' The same media posture seems to pre-
vail inJapan, too.").
109. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 34 ("Since 1986, when the moratorium on com-
mercial whaling came into force,Japanese whalers have killed over 3,500 whales under the
auspices of the ICRW's scientific research provision. As of 1997, 1222 whales had been tak-
en from the New Zealand sector (Area V) and a further 1546 from the Australian sector
(Area IV) in the Antarctic."); see also Burns, supra note 25, at 271-72 ("Since 1987, Japan
has invoked Article VIII to kill approximately 6000 minke, Bryde's, sperm whales, and sei
whales in the Southern Ocean (including minke whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary)
and North Pacific."); Hirata, supra note 60, at 134 ("In 2002, JARPN II was expanded fur-
ther to include additional catches and species (ie., 50 each of minke whales from coastal
waters and sei whales from offshore). As a result, Japan's scientific whaling programs cap-
tured and killed 600 whales that year: 440 Antarctic minke whales through JAPRA, plus
100 North Pacific minke whales, 50 Bryde's whales, 10 sperm whales, 50 sei whales, and 50
minke whales along the Pacific seaboard (through JARPN II). This was double the catch in
the initial scientific whaling program (300 Antarctic minke whales in 1988) and the largest
kill since the program began."). Norway, Iceland, and Korea have renewed their scientific
research permits perhaps because ofJapan's success at using the exemption to get around
the ban. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 34 ("Norway has invoked research needs to kill 288
minke whales in the Northeast Atlantic; Iceland 292 fin whales and 70 sei whales in the
North Atlantic; and Korea 69 minke whales in the Sea ofJapan."); Burns, supra note 25, at
272 ("Iceland, which very recently re-adhered to the ICRW, proposed a scientific research
[Vol. 32:3
2013] CHANGING NORMS TO PROTECT WHALES 27
whales under this provision has grown exponentially since then.
Japan defends its action, saying the United States' threats of eco-
nomic sanctions pressured it into supporting the moratorium,
which it only did on the assurance the ban would end once whale
stocks reached a high enough level for commercial whaling to re-
start."10 It has repeatedly petitioned the IWC to lift the ban and es-
tablish catch quotas for various species of minke whales-a princi-
pal target of its scientific research."'
Proponents of scientific whaling maintain that lethal research
is necessary to determine the impact of whales on fish popula-
tions.112 However, most .cetacean scientists believe non-lethal
program that would authorize the killing of 100 minke, 100 fin, and 50 sei whales each
year for two years."). South Korea in July 2012 submitted an application for a lethal scien-
tific research permit. Ron Popeski, Commission Ups Whaling Quota for Aboriginals,
GREENWIRE ,(July 5, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2012/07/05/10.
110. See Hirata, supra note 60, at 132 ("The United States, the architect of the mora-
torium, pressured Japan and other whaling states to accept the moratorium by threatening
them with economic sanctions."); see also Osherenko, supra note 76, at 227 ("Few Western-
ers understand the depth of distrust of the United States and the level of resistance on the
part of the Japanese and other pro-whaling nations to acquiesce to U.S. demands today.").
When it joined the IWC in 1951,Japan contends the organization was dedicated to restor-
ing whale populations to enable the restart of commercial whaling. See Hirata, supra, at 131
("When Japan joined the IWC in 1951, the country's whaling policy was consistent with
those of the majority of IWC members. Most member nations were whaling states con-
cerned about the serious depletion of certain whale stocks. These prowhaling members
were interested in preserving whale resources for commercialization of whale products,
but did not support a permanent ban on whaling."). Japan did not anticipate the shift to
preserving whales for their own sake. See id. at 131 ("[T]he focus of the organization has
shifted from the sustainable use of whales (i.e., the orderly development of the whaling
industry) to the conservation of whales (i.e., stopping the killing of whales that may other-
wise extinct), and further to the protection of the welfare of wehales (i.e., ending the suffering
of whales' 'irrespective of their conservation status and irrespective of the benefit of such
actions to humans.'") (emphasis in original)).
111. Hirata, supra note 60, at 136. For a list of reasons Japan has for continuing to
use research permits to kill whales, see id. at 145 (listing as reasons: "whaling is a tradition-
al Japanese activity, [therefore] Japan has the cultural right to conduct whaling opera-
tions"; there is no "scientific basis" for the moratorium; "some species of whales are
abundant and are actually destroying the marine ecosystem by depleting fish stocks, and
thus [] it is necessary to reduce their numbers"; "Japan has the legal right to conduct
whaling for purposes of scientific research and- to process and use whales after research,
without regulation by the IWC"; "the 1982 moratorium was a temporary measure that was
supposed to last only until 1990, when the IWC was scheduled to consider scientific re-
search in determining whether commercial whaling could be resumed in a sustainable
way"). Hirata thinks it unlikely that the support ofJapan's bureaucracies for this practice
will change. See id. at 146 ("[T]he end of whaling could mean a decline in these agencies'
political power. Given intense interministerial rivalries in Japan, it is not likely that these
bureaucratic actors would voluntarily concede one of their areas ofjurisdiction.").
112. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 652 (commenting that "Japanese officials argue that
research is necessary to determine the impact of whales on fish populations in Japanese
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methods are equally effective for learning information about
whales."13 In fact, little has been produced in the way of scientific
support for Japan's research program."4 Even Japan has admitted
that its program has been less successful than it had hoped in find-
ing answers to questions about whale stocks." 5 However, Japan also
justifies its use of the exemption as the only way to keep artisanal
whaling practices found in its coastal villages alive,116 a rationale to
which it does not appear there is a ready answer.
waters and . . . will reveal valuable information concerning the viability of world food sup-
plies"); see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 39 ("Proponents of the research programme
contend that it will contribute to the development of 'highly sophisticated management'
regimes."). But see id. at 34 ("[T]he first question is whether scientific research involving
the use of animals is necessary. If the answer is yes, then the second question must be
whether this process can be refined, the number of animals reduced, or the overall pro-
cess replaced."); Lessoff, supra note 21, at 423 ("Critics have pointed out that a single
whale, by its sheer size, would "overwhelm any modern scientific research laboratory,
providing enough material to keep a team of scientists busy for months.").
113. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 401 ("The objective scientific need for the (ex-
tent of the) Japanese scientific whaling programme and the proposed Icelandic scientific
whaling programme appears questionable. Similarly suspect is Japan's alleged strategy of
'vote-buying' by which predominantly Caribbean States may be receiving financial aid in
exchange for aligning their votes with Japan at IWC meetings."); see also Gillespie, supra
note 16, at 40 ("While many scientists acknowledge that information on stock identity was
important, most believe it could be obtained through non-lethal research."); id. at 44
("The assessment of stock abundance in biological populations can also be assisted by
non-lethal methods in the form of photo-identification, transect surveys, and vocaliza-
tion.").
114. See Moffa, supra note 43, at 206 ("Japan has produced very few, if any, peer-
reviewed studies explaining the program's scientific findings."); see also Ruffle, supra note
6, at 656 ("As early as 1987, Japan announced that it would take large male sperm whales
from the Atlantic under the scientific research exception in order to determine the
whales' primary prey. The activity generated a great deal of controversy since the scientific
community had known for over a century that the primary prey of the sperm whale is the
squid.").
115. Gillespie, supra note 16, at 48 ("The JARPA review, to some degree, acknowl-
edges these points, recognizing that although 'much progress has been made ... there was
still uncertainty whether information that fully represents a biological stock could be ob-
tained.... [A]t the halfway point in the JARPA program there are few definitive an-
swers. ... Such a result is all the more disappointing when one realizes that nearly 3,000
whales have already been taken under the pretext of answering such questions.").
116. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 236 ("Scientific whaling persists for the dual
purpose of keeping whaling practices alive as well as protecting important fishing indus-
tries in Japan and Iceland. Current research by Japan aims to understand multispecies in-
teraction of cetaceans and fish and to ensure that growing whale populations do not de-
plete important fish stocks."); id. at 227 ("Loss of access to minke whales 'that for decades
had provided greater than three-quarters of the quantity and value of their annual catch'
constituted not only a substantial economic hardship but also a loss of subsistence and
identity, because 'minke whales also featured prominently in residents' social, ceremonial,
symbolic, and religious life.'"); see also Callicott, supra note 76, at 3 ("[M]inke whales are
locally available and killing them is a historic local tradition.").
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Japan's opposition to the moratorium on commercial whaling
continues unabated" 7 as does its practice of taking whales for sci-
entific purposes." 8 Some see Japan's insistence on continuing to
hunt whales under a scientific research permit as little more than a
thinly veiled attempt to continue commercial whaling despite the
1986 ban." 9 Others see the country's intransigence in the face of
global condemnation as part of a diplomatic effort to "roll back"
the ban and prevent its expansion to other whales-playing a
long-term "diplomatic game to achieve their objectives." 2 0 Alt-
hough it is unlikely that the continuation of scientific whaling will
have an impact on whale stocks,' 2' it remains ethically problemat-
ic, 122 and the scientific research exemption remains the most con-
117. See, e.g., Detsky, supra note 25, at 37 ("In March 2002, Japan announced that at
the annual meeting of the IWC, which it would host, their government would push for re-
suming commercial whaling and ending the moratorium."); Rieser, supra note 2, at 418
("The government ofJapan views the whaling moratorium as a bad precedent that, if emu-
lated by other regional fisheries organizations or governance bodies, would threaten Ja-
pan's access to marine resources around the world."); id. ("To hold the line on what it
views as overly restrictive ocean governance norms that compete for legitimacy with the
sustainable use principle, the government ofJapan is committed to restoring its commer-
cial whaling industry.").
118. See Detsky, supra note 25, at 37 ("In March 2002,... [tihe Japanese government
announced plans to increase its take of scientific research whales substantially, and also
resumed importing whale meat from Norway."). Alison Rieser sees a direct connection
between the continuation of the moratorium and the size of the scientific research whale
harvest. Rieser, supra note 2, at 423 ("The longer the moratorium stays in place, the bigger
and more audacious the scientific whaling program becomes, despite the weaknesses in its
ecosystem-based rationale.").
119. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 640 ("Currently,Japan is the most vocal proponent in
favor of commercial whaling and the world's single largest consumer of whale meat. Con-
servationist groups and anti-whaling nations are convinced thatJapanese research whaling
is a thinly disguised covert operation intended to boost supplies of whale meat in a mar-
ketplace where it fetches more than ten times the price of pork or beef."); see also Hirata,
supra note- 60, at 135 ("Critics argue that Japan's scientific whaling programs represent
commercial whaling in disguise, as the whales captured in the program are killed and their
meat is sold in the open market."). Japan has gone so far as to create a government-
connected Institute for Cetacean Research to oversee this practice, which actually markets
whale meat and other byproducts to national suppliers. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 651-52. But
selling meat from whales killed pursuant to a scientific research permit is consistent with
the Convention. See Moffa, supra note 43, at 206 ("Article VIII further allows the whales
taken under this exception to be processed and sold on the commercial market pursuant
to the instructions of the country granting the research permit.").
120. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 422 ("Japan has emerged as the leader of a veto
coalition determined to roll back the moratorium, to prevent the ban from widening, and
to replace it with conservationist whaling practices.").
121. See Burns, supra note 25, at 273 ("[C]urrent levels of scientific whaling are high-
ly unlikely to threaten the viability of Southern Ocean minke stocks.").
122. See id. ("[Wihile those of us who count ourselves in the preservationist camp
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troversial of the. programs the IWC administers.123 The IWC's ina-
bility to end the program, despite strong opposition to it,124 is em-
blematic of its inability to protect whales.
b. Subsistence hunting.
There is also an exemption in the Convention for aboriginal
whale hunting.25 However, aboriginal hunting creates a moral
conundruml 26-what Gail Osherenko calls a "cognitive disso-
may bemoan the ethics of scientific research whaling on animal welfare grounds, it is
probably untenable to argue that these operations threaten the viability of whale stocks at
this point and thus undermine the IWC's conservation objectives."); see abvo Gillespie, supra
note 16, at 40 ("[T]o this point the debate in the IWC surrounding scientific whaling op-
erations has focused on the necessity for scientific research and alternatives to such re-
search. By contrast, ethical considerations in this context, focused on reduction and re-
finement... have been largely ignored.").
123. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 655 (" [Plerhaps the most controversial of the ICRW
provisions is the scientific research exception."); see also Moffa, supra note 43, at 206 ("A
majority of the IWC nations have made clear through repeated resolutions that the per-
mits granted by Japan in the JARPA I and II programs were beyond the scope of the Arti-
cle VIII scientific research exception, or, at least, constituted a bad faith use of the excep-
tion.").
124. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 42 ("If one construes the question of necessity as
being in the province of the parties, then given the fact that they [IWC members] have
consistently voted against Japan's research program, and have expressly called upon it to
not conduct such operations within the sanctuaries, scientific whaling is not necessary to
effectuate the objectives of the ICRW."); see also Burns, supra note 25, at 272 ("[T]he IWC
has continually passed resolutions over the past 15 years calling for the cessation of re-
search whaling operations, on the grounds that such research is not essential for rational
management of stocks, does not address critical research needs, and that nonlethal tech-
niques can provide commensurate data."). Ruffle comments that at the 2000 annual meet-
ing of the IWCJapan submitted "an extensive proposal" for the annual sampling of 100
minke whales, 50 Bryde's whales, and 10 sperm whales, which "raised a considerable disa-
greement within the IWC" and led to the ultimate adoption of a "resolution strongly urg-
ing Japan to reconsider issuing the permit." Ruffle, supra note 6, at 657. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Ruffle, in October 2000, five whaling ships returned to port with forty-three
Bryde's whales, five sperm whales, and forty minke whales. Id. at 657.
125. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. 3, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079,
155 L.N.T.S. 349; see also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 436 ("It is clear that the IWC always
meant aboriginal whaling to be a legitimate exemption to the overall commercial ban,
provided that such activities did not threaten the survival of whale species."). To the dis-
may of whale preservationists, the IWC recently extended the aboriginal whaling quotas
for the United States, Russia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, allowing the take of ba-
leen whales through 2018 and the killing of 336 bowhead whales in the Bering, Chukchi,
and Beaufort seas, 744 gray whales from the North Pacific, and 24 humpback whales by the
two Caribbean countries. The ENGOs objected to the combination of quotas for three
species instead of considering each country's quota individually. Id.
126. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 166 ("So we have the added ethical dilemma, assum-
ing it is a trustworthy representation, of whether a biological extinction is worth risking if
and when a cultural extinction becomes a possibility.").
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nance" between awe and respect for whales and a desire to pro-
mote and protect cultural diversity. 27 On the one hand, there is
the moral obligation to protect the traditional practices of aborigi-
nal peoples;128 on the other, the moral imperative to protect spe-
cies like the endangered bowhead whale from extinction.12 Litiga-
tion by the Makah Tribe forced the United States, normally a
staunch opponent of whaling, to retract its objections to aboriginal
hunting. 30 The WC withdrew a subsequent request by the United
127. Osherenko, supra note 76, at 222.
128. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 58 ("The exploitative commercial
whaling practices of the developed nations victimized the Inuit people. Having endan-
gered the species, the commercial nations are attempting through the IWC to curtail the
Inuit's historic right to subsistence whaling."); id. at 59 ("[Ilt is not the lives of the Inuit
that are at stake but, rather, their traditional life style." (emphasis omitted)); see also Stoett,
supra note 2, at 167 ("The aboriginal question raises broader issues, as yet largely unex-
plored, about the meaning of contemporary sovereignty, in terms of both community-level
governance and the relationship between communities and the states in which they find
themselves, through processes of colonization and intracolonization.").
129. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 57 ("The problem is poignant because
the whales they hunt are the bowhead, an endangered species."); id. at 59. ("Unfortunate
though it may be that commercial whaling placed the Inuit's source of food in danger of
extinction, the fact remains that no further killing of bowheads-whether by commercial
fishing vessels or by the less technological methods of the indigenous peoples-can be
justified."); see also Molenaar, supra note 80, at 48 ("Likewise, aboriginal whaling was also
not responsible for the near-extinction of many species of marine mammals, but for some
species it may lead to that now."); Stoett, supra note 2, at 166 ("When whales are threat-
ened with extinction, one might plausibly argue even indigenous communities must re-
frain from hunting them.").
130. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 434 ("[T]he United States, which has opposed
commercial whaling, has sought to sanction such whaling since it has a large indigenous
population which has hunted whales for centuries."); id. at 438 ("The United States has
still authorized the Makah to take whales domestically. Doing so undercut their moral le-
gitimacy, however, and allowed states such as Japan, Iceland, and Norway to argue for in-
creased whaling through the device of aboriginal whaling."); see also D'Amato & Chopra,
supra note 47, at 56 ("The United States, which has taken the lead in criticizing Japan's
policy, has been gravely inconsistent. By stressing a ban on commercial whaling, the Unit-
ed States has managed to exempt Alaskan aboriginal subsistence whaling."); Lessoff, supra
note 21, at 423-24 ("The United States did not file an objection to the IWC [subsistence]
quota, although it had a right to do so. It realized such an objection would result in the
taking of a small number of bowheads, and even the smallest of takings would weaken the
IWC's and the United States' role in the IWC's efforts to save the whales. Thus, the United
States realized that even a small taking of these whales would diminish the effectiveness of
the IWC's goal of whale conservation and have a devastating impact on the Commission as
a whole."). Peter Stoett distinguishes the United States' handling of aboriginal hunting
from Canada's, finding favor with the latter. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 167 ("Canada's
withdrawal from the IWC, in retrospect, was a sensible, situational abrogation: It avoided
confrontations between the Inuit community and a shifting global normative environ-
ment.")
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States on behalf of the Makah to catch five gray whales' 3' because
of considerable opposition to it.132 Nagtzaam conjectures that the
opposition was "payback" by whaling countries who argued that
subsistence whaling was the equivalent of whaling by small Japa-
nese coastal towns and should only be allowed if these towns could
also whale. 3 Aboriginal whale hunting has also muted the usually
vociferous anti-whaling ENGOs because of their unwillingness to
offend groups whom they have supported under other circum-
stances. 34 The exception for subsistence hunting shows no sign of
131. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 437 ("At the forty-eighth IWC annual meeting the
United States put forward a request from the Makah tribe to be allowed to catch five gray
whales. The United States stipulated that it had an agreement with the Makah tribe that
there would be no commercial whaling and that the request conformed to the criteria for
an aboriginal subsistence quota.").
132. See id. ("France and the Netherlands opposed the motion, with France asking
how it could be a cultural event if modem technologies were to be used and whether the
Makah arrangement met the definition of subsistence if the tribe had managed for seventy
years without hunting whales. The Netherlands was concerned whether this request met
the current definition of aboriginal subsistence whaling and questioned the Makah tradi-
tion, citing that their whaling had been of a commercial nature. Further discussion ex-
posed that there was clear division on this issue with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the
Russian Federation supporting the proposal, but many other members (Australia, Spain,
Chile, New Zealand, China and Mexico) opposing the motion. Before it could be put to a
vote the item was adjourned in favor of informal discussions.").
133. See id. at 438 ("The vote appears to have been an example of payback by whal-
ing states with Japan leading a coalition of states arguing that aboriginal whaling was the
'moral' equivalent ofJapanese small-type coastal whaling, and if that was not allowed then
aboriginal whaling should also be banned."); see also Hirata, supra note 60, at 136 ("Tokyo
has demanded at the IWC that, under the rules of the 1982 moratorium, Japan's four
coastal communities be given rights similar to the 'aboriginal subsistence whaling' rights
that indigenous communities in the Arctic are accorded."); id. ("Japan sees hypocrisy in
the fact that while, on the one hand, the hunting of small-type minke whales in Japanese
waters (under the STCW scheme) is prohibited, on the other hand, Alaskan Eskimos are
authorized by the IWC to harvest endangered bowhead whales."); Osherenko, supra note
76, at 226-27 ("The moratorium imposes an unjust and discriminatory burden on local
whaling communities in Japan, Norway, and Iceland and has made whalers and whaling
communities pariahs in the eyes of many. The burden has been particularly severe for
small-scale Japanese whalers."); id. at 228 ("[S]ubstantial elements of commercial activity
exist in aboriginal whaling, while artisanal whaling holds cultural, religious, and social im-
portance for Japanese coastal communities that is equivalent to aboriginal communi-
ties."); Stoett, supra note 2, at 162 ("When the subsistence question is raised, easy ethical
divides fall prey to more complicated human rights issues, and the IWC walks a dangerous
ground here, open to accusations of exceptionalism. Are the cultural needs of coastal
whalers ignored in the process of sanctifying the aboriginal hunt?").
134. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 435 ("ENGOs have also been strangely quiet on
this issue, not wishing to offend aboriginal organizations whose rights they have tradition-
ally supported in other forums. Their silence on the issue, however, undercuts their moral
persuasiveness in the eyes of their opponents and to some extent, to the rest of the world.
The vexed issue of aboriginal subsistence whaling is one that preservationist groups must
come to terms with by declaring which set of rights is more important, aboriginal group
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disappearing soon.135
Those who wish the killing of whales to stop deplore the ex-
emption for aboriginal whaling 36 and do not sympathize with
claims for continuation of traditional rights.'37 They contend that
while aboriginal peoples might once have had a legitimate, albeit
"weak" claim to hunt bowhead whales, the exploitive practices of
commercial whalers resulting in their near extinction138 have de-
prived aboriginal peoples of those rights.139 According to
Nagtzaam, whaling countries use this exemption to further their
own whaling goals,140 flying under it like a flag of convenience,
their cultural atavism merely a front for other nationalistic goals
rights or the intrinsic right of whales to exist."); id. at 438-439 ("Their [ENGOs] silence
[on the issue of aboriginal whale hunting] nns the danger of undercutting their authority
as norm teachers, leaving them open to accusations of hypocrisy by pro whaling forces.
Rather than being drawn into a moral and public battle they may not be able to win, most
ENGOs have avoided the issue.").
135. Nagtzaam., supra note 4, at 444-45 ("The vexed anomaly of aboriginal whaling
continues, and given the ENGOs' reluctance to tackle the issue, there is no sign of the
practice being limited or annulled."). The same appears to be true forJapan's use of the
research exemption. See id. at 445 ("WhileJapan is the only state still continuing 'scientific
research on whales, such Japanese research seems set to continue for the foreseeable fu-
ture."); see also Harrop, supra note 48, at 84 ("International law has found ways to com-
promise by provision of narrow and specific exemptions for indigenous groups, but in
other respects this approach remains controversial and the clash still persists.").
136. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 59 (agreeing that "overlooked voices
deserve the greatest consideration," but arguing that the "Inuit's claims (themselves] are
at the expense of an overlooked voice-the anguished cry-of the sentient inhabitants of
the deep").
137. See id. (referring to the great whales' interest "in the survival of their species
or-even short of survival-[in] their "right to live. The whales find their own sustenance
in the oceans; by what right do the Inuit expropriate the bodies of the whales to serve as
their food?"); id. at 57 ("For the cultural use of the baleen in folk theater may well help to
perpetuate and solidify a pervasive attitude among the population that the whale is meant
to be killed for the artistic and gustatory benefit of humans. This attitude itself can thus
contribute to the perpetuation of, or increase in, the hunting and killing of whales." (em-
phasis in original)).
138. Id. at 60 ("[A] weak claim could be advanced that whaling by the Inuit might
have been tolerated for some additional years were it not for the invasion of arctic waters
by the commercial whalers.").
139. See id. ("Article 1(2) can therefore be read as saying that the exploitative prac-
tices of the commercial whalers (coupled with the inevitable present need to protect the
great whales from extinction) deprived the Inuit of their means of subsistence.").
140. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 434 (discussing "the attempt by pro-whaling states
(particularly those with indigenous populations to continue to push for the expansion of
the ambit of such activities.")); id. ("Japan and Norway have attempted to use this issue as
a wedge to reopen the broader issue of commercial whaling, arguing that some of their
tradition cultural activities should fall under this category.").
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having nothing to do with either whales or traditional cultures.141
Yet others, like Osherenko, see the exemption as raising classic en-
vironmental justice issues142 because it disadvantages the environ-
mental concerns of minority groups in favor of those in the majori-
ty,143 and opposition to it a form of cultural imperialism.'"
Osherenko contends that anti-whaling nations are trying to impose
Western "culinary preferences" on less powerful groups, 45 in what
she calls a form of "food hegemony."146 To Russel Barsh, the dis-
141. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 654-55 ("Japan has often adopted an expansive for-
eign policy to obtain much-needed natural resources in spite of international efforts to
protect these limited resources. The right to extract natural resources from the global
commons is critical toJapan's survival as a nation. As a result,Japan refuses to concede on
the whaling issue for fear it might adversely affect the country's tradition of exploration
and exploitation of the seas.").
142. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 235 ("The costs and negative consequences of
the moratorium fall unjustly on those who are marginalized."); see also Stoett, supra note 2,
at 161 ("The environmentalists who eschew the utilitarian perspective of nature often fall
short of grasping the difficulty and cultural resonance of the subsistence lifestyle.").
143. See generally Robert D. Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental
Decisionmaking, ENVIRONMENT, May 1994, at 11 (cited in Osherenko, supra note 76, at 221
n.4 ("The environmental justice movement calls attention to the inequities in the applica-
tion and enforcement of environmental laws that place a heavy burden on the poor and
people of color while benefiting the educated and wealthy disproportionately.")).
144. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 222 (discussing "the cultural imperialism pre-
sent in the whaling controversy"); see also D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at59 ("[T]he
attempt [by environmentalists] to include whales in the 'common heritage of mankind'
under international law is 'a kind of intellectual imperialism.'"); Stoett, supra note 2, at
173 ("Indeed, whales, and their borderless, submerged worlds, would make excellent can-
didates for the ushers/midwives of such a paradigm shift [toward ecocentrism]. Yet this is
at best premature, and at worst places excessive pressure on the symbolic aspect of whales
while ignoring the problems inherent in global governance efforts. The universal applica-
tion of ethical positions, when it derives from coerced imposition, is little short of cultural
imperialism. Even the adoption of the still contestable and unclear precautionary princi-
ple must not be done as a steadfast rule, but left as an 'open-ended process, involving eval-
uative judgments.' Again, situational ethics apply, and this makes the abolishment of whal-
ing a difficult policy when endangerment is not a clear possibility.").
145. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 224 ("The antiwhaling advocates have captured
the central decision-making apparatus of the IWC and used it to impose Western cultural
(including culinary) preferences on less powerful communities."); id. at 225 ("Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, and Europe abhor the taking of whale meat for consump-
tion."). But see Harrop, supra note 48, at 85 ("[With regard] to the protectionists who want
the eaters of whale meat to change their ways and bow to the new taboos; and ... the swell
of humane-society attitudes that want us all to walk around clad in nylon and polyester, do
no harm to nature, and cause no death to any animal.... [I]t is my contention that these
movements are indicative of a growing alienation from the realities of nature and that they
are for a number of reasons unsustainable in the long run." (quoting FINN LYNGE &
MARIANNE STENBAEK, ARCTIC WARS, ANIMAL RIGHTS, ENDANGERED PEOPLES, xi (1992)).
146. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 225 ("[T]he refusal of the IWC to allow arti-
sanal whaling and tighter IWC restrictions on indigenous whaling to global trends in food
hegemony."); id. (quoting the anthropologist Russel Barsh and calling opposition to sub-
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course over killing and eating whales, while "couched in moral
and legal terms," is really about relative power where "the rich na-
tions eat from the tables of poor nations, all the while depriving
poor nations of their own locally controlled sources of nutritional-
ly and ecologically appropriate food." 47 However, the facts that
some aboriginal groups like the Inuit kill endangered whales and
countries like Greenland are serving meat in restaurants from en-
dangered Bowhead whales caught by their aboriginal peoples'4 at
least open to question the moral legitimacy of the exemption for
subsistence whaling.
3. Lack of enforcement powers.
Under the Convention, the IWC has little enforcement power
over member nations149 because it is allowed only to make "rec-
ommendations" to the offending state. 50 It has no authority over
sistence hunting "a continuation of a strategy of cultural hegemony that powerful states
have pursued since the Roman Empire"); id. at 236 ("What does environmental justice.
mean in the context of the IWC debates? Does it mean that the nations that once brought
whales near to extinction in order to light their lamps should now deny all peoples the
right to hunt whales sustainably? As discussed above, environmental justice is called into
question when the food preferences of those who eat pork, chicken, and beef from factory
farms operating in the most marginally humane way prevail over those who eat whale.");
see also Hirata, supra note 60, at 143 (referring to "[c]ultural relativism" and quoting to the
effect that "the acceptance of other cultures' dietary practices and the promotion of cul-
tural diversity is as important as saving endangered species and the promotion of biologi-
cal diversity" (quoting JAPANESE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHERIES,
SHARE OUR PHILOSOPHY WITH YOU: JAPAN WILL HosT THE 54r" INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION ANNUAL MEETING IN 2002 (2002),
http://wwwjfa.maff.go.jp/whale/assertion\itm>)).
147. Osherenko, supra note 76, at 225.
148. See Greenland Restaurants Serve Whale Meal to Tourists, GREENWIRE, (June 26,
2012), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2012/06/26/13. Stoett questions the
moral legitimacy of the IWC's distinguishing between commercial and subsistence whal-
ing. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 165 ("The accepted ethical position for American policy-
makers is that whaling for commerce is bad, but whaling for subsistence and cultural pur-
poses is justified. This leads to many necessary questions. Does the IWC have the necessary
legitimacy to determine the distinction between commercial and subsistence whaling?").
149. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 165 ("Although one might argue the IWC . . . set im-
portant norms and standards, it has little regulatory muscle itself."); see also Ruffle, supra
note 6, at 641-42 ("[The IWC's] role can only be described as symbolic, given the apparent
inability of the IWC independently to enforce its regulations or to sanction member na-
tions engaging in activities that undermine the Commission's goals.").
150. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 659 ("The only leverage the Commission retains is
the power to 'make recommendations to any or all contracting Governments on any mat-
ter that relates to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Conven-
tion.'"); see also Moffa, supra note 43, at 207 ("Formal international law enforcement
mechanisms, such as resolutions, have been ineffectual in endingJapan's illegal whaling in
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non-member states,15 1 and member nations can only enforce IWC
regulations within their territorial jurisdiction. 5 2
The IWC has no independent authority to impose penalties on
those who violate its regulations'53 or to monitor whaling activi-
ties," with the result that many violations of IWC regulations are
undetected or underreported.s55 This contributes to the indeter-
minacy of whale stock estimates that form the basis for hunting
quotas.156 Even a controversial requirement that whaling ships
must carry at least two inspectors on boardi57 has not improved the
accuracy of reporting because inspectors are appointed by their
the Southern Ocean. Lacking the necessary invocation and application functions of inter-
national lawmaking, the ICRW and domestic law prescriptions have had no lasting effect
on community behavior. Japan has been authorizing whaling through the JARPA pro-
grams continuously since 1986."); id. at 209 ("A simple call to action will generally lead to
under-enforcement where international law violations have environmental casualties-
such as the whales of the Southern Ocean-rather than human victims.").
151. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 400 ("The Commission was powerless to regulate
the activities of non-member countries since the Convention was not applicable to non-
members."). Making enforcement more difficult is that whales are generally in the high
seas, areas too vast to effectively patrol and enforce. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 6 ("Freedom
of the high seas is one of the most venerable principles of international law, and the
strength of this principle is reinforced by the vastness and inhospitability of ocean spaces
and the practical difficulties of exercising authority on the high seas.").
152. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 400 ("Enforcement of IWC regulations was left to
individual member-states"); Ruffle, supra note 6, at 653 ("All authority to punish infrac-
tions is vested within the country having jurisdiction over the violations."). This is in line
with general international law principles. See id. at 665 ("[Customary international law
stipulated that a sovereign state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce laws only within
its territorial boundaries."). Lessoff suggests that the United States, New Zealand, and Aus-
tralia impose heavier sanctions on countries that violate IWC regulations "in hopes of cur-
tailing the illegal takings of whales." Lessoff, supra note 21, at 444.
153. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 423-24 ("The IWC's inability to impose penalties
against nations has not curtailed harvesting of whales in excess of IWC quotas and, as a
result, whale stocks continue to plummet throughout the world.").
154. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 642.
155. See id. at 658 ("Many violations are unnoticed or under-reported and essentially
unpunished on an international level."); id. ("[Because] the IWC lacks any authority to
punish pro-whaling nations for violating the reporting regulations, these nations, acting in
their own interests, are prone to under-report these statistics to the Commission.").
156. Lessoff, supra note 21, at 441 ("Accurate assessments would provide the neces-
sary support for the imposition of quotas.").
157. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 668 ("Under the current scheme, whaling nations are
required to maintain at least two inspectors on each ship 'for the purpose of maintaining
twenty-four hour inspection' and adequate inspection at each land station."). This provi-
sion is controversial. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 165 ("[One question is] whether the whal-
ing nations should have to pay the costs of such an intrusive observer scheme or whether
the entire IWC membership should be forced to contribute.").
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own governments and have a tendency to overlook violations.'5 8
IWC attempts to establish a register of whaling ships to eliminate
the practice of vessels "flying flags of convenience" and for whale
meat stockpiles'59 as well as DNA testing of whale products have
been resisted.160 The United States, which had had the capacity
under the Pelly Amendments 6' to impose trade sanctions on
countries that continued to violate IWC quotas, lost that authority
in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society.162 The
United States had used the Pelly Amendments to persuade both
Norway andJapan to lift their objections to the moratorium 63 and
generally to convince "reluctant states to adhere to the moratori-
um or risk losing lucrative export markets."'* However, the deci-
sion in Japan Whaling Association effectively stopped the United
158. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 668 (" [These measures have] proven ineffective since
a strong tendency exists for inspectors appointed and financed by their own governments
to overlook infractions.").
159. Burns, supra note 25, at 271.
160. See id. at 261 ("While the parties adopted the RMP in 1994, adoption of the
RMS has been thwarted by continued conflicts between the parties over elements of the
inspection and observation scheme, including funding and the level of coverage."). A Re-
vised Management Procedure (RMP) is "a management framework intended to ensure
the sustainability of commercial whaling should the moratorium ultimately be lifted," and
is "one of the cornerstones" of the IWC's 1982 Comprehensive Assessment which included
new methodologies to "assess the status and trends of whale populations" among other
things. Id. at 260.
161. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (2012) (Amendments to the 1967 Fishermen's Protective Act,
22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1980).
162. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986)
(holding that the Secretary of Commerce had sufficient discretion under the Packwood
Amendment and the Pelly Amendment to decide not to certify a country for violation of
the Amendment and instead opt for entering into an executive agreement which furthers
the laws goals).
163. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 46 (noting that "[t]he United States at
this time notified both Norway andJapan that it was initiating certification under the Pelly
Amendment," which required "an embargo on the certified nations' fishing rights in its
200-mile economic zone and ban the importation of fishing products from those nations,"
from which the "Soviet Union was immune"). See also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 421
("United States then informed Norway and Japan that under the Pelly Amendment it
would seek to impose an embargo, banning the importation of their fish products to force
them to comply with the IWC decision, which was subsequently found to be illegal under
the GATT."). The United States had previously used that authority in 1978 to pressure
Chile, Peru, south Korea, and Taiwan to stop whaling. See id. at 411 ("Under the U.S. Pelly
Act provisions, the United States certified Chile, Peru, and South Korea in 1978 for con-
tinued whaling."); id. at 412 ("Under this pressure from a significant trading partner all
agreed to be bound by IWC decisions in future. The United States also certified Tai-
wan.... Taiwan decided to ban all foreign whaling from its waters and then imposed on
itself a ban on whaling in 1981.").
164. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 418.
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States from using economic pressure to compel compliance with
IWC regulations. 65
The opt-out provision additionally makes it difficult for the
IWC to enforce its regulations against potentially non-compliant
members who can avoid any regulatory requirement by "opting
out" of its effect 66 or negotiating weaker requirements under the
threat of opting out.167 "Since pro-whaling states are aware that the
Commission cannot compel them to perform their treaty obliga-
tions, they are quick to violate regulations,"1 68 and have done so
with regularity. 69 The IWC's inability to enforce its restrictions has
undermined its credibility and invites nations who still whale to
engage in illegal behavior because there are no consequences.170
165. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 419 ("This decision effectively removed any hope
in using economic threats to assist in gaining the compliance ofJapan and other whaling
nations with the IWC quotas."). On the United States' use of the Pelly Amendments to
curtail Japan's use of the scientific research exemption and whaling in protected areas, see
generally U.S. Dep't of State, Clinton Letter to Congress on Japan's Whaling Practices (Jan. 02,
2001), in 3J. INT'L. WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 311, 313 (2008). Reflecting its disgust withJapan's
outlaw posture with respect to the IWC and its resolutions, the Clinton Administration
went so far as to recommend that the next meeting of the IWC not be held in Tokyo. Id. at
311. See also Hirata, supra note 60, at 134 ("Although the Clinton administration did not in
the end impose trade sanctions, it expressed its disapproval of Japan's new program by
boycotting a UN environmental conference in Japan.").
166. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 418 ("The IWC lacks the power necessary to
properly enforce its regulations. Within the IWC's structure is an "opt-out" provision
which enables any member nation that believes the set quotas and regulations are improp-
er to elect not to abide by the IWC's rules.").
167. See id. at 421 ("Violators of IWC regulations and quotas have little to fear.
Throughout the IWC's forty-seven year history it has consistently received unfavorable re-
views, primarily because of its inability to fully enforce its own rules. As a result, nations
may, by threatening to object to the IWC's restrictive amendments, coerce the IWC into
adopting a weaker position by leading the Commission to believe that some conservation is
better than no conservation at all.").
168. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 659.
169. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 442 ("Phillips argues that the key factor in build-
ing support for the sanctuary was the discovery in November 1993 that the Soviet whaling
fleet had been consistently underreporting its catch figures. These revelations, made just
prior to the Norfolk Island meeting in February 1994, showed that whalers had been ig-
noring IWC directives. This undercut the argument that whalers could be trusted to regu-
late their activities. This revelation was so morally shocking to the other states that it
proved to be a critical factor in the successful vote to create a whale sanctuary in the region
in May 1994."); see also Lessoff, supra note 21, at 443 ("In 1994, tests conducted on whale
tissue samples taken from whales harvested by the Japanese revealed that the Japanese
were harvesting protected whales such as the Pacific Humpback and the North Atlantic Fin
whale, in violation of IWC quotas.").
170. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 11 ("It is difficult to convince actors to exercise re-
straint when they see others refusing to do so and paying no cos as a result of this re-
fusal."); see also Callicott, supra note 76, at 21 ("[I]f, standing upon a venerable tradition of
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B. Non-structural Problems that Hamper the Effectiveness of the IWC
A paralyzing internal conflict between pro- and anti-whaling
member states and inadequate science on whales has also prevent-
ed the IWC from protecting them. These problems have plagued
the IWC 'since its inception and appear no closer to resolution to-
day. Combined with the structural flaws discussed above, they con-
tribute to what Rieser calls "a governance gap" at the IWC.17 1
1. Internal conflict over the convention's purpose and the IWC's
mission-conservation or permanent preservation.
An internal conflict in the Convention's Preamble, which refers
to the signatories' desire to "establish a system of international
regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective
conservation and development of whale stocks," has significantly
contributed to the IWC's dysfunction.17 2 This conflict reflects a
whaling, the Norwegian government feels justified in flouting international agreements
and allowing its citizens to kill the number of minke whales that it believes to be sustaina-
ble, surely the governments of Iceland, Russia, Portugal, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and
all the other countries with a whaling 'tradition' will soon feel equallyjustified in doing the
same thing. This presents another slippery slope of which to be wary. If the number of
minke whales killed annually by Norwegians is sustainable, what happens when other gov-
ernments, following Norway's lead, unilaterally allot comparable catch limits to their
would be whalers? At the bottom of this slippery slope lies the tragedy of the commons.");
id. (Norway continuing to hunt whales commercially "contributes to the general break-
down of international law and order.").
171. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 417 n.77 ("Other features of the ICRW that contrib-
ute to the current stalemate include the requirement of a three-quarters majority for
Schedule amendments, the opting-out provision, the absence of a dispute settlement pro-
cedure, the absence of an independent scientific advisory body (members of the Scientific
Committee represent member states rather than independent scientific institutions), the
open membership, and the absence of a mechanism for amending the Convention. To-
gether these provisions result in a 'governance gap.'"); see also Lessoff, supra note 21, at
423 ("[T he various loopholes within the IWC render the Commission's regulations and
imposition of quotas meaningless. Without enforcement provisioris, the IWC has little con-
trol.").
172. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 34; see also Haskell, supra note 24, at 555
("[The convention's] dual aims are: (1) assisting in the orderly development of the whal-
ing industry; and (2) protecting all species of whales from further overfishing. This dual
mandate creates an. internal tension in the ICRW."); Lessoff, supra note 21, at 420-21
("[T]he IWC has a conflicting dual role of both regulating the whaling industry and pre-
serving the whales regardless of economic demands. Consequently, these conflicting roles
can often be seen as the cause for much of the ineffectiveness of the Commission itself,
resulting in a body whose decisions are based on sound scientific principles, but which ful-
fill neither objective effectively."); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 398 ("[The] delegates' aim
was to manage exploitation of the great whales. The Preamble's language, however, incir-
porated the more conservationist goals of inter-generational equity and the safeguarding
of endangered species.").
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tension between conserving whales for "industrial sustenance" and
conserving them "for their own sake." 1 7
The IWC's self-avowed purpose is to provide for "the optimum
utilization of whale resources" through their conservation. 74 "The
interest of the whales as a species intrinsically deserving to survive
or to swim uninhibited in the world's oceans was not the initial
motivation behind the establishment of the Convention, nor were
the aesthetics of whaling an important factor (as they are to-
day)."' 75 While the Convention gave the IWC power to protect
whales by limiting the whaling season and the waters in which
whales could be caught, as well as the size of whales that could be
caught and the types of gear that could be used,176 these decisions
were all to be made to further the interests of the whaling industry
and consumers of whale products.'77 However, in response to the
addition of anti-whaling member nations, the decline in the global
market for whale products, and a growing international revulsion
173. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 647 ("Most of the current issues ... derive from the am-
biguous philosophies on which the ICRW was based, set out in its preamble-the conflict
between conservation of whales purely for purposes of industrial sustenance and conserva-
tion of whales for their own sake as uniquely huge marine mammals with valuable and at-
tractive characteristics about which and from which man has still much to learn to his own
benefit.").
174. Id. at 646; see also Harrop, supra note 48, at 88 ("The International Whaling
Commission, created by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW), was originally designed to serve as a mechanism for the international whaling na-
tions to control, and to share equitably, its rapidly disappearing whale stocks.").
175. Harrop, supra note 48, at 88.
176. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 646 (" [T]he IWC was empowered to amend the Con-
vention's Schedule of Regulations, ('Schedule') by designating protected species, open
and closed whaling seasons and waters for whaling, determine size limits, methods and in-
tensity of whaling, types of gear to be used, methods of measurement and maximum catch
returns."); see also Haskell, supra note 24, at 556 ("[The IWC] is empowered to set annual
harvest quotas and seasons, regulate whaling practices, conduct research, and monitor
compliance of member nations with IWC regulations."). Rules implementing these func-
tions are set forth in a schedule that can only be changed by a supermajority vote. See
Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 399 ("[The IWC's rules require] a three-quarter majority of
present members to vote to approve changes to the Schedule, which contains the opera-
tive rules governing the global whaling regime.").
177. SeeRuffle, supra note 6, at 647 ("The Convention requires that any amendments
to the Schedule be 'based on scientific findings,' taking into consideration the 'interests of
consumers of whale products and the whaling industry.'"). Harrop argues that these provi-
sions gave "a high level of interest and attention to welfare issues." Harrop, supra note 48,
at 88. But see Haskell, supra note 24, at 556 ("Three criteria must be satisfied in order to
alter prior regulation: necessity, scientific basis, and a fair consideration of the new
amendment's effect on consumers of whale products and the whaling industry. These cri-
teria reinforce the tension between whaling interests and conservation forces. The whaling
nations successfully resist schedule changes unless clear scientific evidence exists.").
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toward whaling, the attitude of the IWC gradually shifted from
conserving whales to protect the whaling industry to preserving
whales for their own sake.17 8
The inherent tension between the "orderly" development of
the whaling industry and the protection of whales for their own sa-
ke has fomented acrimonious debate among the member na-
tions.179 The conflict has prevented the IWC from achieving either
goal. 80 Strong differences of opinion on the underlying moral rec-
titude of each side's position make it hard to resolve the conflict. 181
Today the IWC is rigidly divided into members who favor per-
manently preserving whales and those who want to conserve them
only long enough to enable whale stocks to return to sustainable
levels so that whales can be hunted again.182 The continued divi-
178. See Nagtzaam, supgra note 4, at 417 ("With the passing of the commercial whal-
ing moratorium in 1982, to become operational in 1986, preservationism became ascend-
ant, if not totally dominant, over both conservationism and exploitation."); id. at 414
("The reasons cited by the Australian delegation for this new direction were the probable
high intelligence of whales; an understanding that such actions were immoral and that
methods of taking whales were inhumane; whaling products were economically substituta-
ble; and the survival of some whale speciep was in doubt, thus requiring a 'change in em-
phasis from one of the conservative utilization of whale stocks to promoting a policy of
banning whaling and protecting whale populations.'").
179. See Ruffle, supra note 6, at 641 ("The dichotomy between the few states who still
hunt whales and those opposed to whaling has created intense conflict within the Conven-
tion."); see also Detsky, supra note 25, at 39 ("The fifty-sixth meeting of the IWC started
amid this heated controversy, and ended in disarray and contention, spawning two emer-
gency "special session" meetings late in the year."); id. at 36 ("In 2003, over fifty years af-
ter the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was signed, traditional
whaling nations (Norway,Japan, and Iceland)-as well as many indigenous peoples-still
debate the world community over whether and to what extent they can continue whal-
ing.").
180. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 398 ("The Preamble outlined the Convention as
being about the orderly development of a commercial whaling industry and the conserva-
tion of existing whale stocks. The inherent tension between these dichotomous aims would
lead to much acrimony between member-states, as they could not be reconciled."); id.
("[T]he conservation of whale stocks was understood until recently to mean the facilita-
tion of an orderly resource allocation scheme, having nothing to do with maintaining suf-
ficient stock for future generations.").
181. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 39 ("Ethical clashes and lack of respect for op-
posing views are very prominent within the IWC."). Rieser suggests that removing the
commercial whaling issue from the IWC's agenda might eliminate the conflict and free it
to address the more pressing environmental threats to the survival of whales, like loss of
habitat and essential food supply. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 402-03 ("An accommodation
that removes the commercial whaling issue from the IWC's agenda will free that body to
address the numerous environmental challenges that cetaceans face today, from climate
change and marine pollution to collisions with vessels and fishing gear.").
182. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 415 ("On the one side there were the states and
ENGOs that espoused a preservationist creed and wanted 'to ban all whaling, irrespective
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sion of the IWC into pro- and anti-whaling camps has led to its pa-
ralysis and may lead to its dissolution. 85
2. Data problems.
The IWC has not been able to fill the gaps in scientific infor-
mation about whales. 8 4 Whaling members historically exploited
of whether a particular species is stable or endangered.' Opposing them was the whaling
industry which, at best, favored a conservationist perspective, but in reality had been ex-
ploiting whales for decades. Such diametrically opposed positions meant whalers and
preservationists were unable to reach any accord, leading to an escalation in what became
known colorfully as 'the whale wars.'"); see also Osherenko, supra note 76, at 233 ("The
IWC is caught today in a clash of values between those who wish to protect whale species
and ensure healthy stocks of whales and those who argue against commercial harvests of
whales not only on environmental and ecological grounds but on the cultural grounds that
nonhuman animals (and particularly marine mammals, including whales) have certain
rights. Navigating between the polar shores of this debate, the IWC is caught in the ice of
the moratorium."); Rieser, supra note 2, at 402 ("The conservation movement behind the
moratorium was never able to resolve a basic question: should whaling be banned perma-
nently or, if and when whale populations recover, should they again be hunted for 'sus-
tainable use'?"). The opposition of some member nations to resuming whale hunting
once sustainable population have been reached has undermined the credibility of the IWC
in the eyes of nations favoring resumption of whaling. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 40
("Certain States have even publicly announced that they would never agree on a resump-
tion. In view of the IWC's dual objectives, this has undermined its credibility and legitima-
cy.").
183. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 402 ("The deliberations of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC), have deteriorated into an annual confrontation between the propo-
nents of conflicting values: biodiversity preservation versus consumptive use of marine
wildlife. The whaling regime has been verging on dissolution over the issue of commercial
whaling for almost two decades."); see also Ruffle, supra note 6, at 652 ("The IWC has re-
peatedly failed to create a successful protocol for the regulation of commercial whaling.").
But seeAnton, supra note 29, at 320 ("If either side were to achieve the totality of its ambi-
tions in the [IWC], it is likely that it would spell the end of the ICRW as the accepted glob-
al mechanism for international cooperation and coordination on whaling. Indeed, at the
2007 IWC meeting, the Japanese delegation announced that it was considering withdrawal
from the treaty and the Commission altogether after years of condemnation and acrimo-
ny."). Anton believes that the anti-whaling activities of individual nations like Australia
may reflect all that can be achieved in the way of protecting whales. See id. at 319 ("It is
important to reflect on the individual activities of a state like Australia because the long-
running stalemate under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW) between the anti-whaling forces and pro-whaling forces is, in my view, probably as
good as it gets for the foreseeable future.").
184. See Burns, supra note 25, at 274 ("In most regions of the world there is a dearth
of information on the critical life parameters of cetaceans, including their distribution,
migration, biology, feeding and reproduction strategies, behavior, and even taxonomy.");
see also Lessoff, supra note 21, at 421-22 ("Although many nations demanded more re-
search be performed prior to the imposition of a moratorium or quotas limiting the har-
vesting of specific types of whales, this research was rarely accomplished. To exacerbate the
problem, current scientific methods used to determine the viability of the whale stocks
were imprecise and often inaccurate, and thus, there was little in the way of scientific sup-
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scientific differences of opinion over whale stocks and the trend
line for their survival to justify continuing to whale.185 The absence
of good science on the status of whales means that the IWC cannot
accurately assess the threats whales face and prioritize how its
scarce resources should be marshaled on their behalf.s6 This data
gap also makes it difficult for the IWC to support proposed quota
and size restriction regulations'87 and makes those regulations vul-
nerable to being weakened and violated.
What data there are on whales and their marine ecosystem are
questionable, "fragmentary, and at best, highly speculative," de-
priving the IWC of "any real understanding of living whales." 188
Some attribute the sad state of data on whales to "individual biases
and methodological flaws." 8s9 Others say it is due to the general
axiom that "scientific uncertainty is deeply embedded in interna-
tional environmental law."1 90 Regardless of the cause, whaling na-
tions have been able to take advantage of the dependence of IWC
regulations on solid data about whales by withholding critical in-
formation from the IWC or underreporting their catch statistics.19'
port for the imposition of such restrictions.").
185. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 422 ("Whaling nations exploited the differences of
opinion which existed in the scientific community to justify continued whaling practic-
es."). Ironically, whaling countries like Japan and Norway would benefit from better data,
as accurate assessments of whale stocks could result in the lifting of the 1982 moratorium
and lead to its replacement with new management practices for whale harvesting. Id. at
442.
186. See Burns, supra note 25, at 274 ("The IWC lacks the resources to conduct the
requisite research to accurately assess these threats and hence establish priorities for ex-
pending scarce resources on behalf of cetaceans.").
187. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 439 ("More accurate scientific measures are neces-
sary not only to accurately assess the current status of the whales, but to gain compliance of
those whaling nations who doubt the necessity of IWC measures."); id. (quoting one critic,
a former scientist with the Council for Environmental Quality, as saying, "The continua-
tion of commercial whaling can also be threatened by management measures that are too
restrictive. The most extreme example is a moratorium on all whaling. This is a completely
unselective measure. Given the differing status of the various [whale] stocks, and the fact
that virtually all those species or stocks that are seriously depleted are already receiving
complete protection, there seems to be no scientific justification for a global moratorium.
Ajustification for a complete cessation of whaling can be put forward on aesthetic or mor-
al grounds, but these seem outside the terms of reference of the Commission.").
188. See id. at 422 ("What data exists [sic] are questionable in many aspects, frag-
mentary, and at best, highly speculative. Information on the marine ecosystem necessary
for any real understanding of living whales is almost totally lacking.").
189. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 667.
190. Id. at 666.
191. See id. at 667 ("Whaling nations have often capitalized on this dependence by
refusing to supply the IWC with crucial data or by severely under-reporting catch statistics
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Ironically, Japan has used the IWC's need for data to establish quo-
tas to justify its lethal scientific research on whales. 192
The Convention's opt-out provision and scientific research and
aboriginal hunting exemptions, as well as internal divisions and
lack of enforcement authority have prevented the IWC from pro-
tecting whales and have created a climate of moral indeterminacy.
Schisms in the scientific community over the future of whales and
lack of accurate independent data on them have left the IWC una-
ble to defend the basis for its action against challenges by whaling
members. In a system dependent on self-policing and self-
reporting, it is no surprise that whales continue to disappear.
The Nature authors are right in one respect: The international
regulatory regime to protect whales is broken-perhaps beyond
repair. So why not create a market in tradable whale shares, which
might lead to fewer whales being killed and might gain the support
of both whaling and whale preservation members on the IWC end-
ing the deadlock? Because if whales have an entitlement to life, as
the next Part of the Article shows, then it is morally wrong to de-
prive them of it, and the proposal should not be accepted.
V. WHALES AND THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO LIFE
Humane exploitation is an oxymoron. 93
The prior sections of the Article have shown that the IWC is
too dysfunctional and the Convention too flawed to protect whales.
One manifestation of this dysfunction is the conflict between
member states over the fate of whales-sustainable hunting or
permanent preservation. The ethical content of the debate has
over the years.").
192. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 416 (arguing that Japan has been "using the chief
rationale for the moratorium as justification: uncertainty surrounding estimates of whale
population levels makes it difficult to regulate their hunting effectively.Japan asserted that
its research would improve the understanding of certain cetacean species' population dy-
namics so that sustainable catch limits could be defined."). The dubious nature ofJapan's
claim is apparent from the hundreds of whales the country kills each year. See Nagtzaam,
supra note 4, at 429 n.454 ("For example, in the 1987/88 season Japan undertook a re-
search program with the nebulous aim of better understanding the population dynamics
of minke whales in Antarctica which apparently means killing three hundred whales a
year.").
193. Ellen Goodman, Animal Ethics and the Lare, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1291, 1311 (2006)
(reviewing ANIMAL ETHiCs AND THE LAW A REVIEW OF ANIMAL RIGHTS: CuRRENT DEBATES
AND NEw DiRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbau, eds. 2004)).
[Vol. 32:3
2013] CHANGING NORMS TO PROTECT WHALES 45
made it particularly controversial and difficult to resolve. 94 Mem-
ber states like the United States and Australia find it morally unac-
ceptable to kill whales, 95 while other countries like Japan and
Norway have concluded that it is acceptable.196 If the United States
and Australia are correct that humans have a moral duty toward
whales because whales have an entitlement to life that cannot be
abridged, then that entitlement cannot morally be traded by oth-
ers as the economists propose. 197 This Part of the Article, using cri-
teria identified by animal rights scholars for distinguishing be-
tween animals that can morally be destroyed and those that
cannot,s98 explores why whales might trigger an ethical obligation
194. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 35 ("The debate on the special status of marine
mammals is so controversial due to its high ethical content.").
195. See, eg., D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 22 ("Australia, a nation that in
years past had engaged heavily in whaling, declared in 1979 that 'the harpooning of these
animals is offensive to many people who regard killing these special and intelligent ani-
mals as inconsistent with the ideals of mankind, and without any valid economic purpose
in mitigation."'); see also Molenaar, suipra note 80, at 34 (referring to many people in West-
ern societies and saying, "To them, the presence of eye contact with the whale may make
the kill feel akin to murder"); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 419 ("[S]ome states-such as
Australia, the United States and the Netherlands-had come to accept that whales had an
intrinsic right to live. This altered their identity within the global society. For these states
and for most of the ENGOs, whaling was a barbaric practice and the taking of even one
whale was anathema.").
196. See Anton, supra note 29, at 337 (quoting Justice Allsop as saying, "The whales
being killed ... are seen by some as not merely a natural resource that is important to con-
serve, but as living creatures of intelligence and of great importance not only for the ani-
mal world, but for humankind and that to slaughter them ... is deeply wrong. These views
are not shared by all.... They are views which, at an international level, are mediated
through the Whaling Commission and its procedures, by reference to the Whaling Con-
vention and the views of nation States. They are views which contain a number of norma-
tive and judgmental premises ... which do not arise in any simple application of domestic
law, but which do, or may, arise in a wider international context." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
197. See Sandel, supra note 15, at 122 (referring to "the dimensions of life that lie
beyond consent, in the moral and civic goods that markets do not honor and money can-
not buy").
. 198. See Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, 21
RATIO JURIs 178, 175 (2008) ("[A] line must be drawn, a line between those entities it is
morally permissible to use, consume, and destroy, and those it is not permissible to use,
consume, and destroy."); id. at 176 ("Various criteria for where the line should be drawn
have been proposed: sentience, consciousness, self-awareness, rationality, or being a moral
agent."). For a list of possible reasons referring to animals in general, see, for example,
Mark Coeckelbergh, Distributive justice and Co-Operation in a World of Humans and Non-
Humans: A Contractarian Argument for Drawing Non-Humans into the Sphere ofjustice, 15 RES
PUBLIcA 67, 67 (2009) ("Various arguments have been provided for drawing non-humans
such as animals and artificial agents into the sphere of moral consideration: animals have
been attributed rights or equal consideration of interests; plants and the ecosystem have
been attributed intrinsic value."); id. at 68 ("U]ustifications given for these attributions
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toward them and what that obligation might entail, including pro-
tecting their right to life.199 Although there are differences of opin-
ion as to where this line should be,m a strong case is made here
that depriving whales of their right to life falls on the morally im-
permissible side of the line.201
Accordingly, this Part examines some of the theoretical and
pragmatic arguments supporting the idea that whales have a right
to life, which, if correct, triggers commensurate human ethical ob-
ligations toward them. The Article does not distinguish among the
various arguments based on their relative persuasive power, but ra-
ther encourages the reader to realize that any one of them pro-
vides sufficient support for the argument, and that when they are
accumulated, a contrary thesis is untenable. Set forth below is a re-
view of each of these arguments.
A. Theoretical Arguments Why Whales Have a Right to Life
This review of various right to life theories shifts from those
include the inherent value or capacity to suffer, being alive or being part of a spiritual-
ecological whole or a high degree of system interactivity, autonomy, and adaptability." (in-
ternal citations omitted)). -
199. D'Amato and Chopra argue that this intrinsic right to life has always existed,
even though humans have only recently begun to recognize it. See D'Amato & Chopra, su-
pra note 47, at 60 ("[I]f whales now have an entitlement to life, they always had it; the only
difference is that human recognition of that right has come relatively late in the game.").
They also argue that the de facto permanence of the moratorium has created an entitle-
ment to life for whales. See id. at 49 ("Preservation is transmuted into entitlement when the
moratorium becomes permanent, at which point it is no longer definitionally a 'moratori-
um' but, rather, may be termed an entitlement to life."). But see id. at 48 ("[T]he morato-
rium does not entitle whales to the right to life, because a moratorium implies temporal
limitations (even if extendable) upon whaling activities.").
200. See Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 81 ("Is eating animals for food morally
wrong? This is a hard ethical question."). But see Lee & George, supra note 198, at 175 ("It
seems that it is morally permissible to use some living things, to consume them, experi-
ment on them for our own benefit (without their consent, or perhaps when they are una-
ble to give or withhold consent), but that it is not morally permissible to treat other beings
in this way.").
201. According to D'Amato and Chopra, extending rights to whales should not seem
odd because it "resonates" with comparable expansions of rights to minorities and wom-
en. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 27 ("[T]he extension of rights to whales res-
onates deeply with the historical-legal extensions of equal rights to women and to minority
groups."); id. at 51 (relying on Christopher Stone and saying, "History has seen a widen-
ing of the circle of rights holders" even including "inanimate, intangible entities: trusts,
corporations, joint ventures, partnerships and municipalities"); id. at 23 ("[Granting ani-
mals rights] involves a broadening of humanistic consciousness comparable to.the Coper-
nican revolution that changed the Ptolemaic earth-centered conception of the universe to
the modern realization that ours is but a minor planet revolving around a minor star in
only one of billions of galaxies.").
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who advocate a general right to life for all animals and those that
advocate the same right but only for whales because of their spe-
cial capabilities. Francione argues that animals have rights that
emanate from their being "autonomous subjects."202 These rights
are not dependent on an animal's mental capabilities, capacity to
suffer or conceptualize, 203 or sentience.204 Rather, full moral worth
flows from the fact that animals have the capacity to have prefer-
ences and to act on those preferences205-what Francione calls a
"core consciousness" that translates into an interest in survival and
not being killed.206 Hoch, among others, says an animal's interest
in survival creates a human moral duty toward animals; 207 anything
that impedes the fulfillment of that survival interest is against the
whale's interestS208 and, therefore, morally suspect. Even some util-
202. See Goodman, supra note 193, at 1800 ("The basic tenet of animal rights is that
animals who can be considered autonomous subjects have rights, and humans have associ-
ated duties.").
203. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 49 ("[T]he entitlement philosophy
recognizes this right as belonging to, or even coming from, the whales themselves."). But
see Goodman, supra note 193, at 1307 (asserting that "animals have rights," which "will
depend on the natural and social contexts in which the animal lives").
204. See Goodman, supra note 193, at 1301 ("Francione makes a right to life depend-
ent on animal consciousness, not mere sentierice.").
205. See id. (arguing that "practical autonomy" is "predicated not on the ability to
reason, but on a being's possession of preferences, the ability to act to satisfy them, and
the sense that it is she who wants and seeks satisfaction").
206. See id. (referring to Francione and stating, "Any animal that has a sense of self,
he says, has an interest in continued existence in addition to an interest in happiness"); id.
at 1302 ("Animals who possess this core consciousness, even if they lack an autobiograph-
ical sense of their lives, have 'a continuous mental existence,' which Francione contends
gives them 'an interest in their lives' and in not being killed."); id. at 1307 ("[A]nimals
have dignitary interests."); see also D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 27 ("[W]e argue
only for extending the single most fundamental of all human rights-the right to life-to
whales.").
207. See David Hoch, Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Interests: A Challenge to An-
thropocentric License, 23 GONZ. L. REV. 331, 346 (1987-1988) ("If animals have interests, we
have moral obligations toward them."); see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 13-14 ("Regan
argues that beings that are the subject of life, and have goals important to them, should be
deemed to possess inherent value. In turn, inherent value should make them valuable in
their own right, irrespective of any instrumental value they may possess in the eyes of hu-
mans. For Regan, most animals, like humans, have equal inherent value, and, since inher-
ent value cannot be ranked, they are entitled to equal, inviolable, moral treatment vis-:1-vis
other possessors of inherent value."). But see Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights ofAnimals, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 387, 394 (2003) ("If we are speaking of perfumes, the claim for imposing suf-
fering on animals is ludicrously weak. But if scientists are able to develop treatments for
AIDS and cancer, or even treatment for serious psychological ailments, the claim is much
stronger.").
208. See Lee & George, supra note 198, at 179 ("One can then say that what promotes
the organism's survival and flourishing is in its interest and what diminishes its chances of
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itarians grant animals a right to happiness and equal moral worth
to humans.209 However, freedom of choice or autonomy from hu-
man control based on these interests, as Sunstein urges,210 does
not necessarily mean that animals "have full basic and inherent
dignity (moral worth) or rights." 21'
survival or flourishing is against its interests."); id. at 178 ("We can think of the good of an
individual nonhuman organism as consisting in the full development of its biological pow-
ers. Its good is realised to the extent that it is strong and healthy."); see also Gillespie, supra
note 16, at 14 ("[Tlhis construct suggests that individual animals, as is the case with hu-
mans, that possess inherent value may not be sacrificed for utilitarian goals."); Goodman,
supra note 193, at 1306 ("[H]umans do not sufficiently respect animal interests. For rights
theorists, the failure comes down to the treatment of animals as resources for human ends.
For utilitarians, it is the failure to give equal consideration to animal welfare in the pursuit
of the good. For humanists, it is the failure to fully consider how cruelty to animals harms
humans.").
209. Cf Goodman, supra note 193, at 1293 ("Kantian philosophical [tradition] ...
takes as its starting point the claim that animals have moral claims to life and liberty. If
such rights exist, then, it follows, it is wrong to treat animals as a means to human ends.
This approach is well developed, but hardly dominant. Rights-based arguments compete
with distinctly utilitarian traditions, which recognize in animals no inviolable rights, but
strong interests in happiness that deserve greater weight than they have been given."); id.
at 1300 n. 55 (referencing Tom Regan for the proposition that "some animals are similar
to humans due to their capacities to 'see and hear, believe and desire, remember and an-
ticipate, and plan and intend,' [and] as a result, these animals have right to have humans
treat them respectfully" (quoting TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 42-43
(1983))).
210. See Sunstein, supra note 207, at 397 ("Is there an analogy between slavery and
current treatment of animals? Should animals have a right to choose as they wish, or at
least more of a right to free choice?"); id. at 398 ("Certainly animals, both domesticated
and wild, should be able to make many choices on their own. Equally certainly, it is legiti-
mate to interfere with the autonomy of animals if the interference can be justified in the
interest of animals themselves, or of vulnerable third parties."). But see Lee & George, su-
pra note 198, at 185 ("Human beings also have the basic natural capacity or potentiality to
deliberate among options and make free choices, choices that are not determined by the
events that preceded them, but are determined by the person making the choice in the
very act of choosing."). Sunstein notes that some carry the notion of animal autonomy and
a concomitant right to self-determination to the point of granting personhood to animals.
Id. at 399; see also Taimie L. Bryant, Sacificing the Sacifwe of Animals: Legal Personhood for An-
imals, the Status of Animals as Prperty, and the Presumed timacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L.J.
247, 253 (2007-2008) (criticizing "legal recognition of the extent to which animals should
be considered 'persons' entitled to inclusion in the moral community such that humans
cannot commit acts on animals that humans cannot commit on equally situated humans,"
and stating, "Those criticisms include pragmatic and philosophical reasons to reject pur-
suit of a concept of 'legal personhood' that requires endless, fruitless proofs that animals
bear such substantial similarity to humans.").
211. See Lee & George, supra note 198, at 179 ("[F]lourishing includes pleasure and
lack of pain (though it also includes other things such as their life and their activities). Yet
it does not follow from these points that they have full basic and inherent dignity (moral
worth) or rights."); see also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 13 ("In living creatures, the ascrip-
tion of inherent value, which imbues equal protection and moral worth, is generally re-
stricted to humans."); Goodman, supra note 193, at 1307 ("[T]he conflict between the
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But humans recognize moral worth in animals and feel a sense
of moral responsibility toward them. One manifestation of that re-
sponsibility is the affection and empathy people feel for animals, 212
perhaps because of analogous neurological features and
feelingS213as well as shared social and psychological needs.214 This
flourishing of animal capabilities and human interests.").
212. See Lee & George, supra note 198, at 180 ("[One might argue for animal rights
starting from our natural empathy or affection for them."); see also Goodman, supra note
193, at 1302 ("We should respect animal life, Diamond concludes, because of what it
means to be a fellow creature. An appeal to pity rather than to rationality is what is called
for."); id. at 1297 ("The core of the utilitarian argument-that animals should not be
made to suffer unjustified pain-is immensely appealing in part because it draws on the
empathy for animals so natural for most people."); Harrop, supra note 48, at 80 ("Much of
the work of the classic conservation lobbying may have been successful, not through its
reliance on an array of tedious, esoteric facts portraying scientific certainty, but from its
appeal to compassion as well as to aesthetics."). However, Lee and George consider this a
mistaken premise for animal rights as it is based on a "hedonistic value theory." See Lee &
George, supra note 198, at 180-81 ("[H]edonism is mistaken. It cannot provide support for
the view that sentience (or the capacity for suffering and enjoyment) is the criterion of full
moral worth.").
213. See Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Groting Crack in the "Legal
Thinghood" of Nonhuman Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179, 183-84 (2000) ("According to neurolo-
gist Dr. David 0. Wiebers: 'The EEGs of animals are analogous to those of humans....
This is not surprising given that the brain structure and other central and peripheral
nervous system structures and circuitry, down to the cellular level, are analogous in hu-
mans and other animals.... These structures include ... sensory systems for pain and
touch perception, vision, hearing, taste, and smell; and, in many cases, centers which me-
diate mood and personality. Other physicians and scientists have made similar observa-
tions about the minds of humans and other animals. The eminent British neurologist Lord
Walter Russell Brain (1895-1966) observed ... , 'I at least cannot doubt that the interests
and activities of animals are correlated with awareness and feeling in the same way as my
own.'"); id. at 183 ("The legal progression described above is thoroughly supported by our
society's vast personal experience, and considerable scientific knowledge, of the interests
of nonhuman animals who-though perhaps not possessing minds identical to those of
competent adult humans-certainly possess a similar nervous system, experience similar
physical sensations such as hunger and pain, and have mental and emotional lives.").
214. See Newell, supra note 213, at 184 ("Biologists and ethnologists likewise have es-
tablished that mammals have their own needs and desires, including those of a social and
psychological nature, as well as physical."); see also Lessoff, supra note 21, at 413-14 ("The
behavioral similarities between whales and man have long been established by the scien-
tific community, and these similarities have raised considerable concern about man's re-
luctance to allow these creatures to live beside us unharmed. The Federation of American
Scientists has noted that'there is a good deal to be said for empathizing with whales, as the
area of the whales brain associated with the control of emotion is equally well developed to
that of man.' Additionally, whales, like man, communicate with others of their same kind
in a language which has been described as an 'abstruse mathematical poetry.' And unlike
man, whose ability to communicate with other species is rudimentary at best, whales have
developed interspecies communication with other sea creatures such as dolphins. Like
man, whales care for their young and the young reciprocate affection after being reared
and finding independence from their mothers. Whales are social animals who live in large
groups, and some species live monogamous lives, taking only one mate. Documented evi-
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affection has moved public opinion from viewing animals as "mere
property"215 to "recognizing that they are sentient and emotive be-
ings," deserving protection. 216 Newell sees strong public opinion in
favor of protecting the lives of animals "in accord with the upward
development of an instinct in mankind for the preservation of life
of all kinds, including the life of lesser species."2 17
A sense of a moral duty toward animals may flow from their
mental capabilities.2 18 Scientists have commented on the size of
dence exists of incidents in which a whale is harpooned and taken ashore and its mate has
lingered, waiting offshore for days, and sometimes weeks before departing out to sea.").
215. David Favre, Living Property: A Ner Status for Animals Within the Legal System, 93
MARQ. L. REv. 1022, 1023 (2009-2010) ("[Gliven the reality that many humans attach an
emotional, personal value to their pets, the present position of the law that says that dam-
ages to property are primarily measured by the fair market value of the property, consti-
tutes a large disconnect between public expectations and the rules of property.").
216. See Newell, supra note 213, at 162 ('The law must be informed by evolving
knowledge and attitudes. Otherwise, it risks becoming irrelevant as a means of resolving
conflicts. Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view that animals
are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere property. The law should reflect society's
recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing
companionship to the humans with whom they live." (quotingJudge Andell)); see also Bry-
ant, supra note 210, at 255 ("[N]o one has successfully refuted Professor Francione's ar-
gument that the property status of animals accounts for that extreme gap between wide-
spread, commonsense recognition of animals as sentient beings and the grossly
inadequate legal means of protecting animals from even the most extreme types of hu-
man- inflicted suffering. When animals can be lawfully treated in ways that cause such
great suffering for human ends, it is difficult to conceptualize them as 'legal persons' un-
der any definition of that term."); Goodman, supra note 193, at 1297 ("Jeremy Bentham
looms large in the intellectual development of animal law theories. Bentham refuted the
Cartesian notion, convenient to all and believed by few, that animals are unthinking ma-
chines without interests. Bentham took animal sentience seriously, arguing that sentience
alone was enough to entitle animals to humane treatment. The important question, he
argued, was not 'Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer' If animals can
suffer, their interests in not suffering should be taken into account in pursuit of the com-
mon good."); id. at 1311 ("Animal status as property, [Francione] contends, is the primary
obstacle to animal welfare."); Sunstein, supra note 207, at 399 ("What, then, are the real
stakes in the debate over whether animals are 'property'? Perhaps it is thought necessary
to destroy the idea of ownership in order to make, simply and all at once, a statement that
the interests of animals count, and have weight independent of the interests of human be-
ings."); id. at 400 ("The idea of 'property' does fit very poorly with how people should
think, on reflection, about other living creatures.").
217. Newell, supra note 213, at 182.
218. See Bryant, supra note 210, at 255 ("Among those legal scholars who do attempt
to elevate the standing of animals, there is primary reliance on arguments that animals
have particular attributes that make them worthy of respect, consideration, and protec-
tion."); see also Goodman, supra note 193, at 1306 ("All beings have the right to flourish as
their capabilities allow. What she calls a 'capabilities approach' would respect the basic in-
nate capability, or behavioral needs, of creatures to form social bonds, roll in the mud,
seek adventure, etc."). Steven Wise, a well-established scholar in the animal rights field,
among others, argues that the superior mental ability of some animals to mentally disabled
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whale brains, for example, and that their capacity to communicate
and hunt cooperatively indicates a superior intelligence.21 9 If
Sunstein is right that what human treatment animals deserve
should be related to their capacities,220 then whales that have ca-
pacities, including an intelligence that is comparable to that of
humans, should be treated more like humans, and killing them is
immoral because it is more akin to murder.221 To Lee and George,
persons and children entitle them to rights. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The
Need For a Teoretical Basis, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1506, 1548 (2001) (reviewing STEVEN M.
WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TowARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)) ("As with men-
tally disabled humans, a right may be qualified in certain ways in keeping with the crea-
ture's level of understanding."); see also Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 78 (taking Rawls'
position that rationality is an essential criterion for contracting parties suggests that "we
must treat marginal humans as morally inferior to normal humans, and, equally, we ought
to grant an equivalent moral status to marginal humans and the many animals with levels
of autonomy broadly the same as them." (quoting Robert Garner, Animals, Politics, and
justice- Rarwsian Liberalism and the Plight of Nan-humans, 12 ENVTL. POL. 3, 7 (2003)); Gilles-
pie, supra note 16, at 12 ("Recent research demonstrates that human intelligence differs
from that of other. species less in kind than degree. Additionally, communication, moral
behaviour, the use of tools and the creation of art are proven to be not exclusively human
traits. Those who focus on rationality as the dividing characteristic between humans and
other animals fail to recognize that many humans, such as the very young, the senile, and
the mentally infirm, fail to meet this standard of 'rationality.'"); Goodman, supra note 193,
at 1300 ("Kant included all humans in his ethical system because he believed they pos-
sessed divinely given souls. Animal rights theorists strip Kant's ethics of faith and ask the
fateful question: on what basis can we say that a mentally incompetent human has a right
to life and liberty, but a highly functioning chimpanzee has no such rights? And if a chim-
panzee has such rights, should a dolphin, and if a dolphin, why not a dog?").
219. See Ruffle, supas note 6, at 667 ("Proponents of whale preservation tend to base
their arguments on scientific knowledge of whales indicating that the animals are intelli-
gent, sentient beings capable of communication. For example, studies suggest that the
large brain size of whales coupled with systematic and cooperative hunting techniques ex-
hibit the superior mental abilities of marine mammals. Further evidence of whales' intelli-
gence is found.in their ability to communicate with one another."); see also D'Amato &
Chopra, supra note 47, at 26 ("Why should whales have evolved with a capacity to com-
municate their ideas to homo sapiens when the latter appeared only at the very end of the
30 million years of the whale's history? There is overwhelming evidence that whales com-
municate effectively with their own species (and, as previously noted, have even developed
interspecies communication)."); id. ("Our failure to converse with whales could well be a
matter more of our own limitation than of theirs."); Stoett, supra note 2, at 164 ("[W]e've
yet to arrive at an acceptable universal standard for measuring human intelligence, much
less nonhuman intelligence."). But see Callicott, supra note 76, at 23 ("How does one assess
whale intelligence? More fundamentally, can one meaningfully attribute 'intelligence' to
whales?").
220. Sunstein, supra note 207, at 401.
221. See Bryant, supra note 210, at 256 (citing Derrida in support of the assertion that
as long as killing animals is not considered murder, animals will not be included among
those to whom moral responsibilities are owed. The amorality of killing animals sustains a
view of animals as sufficiently different from humans that concepts of justice are not of-
fended when animals are exploited in ways that humans cannot be exploited."). But see
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it is an animal's rational nature that gives it "full moral worth." 222
It does not matter that animals cannot conceptualize, sense any-
thing other than their existence, project into the future in their
deliberations, or choose between options like humans.223
To other animal rights scholars the capacity of any animal to
feel pain imposes upon humans a moral duty toward them.224 For
Regan, this capacity to feel is a basis for granting any animal
rights.225 At minimum, to these scholars this shared capacity for an
animal to feel pain raises the ethical bar226 and gives it "moral
Molenaar, supra note 80, at 37 ("Criteria such as intelligence, complexity of behavior or
consciousness are after all very subjective and data upon which to make such assessments is
very difficult to obtain.").
222. See Lee & George, supra note 198, at 187 ("Neither sentience nor life itself en-
tails that those who possess them must be respected as ends in themselves or as creatures
having full moral worth. Rather, having a rational nature is the ground of full moral
worth."); id. at 190 ("Consistency, then, demands that one respect reasonable pursuits and
real fulfillment of others as well. Thus, having a rational nature, or, being a person, as tra-
ditionally defined (a distinct subject or substance with a rational nature) is the criterion
for full moral worth."); id. ("[T]he position (that full moral worth is based on the posses-
sion of the basic natural capacity for rationality), if correct, would also lead to the denial of
fundamental personal equality. However, the criterion for full moral worth is having a na-
ture that entails the capacity (whether existing in root form or developed to the point at
which it is immediately exercisable) for conceptual thought and free choice-not the de-
velopment of that basic natural capacity to some degree or other." (internal citations omit-
ted)).
223. See Goodman, supra note 193, at 1301 ("Regan's [test] accords rights to animals
that have 'propositional attitudes, emotions, will, and an orientation to oneself and one's
future.'").
224. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 15 (viewing pain avoidance as "a characteristic of
all sentient creatures"); id. at 16 (claiming the capacity to avoid pain "leads to the need to
weigh like interests equally"). This concern about protecting animals from pain differenti-
ates animal welfare advocates from conservationists who are more concerned about main-
taining sustainable populations of wildlife for human use. See Harrop, supra note 48, at 81
("On the one hand welfare prescribes our moral duties which must stand in the face of
scientific analysis and on the other conservation is based upon economic and scientific
enquiry resulting in an equation of sustainability supporting anthropocentric goals."); see
also Goodman, sufra note 193, at 1298 ( "[K] illing for sport and food consumption, where
unnecessary for survival, is inconsistent with an ethic of care for animals that takes their
interests seriously.").
225. See Goodman, supra note 193, at 1301 (referring to Francione and stating,
"[A] nimals qualify for basic liberty rights merely because they feel").
226. See Hoch, supra note 207, at 334-35 ("Bentham argued that if animals are capa-
ble of suffering then humans have more duties toward them. Bentham was a utilitarian,
however, and did not argue against the imposition of all suffering on animals."); id. at 334
("Even though laws regulating the use of animals have always been minimally protective of
nonhumans, ethically proper conduct often demands more than the law commands."); see
also Callicott, supra note 76, at 13 ("[R]espect for game animals requires land ethical
hunters to dispatch them with care, skill, and humanity. Human beings should not cause
other forms of life to suffer gratuitously."); Gillespie, supra note 16, at 15 ("The central
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worth."227 This same principle applies to whales that "are sentient,
intelligent beings who can feel pain."22 8 D'Amato and Chopra
question whether the fact that whales are not human,229 especially
since the "bright line distinctions between humans and other ani-
mals" may be false, 230 means they deserve less in terms of human
behavior toward them.28 1
B. Pragmatic Reasons Why Whales Have a Right to Life
There are also pragmatic reasons why humans should grant
whales moral worth. They occupy a critical place in an ecosystem
where animals and humans are codependents, 232 what
point to extract from Bentham's and Singer's argument is that animal interests should be
(prima facie) considered in the course of moral deliberations since animal interests in
avoiding pain are commensurate to those of humans.").
227. See Lee & George, supra note 198, at 176 ("Animal welfarists argue that the cri-
terion of moral worth is simply the ability to experience enjoyment and suffering."); see
also Gillespie, supra note 16, at 16 ("Creatures that demonstrate consciousness or aware-
ness are capable of feeling pain; therefore, they should be objects of moral concern. In so
far as animals suffer commensurately with humans, they have equal claim to relief from
pain.").
228. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 414 ("If whales are, as scientists believe, sentient,
intelligent beings who, like man, can feel pain and suffering, is it just to destroy such ani-
mals?"); see also Harrop, supra note 48, at 79-80 ("[A] nimal welfare begins and is funda-
mentally concerned with ethical assumptions.... [W]ith science to an extent measuring
and identifying such suffering but very much subordinated to the moral assumptions ...
."); Sunstein, supra note 207, at 400 (" [Ihf ants and mosquitoes have no claim to human
concern-if they can be killed at our whim-it is because they suffer little or not at all.").
229. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 9-10 (listing bases for drawing a distinction be-
tween humans and non-humans as including the rationality of humans and their ability to
communicate, "purported superior moral behavior," their ability "to use tools to modify
and change the environment," and to create art and to hold "religious beliefs").
230. See id. at 11 ("In contrast to this anthropocentric paradigm, modern scientists
argue that the purported bright line distinctions between -humans and other animals are
spurious.").
231. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 27 ("To be sure, whales are not hu-
man, but are they 'less' than human?"); id. at 26 (warning of the dangers of this compari-
son and stating, "[t]hroughout history, the denial that other persons-outsiders, minority
groups-as well as other animals, have a consciousness equivalent to our own has been the
foundational philosophy for genocide and enslavement").
232. See Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 75 ("Humans and some kinds of animals
are mutually dependent on each other for their food and living."); see also Burns, supra
note 25, at 268 ("Cetaceans can play an important role in the ecosystems of which they are
a part."); Stephanie Curran, The reservation of the Intrinsic: Ecosystem Valuation in New Zea-
land, 9 N.Z.J. ENVrL L. 51, 61 (2005) ("Beyond duties and obligations, holistic worldviews
see the biosphere as interconnected whereupon each part is valuable for the role it has
evolved to serve."); Goodman, supra note 193, at 1307 (noting the "environmental con-
cern for animals as part of a functioning ecosystem."); Rieser, supra note 2, at 401 ("[I]n
the twenty-first century, whales are sentinels for the large-scale changes that global warm-
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Coeckelbergh calls "cooper-ands." 233 This codependency and
"quasi-cooperation," according to Coeckelbergh, makes it less just
to exclude whales from our "moral sphere and related conceptual
frameworks"2 3 and makes whales "morally equal participants" 235
regardless of their capacity for rational thought.236 According to
Coeckelbergh, "[i]f we take seriously the fact that the human
world depends on the nonhuman world, then it is not even neces-
sary to blur the categorical line between the moral status of hu-
mans and that of nonhumans to understand nonhumans as an in-
tegral and necessary part of a wider cooperative quasisocial
scheme."237 This "position of mutual advantage and cooperation"
also eliminates any need to find ontological or other similarities
between humans and animals.2 38 Recognizing the interconnected-
ing and ocean industrialization are bringing to the seas."). Indeed, international envi-
ronmental treaties are increasingly directed at preventing ecosystem harms. See Ruffle, su-
pra note 6, at 665 ("Recently, the emphasis of international environmental treaties has
shifted to address concerns regarding the disruption of wildlife habitat and also the
preservation of delicate ecosystems.").
233. Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 78 ("[W]e need not recognize their being-
such-and-such; we 'only' need to see them as co-operands.").
234. See id. at 70-71 ("[O]nce we come to understand our world partly in terms of co-
operation between various entities and life forms, we no longer have a good reason to ex-
clude non-humans from the moral sphere and our related conceptual frameworks."); id.
at 83 ("[T]o the extent that they can be considered as part of a co-operative scheme be-
tween humans and non-humans, non-humans must be included in the sphere ofjustice.").
Coeckelbergh calls this co-operative relationship between humans and non-humans "qua-
si-social." Id. at 67 ("We should try to grasp conceptually the quasi-social dimension of re-
lations between non-humans and humans.").
235. Id. at 69 ("I argue that we should draw non-humans into the sphere of moral
consideration not only because of what they are (features) or do as such (consequences)
but because of their relations with us, in particular their (quasi-co-operation) with us.").
236. See id. at 73-74 ("[W]e do not need to make assumptions about the rationality
or intelligence of animals (or other non-humans) in order to treat them justly: we only
need rational and intelligent humans to make the judgment and decision to treat animals
in that way.").
237. Id. at 74-75; see also id. at 75 ("These entities are not drawn into the sphere of
justice because they are rational, self-interested, or because they have capabilities, but be-
cause they are part of a larger co-operative scheme that is not completely within our con-
trol but that exists and on which human society depends for its operation.").
238. See id. at 77 ("Instead of requiring that we see, or want to make, the 'newcom-
ers' as beings-like-us ... , we can allow for (ontological) differences."); id. at 76
("[P]arties-human and non-human-are often already in a position of mutual ad-
vantage and co-operation, in spite of or regardless of the wide disparity in capacities
('powers')." (emphasis omitted)). But this same theory of co-dependency may justify hu-
mans eating animals. See id. at 81 ("[I]f our relations with animals we use for food satisfy
the criteria of mutual dependence and cooperation, they fall within the sphere of morality
and justice. I believe this is indeed the case: we depend on them for food and they depend
on us for their lives.").
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ness of life forms increases the importance of the survival of each
part of the natural system239 and should temper the proclivity of
humans toward destroying parts of it.240 Both humans and whales
have an important role in maintaining that ecosystem, in which
each part has individual value for the contribution it makes toward
maintaining the whole. 241 However, whales have "become a symbol
of humankind's inability to find common ground and cooperate to
protect the global environment," 24 2 although they may yet offer
humans a chance at ecological redemption.243
Whales occupy an important place in the pyramid of life cel-
ebrated in Leopold's "land ethic."244 Such an ethic, according to
239. See Curran, supra note 232, at 69 ("[A]n ecosystem approach 'recognizes the
relationships between life forms and places great value upon the survival of each for its
contribution to the operation of its natural ecosystem.'").
240. Id. at 70 ("[M]an should be firmly viewed as an aspect of the biosphere, an as-
pect highly influential and able to inflict damage upon other aspects yet also reliant upon
the health and well-being of the biosphere and the ecosystems comprising it."); id. (assert-
ing that an ecosystem approach is a "change from previous anthropocentric approaches in
which man was separated from nature with little responsibility taken for the effects of hu-
man activities on the environment"). Some, however, argue that whales are "nuisance spe-
cies" that could make things worse for over-exploited fish stocks. See Molenaar, supra note
80, at 48 ("In areas where all fish stocks are fully or over-exploited, large populations of
marine mammals may adversely affect the status of those fish stocks."). However, Molenaar
adds that while "a preemptive (anticipatory) catch [of whales] may not be a bad idea,"
whales and other marine mammals should not be treated as "scapegoats" for human ex-
cesses. Id.
241. See Curran, supra note 232, at 70 ("The central goal of human survival remains
but a holism is introduced that recognises that all life is interconnected and, therefore, has
value for the role it has evolved to take."); see also Molenaar, supra note 80, at 49 ("One
could also see it as an issue of shared responsibility, although marine mammals are of
course unable to accept that responsibility themselves and the consequences are much
more far-reaching for them.... This clearly raises philosophical questions on the role of
humans on earth.").
242. Rieser, supra note 2, at 401; see also Ruffle, supra note 6, at 666 ("Whales play a
crucial part in maintaining the equilibrium of the ecosystem. Thus, 'the killing of one
whale amounts to harvesting from three hundred to five hundred square kilometers of
ocean area.'").
243. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 172 ("The story of whaling, as a symbolic construction
of redemption, is firmly (if unevenly) embedded in Western political mythology.").
244. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
251-58 (1966) (describing the concept of a "biotic pyramid" as "an ethic to supplement
and guide the economic relation to land" and warning that "[t]he combined evidence of
history and ecology seems to support one general deduction: the less violent the man-
made changes, the greater the probability of successful readjustment in the pyramid").
Callicott refers to this as a "sea ethic." Callicott, supra note 76, at 3; see also id. at 3 n.12
(explaining that Leopold in his seminal work, proposes that "mankind adopt a relation-
ship to wildlife that includes obligation as well as privilege and that humans should affirm
the biotic right of other species to exist").
56 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL IAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:3
Callico, is in addition to and not a substitute for other ethical
codes. 20 To the extent it is applied to answer the question about
the morality of whaling, the ethic's broader "communitarian"
premises should be consulted for guidance, 246 including its inclu-
sion of nonhumans.247 When so little is understood about
whales-a keystone species in the marine ecosystem 248-the land
ethic dictates that it is a wiser course not to kill them unless there
is a better justification for doing so than is offered by whaling
countries. 249 Being reluctant to interfere in the functioning of an
important ecosystem like the marine environment is also based on
a moral duty toward future generations, including preserving their
245. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 5 ("Leopold characterized the land ethic as an
'accretion,' which suggests another layer of the same siubstance. This implies that he un-
derstood the land ethic to be an addition to, not a substitute for, the more venerable and
familiar social ethics. Thus, the land ethic was never meant to oust traditional, human-
oriented morality and reign supreme. It was intended, rather, to supplement traditional,
human-oriented morality.").
246. See id. at 5-6 ("Thus, the land ethic was not conceived to be an ad hoc addition
to traditional social ethics, based upon altogether new and unfamiliar premises and prin-
ciples. Rather, the land ethic is the most recently born sibling in a family of ethics-the
family of ethics generated by and dependent upon various community entanglements.
Hence, in applying the land ethic to the present question, the morality of whaling, one
need not be restricted to the land ethic narrowly defined-one can reach more deeply
into the land ethic's generic communitarian premises and principles for guidance.").
247. See id. at 6 ("[T]he land ethic accommodates concern for individual nonhuman
beings no less surely than it coheres and peacefully coexists with the more venerable and
familiar human-oriented ethics. When Leopold first crystallizes the implications of the
land ethic, he mentions individual nonhuman natural entities alongside biological wholes.
'In short a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, [as
well as] respect for the community as such.'").
248. See Curran, supra note 232, at 75 ("[T]he value of a keystone species to an eco-
system must be found to be greater than other species.").
249. See id. at 71 ("Leopold found that: A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it does not."); see
also Molenaar, supra note 80, at 47 ("[T] he precautionary approach should be applied so
as to avoid serious consequences of scientific uncertainty."). This conclusion also makes
sense, if one sees whales in an instrumentalist way. See Sunstein, supra note 207, at 387
("Immanuel Kant thought of animals as "man's instruments," deserving protection only
to help human beings in their relation to one another."); id. at 396 ("[A]nimals have in-
trinsic as well as instrumental value."). Callicott applies Leopold's "land ethic" to sustaina-
ble whale hunting and finds it "land ethically" sound, if it does not adversely affect endan-
gered species or disrupt the stability of a biotic community. Callicott, supra note 76, at 17-
18; id. at 8 ("[S]ignificantly interfering with poorly understood complex population
equilibria courts disaster."). For these reasons, Callicott also "cautiously" approves com-
mercial minke whale hunting, if their populations are as "robust" as maintained and
"strict quotas" are maintained to prevent over-hunting. Id. at 10.
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"fair access to resources." 250
Whales are members of biotic communities, and as such,
humans owe duties toward them.25' As members of the same biotic
community of intelligent beings as humans,2 5 2 whales should be
owed comparable moral respect.25 3 Under modem ethical princi-
250. See Curran, supra note 232, at 60 (" [F] uture generations are not 'traders' in the
market, yet many consider that they should have fair access to resources." (quoting
MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENT 2010 STRATEGY-A STATEMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY ON THE ENVIRONMENT, WELLINGTON (1995))); id. ("[A] nother
view of stewardship, based upon a moral duty to provide for our descendants."); see albo
Stoett, supra note 2, at 164 ("[O]ne could argue we are obligated to future generations to
avoid driving today's species into extinction, and the imperative of intergenerational ethics
was even accepted in the Rio Declaration."). D'Amato and Chopra find such a claim
"weak." See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 23 ("A weak claim of environmental
awareness is that we must concern ourselves with the integrity of the environment because
of a duty to future generations."); id. at 28 ("[M]orality cannot be a matter of self-
interested or prudential calculation, but is rather a deontological obligation that we owe to
others even at the possibility of a net cost to ourselves."); id. at 23 ("[W]e owe a duty to
living creatures in the environment per se, without calculating their utility to future gener-
ations of human beings."); see albo Curran, supra note 232, at 60 (discussing the rejection
of the concept of intergenerational equity because "it rests 'on the presumption that our
descendants will still delight in what now delights only some of us and did not delight our
predecessors'" (quoting JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILTIY FOR NATURE 124-25
(1974))); id. at 60 ("[D]uty that can provide for future generations could apply equally to
other species, and even to the environment itself."); id. ("Ulust as any human may value
his life any other living creature may do the same, despite the lack of instrumental value its
life offers another.").
251. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 11 (remarking on the incompleteness of the Land
Ethic because "it says nothing about duties to 'fellow-members' of the biotic community").
Coeckelbergh says deep ecologists carry this thought one step further and argue that hu-
mans and animals are on the same moral level. Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 70 ("[I]ts
[deep ecology] ideal is a biospheric egalitarianism' which again puts humans and non-
humans on a morally equal level. We are not just members of a biotic community' (Leo-
pold) but equal members.").
252. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 23 ("Homo sapiens and the cetaceans are fellow-
members of the global biotic community with few natural enemies. Cetaceans are warm-
blooded, live-birthing, long-lived, suckling, nurturing, playful, curious, learning beings.
They inhabit an environment that is, from a human point of view, completely foreign. But
human beings and cetaceans may share a fellowship of a much more sympathetic sort: very
different, but equally expansive mental lives."); see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 161 ("We
are, in some sense, little more than highly complex organisms at a particular moment in
evolution. Whales are similarly creatures of their environment, and although there are
endless debates over cetacean intelligence, we might safely conclude that they are the most
cognitively oriented of all marine life, as humans are on land. The clash between these two
species, however, does not fit with the usual pattern of land-space conflict one sees in the
natural wild . . . .").
253. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 24 ("[Olne may confidentially believe that hu-
mans share a select community of intelligent life on Earth with whales and dolphins.
There exists a cetacean mind in the waters as well as a human mind on the land. Member-
ship in that community-the community of minded organisms-carries with it special
ethical duties and obligations."); see also Goodman, supra note 193, at 1308 ("[R]ights em-
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ples, this respect should at minimum imply non-interference with
other members of these biotic communities, 254 and should certain-
ly not countenance killing 255 or any form of animal cruelty. 256
While hunting may be an exception to a rule against killing a
member of the same biotic community, the killing of an animal
during a hunt should not cause unnecessary suffering.257 Causing
an animal to suffer debases humanity;258 treating animals well en-
larges human welfare.259 Since whale hunting is a particularly cruel
form of hunting,260 it, therefore, should not be countenanced as
anate from membership in society and an expectation of reciprocity among members.").
254. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 11 ("From the point of view of modem ethical
principles, respect for fellow-members of the human community implies, at the very least,
noninterference.").
255. See id. ("[A]n environmental ethic-to kill and eat a fellow-member of the biotic
community is primafaciesuspect. Would not that, if anything violate the land ethical duty to
respect fellow-members of a biotic community?").
256. See Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 71 ("But it does not follow that there are
no requirements at all in regard to them, nor in our relations with the natural order. Cer-
tainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of the whole species can be a
great evil. The capacity for feeling of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which
animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case."
(quotingJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTIcE 448 (1971))).
257. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 13-14 ("A modern or perhaps postmodern West-
ern demonstration of respect for hunted fellow-members of the biotic community, as
sketched by Leopold, included: learning the biology of one's quarry; voluntarily limiting
one's means of capture; good markspersonship; not shooting when one cannot be sure of
making a quick, clean kill; strict obedience to statutory regulations; and assiduously follow-
ing a code of sporting conduct."); see also id. at 14 ("Voluntary adherence to an ethical
code elevates the self-respect of the sportsman, but it should not be forgotten that volun-
tary disregard of the code degenerates and depraves him." (quoting LEOPOLD, supra note
244, at 178)).
258. See Goodman, supra note 193, at 1302 ("Empathy, not moral duty, requires this
commitment. Animal suffering matters because it debases humanity and causes (or should
cause) human suffering."); idat 1308 ("[T]here is a moral consensus in the Western world
that animals should be treated better than they are.").
259. Id. at 1303 ("[H]umans should treat animals well to enhance human welfare.");
see also Sunstein, supra note 207, at 401 ("I believe that in the long run, our willingness to
subject animals to unjustified suffering will be seen as a form of unconscionable barbari-
ty-not the same as, but in some ways morally akin to, slavery and the mass extermination
of human beings."); id. ("Every reasonable person believes in animal rights. Even the
sharpest critics of animal rights support the anticruelty laws. I have suggested that the sim-
ple moral judgment behind these laws is that animal suffering matters.").
260. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 15 ("It can also be appreciated that, as a matter of
fact, in more than half of all cases the whale's death is prolonged and its agony propor-
tionately protracted. Thus, for reasons not of logical but of practical necessity, whaling vio-
lates the first land ethical rule of respect for nonhuman fellow-members of the biotic
community. It is inherently inhumane for more than half the minke whales taken."); see
also Stoett, supra note 2, at 169 ("A related ethical question ... concerns the nature of
whaling itself, which is often seen as an especially cruel form of hunting.").
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an exception to these ethical precepts. 26 1
A species-specific ethic has developed around whales. 262 People
who value natural resources like whales believe it is unethical to
destroy them, especially when those resources are rare. 263 The fear
of extinction has symbolic value and can lead to a collective sense
of guilt at the thought of consuming a rare species like a whale. 2M
The whale has become a powerful symbol of nature in some coun-
tries. 265 This view of whales is very different than the scientific view,
which carries no normative content or symbolism and allows hu-
mans to consider themselves dominant over nature and, therefore,
able to exploit it.266 It is also different from the view of the three
261. See Callicott, supra note 76, at24 ("[W] hales seem to recognize human beings as
fellow-intelligent-beings and assiduously refrain from harming members of the human
species. Should not human beings then have a duty to reciprocate?"); id. at 25 ("Should
Hlomo sapiens be killing fellow beings who may be the most highly evolved form of intelli-
gent life on the planet?"); see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 162 ("If we can destroy such re-
markable marine mammals-beasts who do not compete with us for living space, who are
not predators on our domestic livestock, who are not physical threats to us in any way, and
whose beauty are impressive and enriching-then nothing is safe from our destructive
impulse." (quoting F. STEWART, THE PRESENCE OF WHALES: CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS ON
THE WHALE 15 (1995))); D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 21 n.1 ( "Though the
search for extraterrestrial intelligence may take a very long time, we could not do better
than to start with a program of rehumanization by making friends with the whales and the
dolphins.... They have behaved benignly and in many cases affectionately toward us. We
have systematically slaughtered them." (quoting CARL SAGAN, THE COSMIC CONNECTION
178-80 (1973)))..
262. See Stoett, supra note ?, at 171 ("In terms of public opinion and policy, envi-
ronmental ethics are situation-specific; indeed, one might suggest they are species-specific,
as well.").
263. See David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal reservalion Regulation, 28 HARV.
ENvrL. L. REv. 343, 366 (2004) ("Just as some people believe it is wrong for one state to
permit its firms to pollute another state, some people believe that it is wrong for a state to
permit its firms to destroy natural resources, at least non-reproducible or rare re-
sources.").
264. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 163-164 ("Why not eat whales? Taste preferences
aside, the answer may lay in a collective sense of guilt. It is the symbolic value of the great
extinctions, or threat thereof, that separates the whale from most species, leading to a ra-
ther clear construction of a species-specific hierarchy by cetologists and others."); id. at
159 ("Symbolism is an integral aspect of the social construction of ethics . . . ."); id. at 160
("[S]uggest that views toward nature have an axiomatic impact and that they are sustained
not only by material needs but by symbolic imagery, from trees to whales to the entire
globe captured by space-based photos.").
265. See id. at 159 ("Even in these localized cases, the symbolic pull of the whale is
apparent."); id. at 151 ("Symbolism-the use of socially constructed images to convey a
cause-has seldom been so important as in the case of the struggle over whaling rights
and responsibilities.").
266. See id. at 160 ("[T]he concept of nature in science carries no ethical value, since
various organisms and animals are considered to be as morally neutral as molecules, at-
oms, or objects falling from space. Such a concept of nature places human beings in a po-
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academics in their Nature commentary, which shows no collective
concern for the environment's well-being. 267
This Part of the Article shows why "whales are entitled to
consideration as moral entities,"268 and why excluding them from
a moral scheme is an unjustifiable conceit and an indefensible
"value-laden belief."269 If that conclusion is correct, then depriving
whales of their right to life under any circumstances is morally
wrong, 270 making the economists' proposal morally suspect. Grant-
ing whales a right to life could also "inform existing law"271 or
move it along a particular path.27 2 Indeed, the law might develop
more favorably for whales if courts viewed them as rights-
holders.273 However, there is no international legal principle or
principle of customary international law that prohibits the killing
of non-endangered whales.274 But if there is a widely held moral-
sition of dominance over nature, and makes it acceptable morally to exploit nature for the
'benefit'.of humans."); id at 161 ("[It leads to an incomprehensible perspective on hu-
manity separate from nature . . . .").
267. See Curran, supra note 232, at 81 (" [V]aluation of the environment will always
be low where there is little collective concern for its well-being. Under cost-benefit analysis
every participant's preference is of equal weight and, therefore, without a collective envi-
ronmental concern, valuation of healthy ecosystems will never be high."); see aLbo Sandel,
supra note 15, at 101 ("To know whether a good should be subject to market exchange
... , we need to know what mode of valuation is fitting or appropriate to that good. This is
different from knowing how much the thing is worth. It involves a qualitative, not just a
quantitative judgment.").
268. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 61.
269. Coeckelbergh, supra note 198, at 72.
270. See Callicott, supra note 76, at 22 ("Whale hunting is land ethically wrong, abso-
lutely and categorically-even if the target species can sustain an annual commercial har-
vest and even if the whalers go about their grim work obsequiously.").
271. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 61 (asserting that there is a "considerable
degree of overlap" between moral and legal rights, reflecting how a norm develops "over
time").
272. See id. at 52 ("[Mloral considerations influence the content of law over time.");
id. ("Courts may be predisposed to giving a far more 'liberal' construction of applicable
rules to a party that claims to be asserting rights than to one that claims to be a third-party
beneficiary of asserted rights.").
273. Id. at 52 ("[D]evelopment of ajurisprudence regarding whales is more likely if
whales are perceived by courts as rights holders . . . .").
274. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 49 ("[T]here is currently no universal rule of
international law that prohibits States from killing marine mammals, either by way of pre-
emptive catches or straightforward exploitation, provided this does not lead to their ex-
tinction. There is no treaty-based rule to that effect, nor a customary rule based on suffi-
ciently uniform and widespread State practice."). Molenaar believes that it might be very
difficult and unlikely for such a legal principle to emerge. Id. at 50-51 ("In certain western
societies, most prominently the United States, marine mammals are regarded as having
inherent value, perhaps even a right to life. Such rights have no basis under international
law: there is no treaty rule to that effect and the practice of States is not uniform and wide-
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based whale preservation norm, then it might fill the gap in law.275
VI. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF NORMS IN WHALE PRESERVATION
Of course, the need for normative justification often reduces pol-
itics to a symbolic game of showmanship. But the need, nonethe-
less, persists-and this is why normative analysis retains its validi-
ty, regardless of the behavioral and postpositivist revolutions in
social scientific thought.276
This Part of the Article focuses on norms: how they arise and
are dispersed. It specifically focuses on the competing norms af-
fecting the fate of whales and how one of these norms, the whale
preservation norm, is on the rise in the international arena, but has
not yet been adopted by whale hunting countries, which have in-
stead embraced the whale conservation norm in their quest to re-
sume whale hunting.277
Norms represent broadly shared understandings about what is
appropriate or inappropriate behavior in a variety of situations. 278
spread enough to create a rule of customary law that binds all States. And whereas it is in
principle possible that the practice of States changes to give rise to a customary rule, this is
not likely to happen due to a lack of logic and immediate benefits. There are simply no
objective criteria to determine which life forms would have a right to life, and which would
not."). But see D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 22-23 ("This essay examines the histo-
ry, and argues for the 'presentation,' of a broadening international consciousness about
whaling amounting to an opiniojuris-the psychological component of international cus-
tomary law. When this component is added to the evolving practices of states toward whal-
ing, the combination of psychological and material elements arguably constitutes binding
customary law. The dynamic element of that custom and its underlying philosophy gener-
ate, we conclude, an emergent entitlement of whales-not just 'on behalf of whales-to a
life of their own.").
275. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 61 ("One cannot fully explain 'law'
without reference to normative values-what law is striving to achieve.").
276. Stoett, supra note 2, at 157.
277. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 376-77 (discussing "the exploitation of whales
and the competing attempts by various normative entrepreneurs to introduce their pre-
ferred competing environmental norms of exploitation, conservation, or preservation").
278. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 2 ("Constructivists consider legal rules and systems to
be constituted by shared understandings developed through iterative processes of interac-
tion. Legal rules are not regarded as commands backed by sanctions, but rather as crystal-
lizations of shared understandings that affect the way in which actors perceive a problem,
the range of possible solutions, and their own interests and priorities."); see also Nagtzaam,
supra note 4, at 377 ("Norms contain somewhat clearer injunctions to members about le-
gitimate and illegitimate behaviour, still defining responsibilities and obligations in rela-
tively general terms.... Rules are, however, more specific: they indicate in more detail the
specific rights and obligations of members."); id. ("Norms can be defined ... as 'shared
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Norms are generally enforced through tactics like shaming to pres-
sure people to conform to the norm's directives; once norms are
internalized, they guide behavior without outside interference. 2 7 9
Compliance with a norm legitimizes an actor, imparting credibility
and status-effects of being a good citizen.28s Norms exist at the
international level281 and can be found in international or custom-
ary law.282 Until a competing international regulatory body espous-
ing different norms is created, the unchallenged existence of the
IWC as the sole international organization charged with preserving
whales means that its underlying norms "reflect those operating in
the broader world." 28s
While some norms, like the duty to maintain biodiversity and
prevent certain life forms from dying out, have gained the status of
becoming customary international law,2 8 this is not true for the
expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors.'"); see generally
Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 134-42 (discussing how norms arise,
the difference between personal or individual norms and social norms as well as abstract
and concrete norms, and their various uses in suggesting the right behavior).
279. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 377 ("[Norms] can provide a basis for shaming or
pressuring actors, or they can provide the basis of social learning of appropriate or moral
behavior and become internalized by agents and guide actions."); see also Babcock, A New
Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 134 ("Norms are informal obligations or social rules
that are not dependent on government either for their creation or enforcement.").
280. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 378 ("[T]he benefits that accrue from normative
compliance may not necessarily be material, but may include the need for legitimacy, cred-
ibility, status, or a concern to be perceived as a good global citizen."); id. at 412 (referring
to the United States' persistent pursuit of whale preservation and saying, "It is arguable
that the United States might have gained a 'reputational advantage' in being perceived is
a good environmental citizen").
281. See id. at 377 ("At the global level, norms can be found operating in interna-
tional regimes of all persuasions . . . ."). But see Stoett, supra note 2, at 158 ("[T]he embry-
onic field of global environmental politics suffers from normative paucity at this stage,
which is somewhat surprising, given the emotive appeal of environmental issues (perhaps
this is the sobering effect of social science).").
282. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 378 ("At the international level such norms are
often codified within international law, which provides an important indicator of the pres-
ence and strength of a global norm."); see also D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 50
("What states do becomes what they legally ought to do, by virtue of a growing sense that
what they do is right, proper and natural.").
283. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 399.
284. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 36 ("[I]n the case of certain norms the practice
of States has become so uniform and widespread that these norms have acquired the status
of customary law and thus are binding on all States absent timely objection during the
crystallization process. For example, the prohibition on over-exploitation of marine living
resources, the duty to cooperate in relation to transboundary marine living resources, the
duty to conserve biodiversity and the duty to take measures to prevent species from becom-
ing extinct are binding as customary law on all States. For States that are parties to the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), the 1992 Con-
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anti-whaling norm. The continuing controversy over commercial
whaling on the IWC and the use of exemptions allowing whales to
be killed shows the lack of universal acceptance of the anti-whaling
norm and why it is not yet customary international law. 285
However, a growing international consciousness that killing
whales is morally repugnant is an indication of an emergent inter-
national whale preservation norm. 286 That consciousness is appar-
ent from the fact that only a few countries adhere to a different
norm. It manifests an international awareness of a legal obligation
toward whales;287 perhaps even an acknowledgment of a whale's
right to life with commensurate legal and moral obligations im-
posed on the international community.288 Nations that maintain a
contrary position in the face of such an emerging universal norm
threaten to undercut the nature of international law as a reflection
of general norms that bind states.289 But this concern has had little
effect on whaling countries that stand to gain only international
reputational benefits if they were to convert to a whale preserva-
tion norm.
Preventing universal acceptance of a whale preservation norm
is the existence of two other competing whale norms:290 exploita-
vention on Biological Diversity, and the CITES Convention these norms are also binding
as treaty law.").
285. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 36 ("It can therefore not be ruled out that a
prohibition on the exploitation of certain or all marine mammals could ultimately acquire
customary status. But the provision for aboriginal subsistence whaling under the IWC Con-
vention and the current deadlock on commercial whaling indicates that current State
practice is far from such uniformity.").
286. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 50 ("We have seen, in the history [of]
... the practice of states (reflected through their whaling activities) moving through six
stages that are best characterized as increases in international breadth of consciousness.");
see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 167 ("Cultural relativism surfaces here. The antiwhaling
lobby often has pushed toward the powerful idea that efforts to abolish whaling are reflec-
tive of a new, global consciousness.").
287. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 50 (suggest[ing] "an opinio juliv-a
growing sense of international legal obligation toward whales").
288. Id. ("Nearly all nations accept the obligation of preservation. And in this con-
sensus of preservation, we suggest that there is the incipient formation of the final, decisive
stage-the entitlement of whales to life.").
289. See id. at 56 ("' [T]he sovereign rights of states' in objecting to certain specifica-
tions on scientific research laid down by the IWC's Technical Committee. But 'sovereign
rights' is a rhetorically overused and ill-fitting concept in discussions of international law.
If any state could claim sovereign rights in the teeth of an international norm to the con-
trary, international law (as a set of general norms binding on states) would not exist.").
290. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 380 (identifying three competing norms as "ex-
ploitation, conservation, and preservation").
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tion-a declining norm29' that treats natural resources as fungible
goods separate from the environment in which they are found-
and conservation.292 The conservation norm finds support in many
different cultures293 because it is "a utilitarian, human-centered
perspective that seeks the greatest good for the greatest number of
humans"294 and personifies "a rhetoric" of restrained and wise use
of natural resources.295 Pro-whaling countries support the conser-
vation norm because its indeterminacy enables them to use the
language of conservation to support their goal of resuming hunt-
291. See id. at 385 ("[Exploitation] will be understood ... as referring to a situation
where humanity treats resources as merely instruments to be developed and consumed
without consideration for the survivability of the resource, the overall ecosystem, or the
rights of future generations of humans."). Nagtzaam finds support for the exploitation
norm to be fading as indicated by the failure of nations like Japan and the Soviet Union to
justify their continued killing of whales in exploitative language. See id. at 386 ("[T he
choice not to use the explicit language of exploitation also provides a revealing indication
that support for the norm has waned." Instead supporters of the exploitation norm "pre-
fer to use the language of sustainable utilization or conservation"); id. at 385
("[A]rguments for the unrestrained or minimally restrained utilization of a resource are
rarely couched in the language of exploitation by its proponents, who prefer to use the
language of sustainable utilization or conservation.").
292. See id. at 386 ("The conservationist approach is bound up with the production
process and regards the nonhuman world merely in terms of its use-value terms, as a re-
source to be utilized. Therefore a conservationist perspective treats the biosphere as a res-
ervoir of matter-energy to be altered by technology for human consumption."); id. at 387
(quoting MARK SMITH, ECOLOGISM: TOwARDS ECOLOGICAL CMZENSHIP 11 (1998)
("[T]he idea of conservationism has tended to act as a brake 'to moderate the pressures
for an exploitative "free for all" inherent in the drives which propel actions in economic
markets,' thus ameliorating damaging practices of the past.")).
293. Id. at 387 ("Using this norm [of conservation] to underpin a global environ-
mental regime tends to invite greater consensus from stakeholders as its argument that the
environment is a resource that wisely must be utilized resonates deeply with many cul-
tures.").
294. Id. ("Conservation is in many ways the least controversial environmental norm
since it has at its heart a utilitarian, human-centered perspective that seeks the greatest
good for the greatest number of humans."). Even those who favor a norm of preservation
use the language of conservation and sustainable whale stocks in their arguments against
killing whales. See id. at 418 ("Preservationist proponents' arguments were never advanced
in terms of preserving whales." Rather, these arguments were defended within the IWC as
providing a chance for whale stocks to rebound, which left the door open for whaling to
continue at a later date, which is consistent with a conservationist position."); id. at 446
("Proponents of preservationism do not dare make arguments with preservationist lan-
guage because they know they will not succeed so the strategically couch their claims in
conservationist rhetoric instead."); see also Harrop, supra note 48, at 79 ("In the most gen-
eral sense, conservation concerns scientific (and increasingly) economic assumptions
based on a foundation of anthropocentric concern.").
295. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 387 ("[The conservation norm] embodies a rhet-
oric of restraint.").
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ing whales once sustainable populations are reached.26  The
preservation norm, in contrast, takes a non-instrumentalist view of
whales," 7 uninterested in any future use they might have for hu-
manity. 98 The whale preservation norm appears to be ascending
over both the exploitation and conservation norms on the interna-
tional stage, in large part due to the activities of environmental
non-governmental organizations.m However, the division between
anti-whaling members on the IWC over whether the whale norm
should be conservation or preservation 00-what Nagtzaam refers
to as a failure of "concordance or commonality" 3 0 1-has prevent-
ed the [WC's adoption of the preservation norm302 despite increas-
296. See id. at 423 ("IfJapan and its allies can limit and define the normative contest
within the IWC to one of only debating conservationist mores and practices, it knows that
it has an excellent chance of eventually being allowed to whale legally again."); id. at 425
("Both sides to the debate have used conservationist rhetoric for their own ends rather
than actually discussing exploitation and preservation.").
297. See id. at 388 ("[P]reservationism accords an intrinsic or non-instrumental value
to the world even if it conflicts with human interests."); id. ("[W]hile it is possible to argue
preservationist positions from an instrumental perspective, doing so does a disservice to
the intentions of many global actors advocating preservation who argue that whales or
other creatures deserve not to be culled because they intrinsically have a right to exist.").
298. See id. at 388 ("A conservationist may only save a resource for use at a future
time, while a preservationist desires to keep the re-sources forever untrammeled and pro-
tected ... ."); id. at 387 ("If the saving of a resource is from utilization rather than for utili-
zation, however, we are generally speaking of 'preservation.'" (emphasis added)).
299. Nagtzaam attributes the ascendance of the whale preservation norm to the work
of international ENGOs. See id. at 382 ("All three environmental norms examined in this
Article started as domestic norms but have become global due to the increasingly trans-
boundary character of environmental problems and the transnational activism of ENGOs.
Thus norms have histories that can be 'subject to change over time' as a 'result of the
communicative process in which value-based expectations of behavior are socialized and as
a result of which the contents of socialization can change in the long term.'").
300. See id. at 386 ("[The] domestic debate [between those advocating conservation
and those promoting preservationism] is now being played out on a global scale."); id. at
420 ("Preservationist states and ENGOs have attempted to widen the moratorium into a
comprehensive ban on all whaling by creating whale sanctuaries and encouraging whale
watching enterprises, while other states like Japan campaign to put in place ostensibly con-
servationist programs.").
301. See id. at 381 (defining the concept of concordance or commonality as "how
widely accepted the rules are in diplomatic discussions and treaties (that is, the degree of
inter subjective agreement)"). Nagtzaam discusses three factors that can determine a
norm's strength, "specificity, durability, and concordance." Id. at 380. "The strength ... of
a norm is determined in these cases by the units within a system who share that norm's
values." Id. at 381. Specificity is "how precisely a norm distinguishes appropriate from in-
appropriate behavior," and durability looks at how long the norms have been in existence,
their ability to withstand challenges to them, and whether their violations are punished. Id.
302. See id. at 446 ("Taking the three factors of specificity, durability and concord-
ance into account, we can only speak of the [whale preservation] norm being of medium-
to-high commonality."). Nagtzaam, however, believes that the IWC has accepted the whale
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ing support for it there.303 ENGOs have not been able to break this
"asymmetric" norm "deadlock,"34 and enactment of the ban on
commercial whaling has only hardened positions on either side .of
the conflict.305 That both sides are buoyed by national cultural
norms and moral beliefs makes any change in the norm stalemate
on the IWC unlikely36 and has neutralized the IWC as a force for
norm change elsewhere in the world.
The whale preservation norm is a weak behavioral guide for
those notinclined to follow it. Even though the ban against com-
mercial whale hunting is "reasonably understood and adhered to"
by most nations, 7 the exceptions to it for lethal scientific research
and aboriginal hunting308 mean that the preservation norm's in-
ternational internalization is not complete.3 The ban's continued
conservation norm, leaving whaling nations like Japan and Norway as renegade nations. Id.
at 432 ("Japan stands out as the exception that proves the norm, which is becoming more
deeply entrenched among IWC members.").
303. See id. at 444 ("It is clear that for the moment preservationist norms are ascend-
ant and that most members of the IWC favor the total extinction of the whaling indus-
try:"). Nagtzaam attributes norm change on the IWC to the addition of non-whaling states.
Id. at 399 ("Allowing other states to join the IWC, whether whaling nations or not, was to
prove a critical factor in norm transformation. This step would not have occurred in the
absence of this new view that whales should be considered a global re-source and not just
the property of whaling states. The provision allowed states to circumvent potential veto
coalitions by recruiting like-minded allies, a tactic used by both pro- and anti-whaling forc-
es.").
304. See id. at 420 ("The actions of the coalition of pro-whaling states indicate that
the whaling regime is in a situation of 'asymmetric deadlock,' with whaling states having
no intention of cooperating with other states to preserve whales."); id. at 443 ("At the
moment there appears to be a normative deadlock with neither group able to expand
their sphere of influence.").
305. See id. at 419 ("[T]he moratorium did not end the normative contestation with-
in the IWC and globally.... In many ways the debate became more acrimonious as posi-
tions hardened."); see abo Molenaar, supra note 80, at 39 ("Ethical clashes and lack of re-
spect for opposing views are very prominent within the IWC.").
306. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 420 ("Neither side has approached the negotiat-
ing table with a willingness to compromise because no diminution of position is possible
given the moral and cultural belief structures at stake.").
307. See id. at 445 ("[Tlhe majority of states do, at present, accept the ban as legiti-
mate."). ,
308. See id. at 434 ( "[H]ow strong can the preservationist norm within the IWC be if
whales are still killed under the pretext of aboriginal subsistence whaling?"); id. ("If whal-
ing still continues, even with only a few taken, then the preservationist norm has not been
fully entrenched but is limited in its application."); id. at 439 ("This tension raises the big-
ger question of whether support for aboriginal whaling necessarily undermines the preser-
vationist norm as a whole.").
309. Id. at 444 ("[T]he commercial moratorium is reasonably understood and ad-
hered to. However, the exemptions allowing for scientific and aboriginal subsistence whal-
ing complicate the operation of the ban.").
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violation by a number of countries,310 that it is repeatedly chal-
lenged at annual IWC meetings,31 and that Japan has threatened
to set up a rival organization based on sustainable use (the conser-
vation norm) if the ban is not repealed are all indications of the
whale preservation norm's weakness and questionable durability.312
On the other hand, proponents of the preservation norm have
achieved much on the global stage in terms of changing how the
world thinks about whaling practices and whale hunting in gen-
eral.313 Indeed, the whale preservation norm may have gone
through an international tipping point, making its reversal unlike-
ly.314 The United States, Australia, France, and the Netherlands
have become powerful proponents for norm change on the global
stage because they have internalized the whale preservation
norm.315
310. See id. at 381 ("Has [the norm] been internalized? Do they put conditions on
acceptance and therefore diminish it? Are these rules so taken for granted that no actor
even considers violating them?"). On problems enforcing the ban, see D'Amato & Cho-
pra, supra note 47, at 30-34 (discussing problems the IWC has enforcing the ban).
311. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 445 ("[T]he ... durability of the norm is also
complicated. While the moratorium has been in effect for over twenty years, the question
of its continuation has been revisited on a yearly basis at the IWC annual meeting."). But
see id. ("Delegate numbers are still finely balanced.... However, overturning the morato-
rium requires a three-quarters majority of members. This seems unlikely in the near fu-
ture, given how faction numbers are so evenly balanced.").
312. See id. at 446 ("Japan seems to be losing faith in the process altogether....
[A] nd it threatened to quit the IWC and to set up an alternative organization based on
sustainable utilization.").
313. See id. at 447 ("While preservationist proponents may not yet have brought
about a universal shift sufficient to end the normative debate they have been remarkably
successful in a relatively short period of time in changing how whales and the practice of
whaling are perceived globally.").
314. See Babcock, A New Envirnmmental Norm, supra note 18, at 143 (discussing how a
"'tipping point' occurs when a 'critical mass' of other actors 'become norm leaders and
adopt new norms'"); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 447 ("Friedheim argues that we can ob-
serve within the whaling regime that 'the preservation norm has gone through a "tipping
point" and has "cascaded" throughout the world community, and all that needs to be
done is to have it "internalised" by the peoples and governments of the world.'").
315. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 447 ("States such as Australia, France, the Nether-
lands, and the United States appear to have internalized preservationist values as part of
their state identities, and as a consequence they have become powerful norm propo-
nents."); id. at 415 ("It is clear that given the resources put into the global moratorium
that this was no mere strategic decision by the United States and Australia, but rather
symptomatic of a change in their very identity, from passive bystanders to active norm pro-
ponents.").
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VII. NORM CHANGE AS A WAY TO PROTECT WHALES
The cold view ... is that we are therefore headed for extinction
in a universe of impersonal chemical, physical, and biological
laws. A more productive, certainly more engaging view, is that we
have the intelligence to grasp what is happening, the composure
not to be intimidated by its complexity, and the courage to take
steps that may bear no fruit in our lifetimes.316
There have been many recommendations for how to improve
whale protection besides the proposal that inspired this Article's
response.317 Some involve the IWC changing how it manages
whales, 318 like imposing stricter quotas and using nongovernmen-
tal organizations to monitor whaling activities.319 Others suggest
the creation of an international trust to protect whales3 20 or the
creation of whale reserves, in which hunting whales by anyone
would be prohibited. 321 Many of these proposals are premised on
316. Haskell, Jr., supra note 24, at 591 (quoting B. LOPEZ, ARCTIC DREAMS 52
(1986)).
317. See Regina Asmutis-Silvia, A Multi-Faceted Approach Is Necessary to Protect Endangered
Species: A Case Study of the Critically Imperiled North Atlantic Right Whale, 36 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L.
REV. 483, 493 (2009) (advocating the use of multiple approaches in the cause of saving
environmental species.); id. at 494 ("[A]n insistence on a single-tool approach is myopic
and doomed to failure, as is damning the use of any particular tool.").
318. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 229-30 (discussing Friedheim's proposals to
reform the IWC as including "adoption of a long-overdue Revised Management Scheme
with enhanced implementation and compliance mechanisms, (creation of a permanent
Implementation Subcommittee, a field inspection corps, a Register of Whaling Vessels,
and a system of third-party audits), redefinition of aboriginal whaling so as not to exclude
nationalities with a long tradition of coastal whaling but which do not meet international
definitions of indigenous or aboriginal, and acceptance of a definition of reallocation of
costs so that all users, consumptive and nonconsumptive, pay for the cost of the whaling
regime").
319. SeeRuffle,supra note 6, at 666 ("[I]mproved monitoring with the assistance of
non-governmental organizations ('NGOs') is also required.").
320. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 39 (quoting the IWC/25th Report as
saying, "[W]hales come under no man's exclusive national jurisdiction and as such have to
be an international trust in whose disposition all nations should have a voice").
321. See Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 Aiz. L.
REV. 511, 529 (2008) (suggesting that marine reserves would provide "insurance against
management errors within fished areas"); id. ("The growing popularity of the idea of re-
serving areas of the oceans as protected spaces recalls the move in late nineteenth and ear-
ly twentieth century America to preserve some of the country's most spectacular scenery
for future generations after many public lands had been privatized."). But see id. at 542
("Reserves are often difficult to establish because they entail closing off areas of the ocean
to fishing and other extractive activities."); id. ("Reserves also may be costly to manage.
Their boundaries must be policed, and it may be necessary to undertake measures in areas
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whaling and anti-whaling nations being able to reconcile their dif-
ferences through compromise,322 uniting whaling and anti-whaling
nations in a single regime that assures the survival of whales. 23
Given the "vituperative atmosphere" at the IWC,324 achieving this
result will be quite a challenge.
An alternative approach is to seek norm change in whaling
countries. Since norms are "constructed through shared under-
standings" about what constitutes good behavior, 25 for a norm to
change, "a new social meaning must be created" about the activity
in question.326 When social understandings change, the institutions
and rules that are dependent on them change as well.s27 Most
bordering reserves to protect the areas inside them."); id. at 540 ("Reserving certain areas
of the oceans also might displace fisheries and their attendant environmental harms to
other areas.").
322. See Bums, supra note 25, at 276 ("[I]f the IWC is to overcome its
dysfunctionality, both whaling and non-whaling nations will have to stand down from their
ultimate objectives and work to craft a reasonable compromise on the issue of commercial
whaling."); see albo Osherenko, supra note 76, at 239 ("The parties should set aside irrec-
oncilable value differences, fully commit to set harvest quotas for artisanal whaling based
on best scientific stock assessments, and join together to address the environmental threats
to conservation of whale populations.").
323. See Osherenko, supra note 76, at 230 ("Friedheim's arguments rest not so much
on concerns for environmental justice as on a desire to see an effective international whal-
ing regime that entices the Japanese and other whaling nations to participate rather than
behave as 'bootleggers' in the face of Baptists (to use Friedheim's own metaphor)."). For
an example of what such a compromise might look like, see Burns, supra note 25, at 276
(quoting Sydney Holt as saying, "There may be only one way out of the looming catastro-
phe: that is for both whaling and non-whaling countries to engage for the first time in se-
rious negotiation. Rigorous, precautionary management rules are needed, backed by a
stern regime to secure compliance with the rules. In such negotiations, a few non-whaling
countries would need to drop their pretense that a permanent end to commercial whaling
can be brought about by vote in the IWC."); see also id. (offering the Canny Compromise as
a way to bridge the divide, which proposed "the completion and adoption of the RMS,
with catch quotas restricted to coastal areas and harvesting by current whaling nations; lo-
cal consumption only of harvested whales; a phase-out of lethal scientific whaling opera-
tions"). But see Lessoff, supra note 21, at 444 (" [T]he IWC and the United States still make
too many concessions to commercial whaling nations. It is now time, if the United States is
serious about saving these animals, to exert increased political and economic leverage on
nations who choose not to abide by the IWC's quotas.").
324. See Burns, supra note 25, at 276 ("While it is difficult to envision acceptance of
the Canny Compromise in the vituperative atmosphere of the IWC, ultimately the body
must find a way to save itself if it is going to save the whales.").
325. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 14 ("If social institutions, including legal rules, are
constructed through shared understandings.. . , this means that changes in shared under-
standings lead to changes in those institutions.").
326. Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 143.
327. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 14.
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times, these changes happen imperceptibly 28 because they occur
"against a backdrop of shared understandings and social institu-
tions that give them meaning and anchor them in the shared reali-
ty of the various interested actors."329 For example, the emergence
of the anti-whaling norm in western countries coincided with the
upsurge of a more concerned and environmentally sophisticated
public in those countries.330
However, changing norms is not easy when there are no shared
understandings and when it means abandoning previously ac-
ceptable behavior that has beerr engaged in so long that it has be-
come its own norm, as is the case in whaling countries. 3 1 There
are also countervailing general norms like the autonomy and reci-
procity or fairness norms that might create barriers to the adop-
tion of a specific whale preservation norm by a whaling country.
Thus, if a pro-whaling country feels that it is being forced to adopt
a norm, then the-autonomy norm may prevent its adoption. 32 Sim-
ilarly, if a country believes it is being treated unfairly, then the
"reciprocity norm" may diminish any desire a whaling nation has
to adopt the whale preservation norm.333 An example of how this
particular countervailing norm might function in Japan's case is
the failure of the global community to sanction contrary behavior
by anti-whaling countries, like eating meat or to accept traditional
hunting by Inuits but not by Japanese coastal villages.3M Putting
328. See id. at 14 ("At times, changes to the rules are done quite deliberately: laws are
adopted, definitions are developed, legal relationships are structured and modified. Most
of the time, however, these changes take place almost imperceptibly.").
329. See id. at 39 ("Constructivists in particular understand that the series of utter-
ances that comprise the kinds of claims and counter-claims described above are far from
isolated events; they take place against a backdrop of shared understandings and social
institutions that give them meaning and anchor them in the shared reality of the various
interested actors.").
330. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 405 ("Critically, the issue of overexploiting whales
was becoming one of global concern at a time when the global public was becoming more
worried and better educated on global environmental issues.").
331. See Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 143 (discussing the dif-
ficulty of norm change when it requires "the abandonment of preconceived ideas").
332. See id. at 152 (discussing the autonomy norm).
333. See id. (discussing the reciprocity norm).
334. Many Japanese consider western culinary preferences hypocritical. See Hirata,
supra note 60, at 142 ("Westerners consider it morally wrong to kill certain mammals such
as whales but consider it acceptable to kill others, such as kangaroos (in Australia) and cat-
tle (in the United States)."); see also Callicott, supra note 76, at 14 ("Under land ethical
principles, why would sustainable minke whale hunting, provided it is done respectfully, be
any less justifiable than sustainable deer hunting, respectfully done?" (emphasis omit-
ted)).
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pressure on the pro-whaling nation to conform to a whale preser-
vation norm could be viewed as showing lack of respect for diver-
gent cultures, a form of "cultural imperialism." 3 35 This perception
could undermine the credibility of the IWC, if it is perceived to be
the source of the pressure.336 Since maintenance of any norm re-
quires informal enforcement before the norm is internalized, it is
unlikely that internalization will occur, if countries feel they have
been forced to comply with the new norm.37
Still, it may be possible to change the preferences of whaling
nations by changing the preferences of their citizens.338 Doing this
might avoid the effect of the autonomy norm because people
would not perceive themselves as being forced to change their be-
havior in response to outside pressure. To the extent that prefer-
ences are merely "mental constructs" and not due to external
facts,339 they can be realigned. Thus, if a preference is held only by
a few and is not deeply felt, then its strength is not overwhelm-
ing,340 and a different outcome might be possible.31 Should a
335. See Hirata, supra note 60, at 142 ("Japanese public resents what it perceives as
Western interference in its own indigenous behavior."); id. (calling Western interference,
"cultural imperialism"); id. ("[O]pposition to Japanese whaling is an expression of rac-
ism."); see also Molenaar, supra note 80, at 38 ("The need for mutual respect is clearly un-
der threat if States exert pressure on other States to ensure compliauce with their views.");
id. ("Even though killing marine mammals is not prohibited by international law, States
that do prohibit this within their jurisdiction may regard the killing of marine mammals by
other States as disrespect for their views."); Stoett, supra note 2, at 167 ("The idea that the
Japanese will eventually lose their fondness for whale meat is not without some merit....
However, it is obvious that this argument is based on a rather condescending cultural ori-
entation, one resented by the Japanese .... ").
336. See Molenaar, sura note 80, at 51 ("The sovereign equality of States implies that
States should respect the views of other States even though they may not agree with them.
Exerting pressure on States to ensure that they also treat some animals more equally than
others may not always be inconsistent with international law, but reflects at any rate a lack
of mutual respect. Using international regulatory bodies like the IWC and CITES for such
pressure will lead to a loss of the credibility and legitimacy of such organizations.").
337. See id. at 39 ("Also, States may be less than enthusiastic in ensuring compliance
with rules they have been forced to accept.").
338. See Dana, supra note 263, at 372 ("[P]olitical outcomes track, if imperfectly, the
relative weight of competing sets of preferences held by members of the population.").
339. Id. at 361.
340. See id. at 372 ("[T]he weight of a set of preferences held by a group is a func-
tion of breadth-how many people hold particular preferences-and depth-the intensi-
ty with which the preferences are held.").
341. See id at 374 ("[T]he emergence of a political outcome supporting preservation
of a natural resource despite the transaction costs and political structures impediments
strongly suggests that the preferences in support of preservation clearly outweigh the pref-
erences in opposition to preservation."). But see Curran, supra note 232, at 82 ("Govern-
ments face difficulties obtaining a complete view of individual preferences and are easily
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change in preferences start to happen in a whaling country then
this could create a cascade of changed behavior in that country as
more and more people abandon the old whale hunting norm and
adopt the new whale preservation norm.34 2 Making the public
aware of the issues involved in whaling-particularly its cruelty-
might change individual preferences and help a whale preserva-
tion norm emerge in whaling countries.3 " Ethics play a critical
role in defining the content of norms and in their diffusion.3 " So a
culture's aversion to animal cruelty and adherence to an ethic of
not being cruel to animals might help spread the anti-whaling
norm.
Since norms guide people into behaving in ways that conform
to community expectations, community expectations in pro-
whaling countries about whaling will have to change first.36 This
influenced by sectional interests.").
342. See Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 145 (discussing the
phenomenon of a norm cascade).
343. See Alker, supra note 32, at 559 ("Also, this market closure was made possible in
part by activities of conservation groups dating back to the 1960s. Years of publishing in-
formation had generated a cumulative effect, whereby the public was already marginally
aware of some of the issues. Thus a somewhat lesser immediate effort was needed to create
a strong rallying point for this single critical issue in 1990. Of course, as the reality of our
culture dictates today, having video footage finally proved more effective than most of the
previous efforts to help the public understand the problem."); see also Nagtzaam, supra
note 4, at 402 ("Frustrated delegates to the ICW, who wanted to promote a conservationist
platform, could not alter the situation in a context where there was little public knowledge
of whaling issues and practices.").
344. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 158 ("[E]thical questions, and their interpretation
and transmission through global governance structures, remain central to the evolution of
both jurisdiction and veridiction."); id. at 151 ( "The continued value of ethical analysis in
World politics, ecopolitical and otherwise, is demonstrated with reference to the ongoing
debate over cetacean management at the international level."); see also Curran, supra note
232, at 88 ("When a high level of environmental protection is desired [a spiritual belief in
Nature's intrinsic value and economic modeling of community preferences] ... are inap-
propriate and ineffective without a collective environmental ethic.").
345. See Babcock, A New Envirnmental Norm, supra note 18, at 134 ("[Norms] portray
how people behave and also prescribe how they should behave to conform to community
expectations."). Rieser would abandon this behavioral change effort because the need for
reform in other areas of marine species management is greater. See Rieser, supra note 2, at
428 ("The need for reform is much greater in other regimes; a regime for whaling that is
very costly to reform is not worth the price. Greater effort at other international bodies to
advance precautionary and ecosystem approaches will in the long run do more for whales
in a warming ocean than a less acrimonious IWC."); see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 159
("The IWC became hamstrung by popular opinion in Europe and the United States, driv-
ing the IWC into a chamber of hardened positions. Most ecologists (in the scientific sense
of that word) would agree that the focus on charismatic megavertebrates reduces the po-
tential attention paid to broader and more important issues related to ecosystem health,
especially habitat preservation."). Rieser also believes that the diplomatic cost of reform-
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can be done by changing the salience of the whale preservation
norm in those countries.346 For a norm to have salience and exert
any prescriptive pressure on the behavior of nations, its adoption
must be perceived as legitimate by the adopting state, and it must
also be "sufficiently robust or widely enough held"M7 to overcome
barriers to its adoption. Here, the whale-preservation norm is ro-
bust and widely held at the international level, but not yet strong
enough by itself to be part of a new cultural identity in whaling na-
tions.348 Therefore, a lack of belief in the rightness of the anti-
whaling norm means that where a whaling nation's costs of not
whaling exceed. perceived benefits-especially where the harm
from killing a whale is felt far away and only very indirectly-
behavioral change will be difficult to induce.349 It is hard to get
people, let alone countries, to accept a new norm when a claim
that adopting the new norm will be good for everyone cannot be
sustained. 35o Additionally, whale populations are recovering; many
ing the behavior of whaling nations is too high, if it requires compromising other norms
that were hard fought to achieve. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 428 ("If diplomacy to resolve
the whaling regime stalemate can only succeed by compromising norms that were earned
the hard way, diplomacy in that case is really not working.").
346. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 40 ("[T]he salience of fisheries conservation and
management, and marine ecosystem protection more generally, must be significantly in-
creased within the machinery of governments and in the public imagination."); id. ("If
citizens and politicians cannot be made to care about this issue, all the monitoring tech-
nology, port inspections and trade measures in the world will not make a significant dif-
ference. Law cannot bear the burden of fisheries conservation and management alone.");
see also Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 154 ("[P]eople may not want
to change their behavior because they simply do not believe the reason for the behavior
change or they question the legitimacy of the norm."); Hirata, supra note 60, at 130
("[Two national-level factors seem to condition the effects of international norms on
domestic political processes: the domestic legitimacy (or 'salience') of the norm and the
structural context in which domestic policy debate takes place.").
347. Babcock, A New Environmental Nrm, supra note 18, at 152.
348. But see Stoett, supra note 2, at 159 ("[G]iven the divisive nature of the whaling
issue, any resultant transformation of ethical positions into universal knowledge is far
away.").
349. See Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 141-42 (discussing how
a cost-benefit calculation of personal behavior can influence adherence to a new norm);
id. at 141 (discussing the problem of changing behavior in situations where there are
"large-number, small-payoff collective action problems").
350. See id. at 144 ("[N]orms that make 'universalistic' claims about what is good for
a lot of people ... also have a higher likelihood of success."). This lack of universal sup-
port may be one reason the IWC has not been able to effectively enforce its regulations. See
Ellis, supra note 24, at 36 ("[T]he choice of a regime that establishes general objectives
rather than specific obligations and avoids the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance
is generally not made because it is believed that such a regime will prove more effective,
but rather because the regime's member states have not yet developed the kind of deep
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species are moving out of the imminent endangerment zone, mak-
ing their further protection less urgent.35 Ironically, the recovery
of some whale species undercuts the legitimacy of the whale
preservation norm.
Diffusion of an international norm within a country de-
pends on the country's "cultural characteristics" and the extent to
which the "international norm resonates with domestic values." 352
In Japan, for example, the anti-whaling norm is non-congruent
with the country's domestic value system.3 53 Even though whaling
has never been a major contributor to Japan's economy,35 4 the di-
vide between Japan's self-image as a whale-eating nation,355 who
have hunted whales for over two thousand years,356 and the norm
of whale preservation is very wide.357 Most Japanese have no par-
ticular affinity for whales or a belief in their entitlement to life.358
consensus about the issue-area that would permit a more rigorous regime."); id. ("The
effectiveness of formal mechanisms is likely to depend upon the degree to which they are
embedded in contextual regimes where shared perspectives have evolved-and political
and legal legitimacy has been recognized and accepted .... (quoting Brunned and
Toope)).
351. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 50 ("In the not so distant future, the general
public and the international community of States will have to come to terms with the fact
that many species of marine mammals are no longer under a threat of extinction.").
352. Hirata, supra note 60, at 141.
353. See id. at 148 ("Japan's refusal to adopt the antiwhaling norm is explained in
terms of its domestic cultural and political structures. Because the norm does not fit well
into the domestic value system, antiwhaling advocates have not been able to create a social
movement that is strong enough to force the ministry's hand. Also, the political structure
keeps these antiwhaling advocates marginalized, thus making it extremely difficult for
them to influence bureaucratic views or policy.").
354. See Rieser, supra note 2, at 417 ("Japan's whaling industry has never been and is
unlikely to become a major contributor to the Japanese economy.").
355. See Lessoff, supra note 21, at 416 ("The whale is of great cultural importance to
Japan as both an economic resource and as a necessary food source."); see aso Hirata, su-
pra note 60, at 141 ("Japanese attitudes toward whales and whaling are based on ... the
belief that the Japanese have been eating whale for thousands of years. ManyJapanese be-
lieve that they have a distinct and unique whale-eating culture."); id. ("Japanese consider
whale preparation and eating an integral part of the national cuisine and an expression of
cultural identity."). But see id. ("[T]he eating of whale only became commonplace in Japan
after World War II."); Lessoff, supra note 21, at 416 ("Today, manyJapanese concede that
the current whaling industry is maintained not for the necessity of the meat to the Japa-
nese diet, but rather for the profit which can be made from the selling of whale meat to
wealthy restauranteurs in Tokyo for preparation for their upscale clientele.").
356. Moffa, supra note 43, at 204.
357. See Hirata, supra note 60, at 141 ("In the case ofJapan's whaling, the divide be-
tween the international norm and domestic values is substantial. Many Japanese perceive
the whaling controversy largely as a cultural matter.").
358. See id. at 141-42 ("[M]ost Japanese lack any special affinity for whales and disa-
gree with Western animal-rights activists who insist on whales' rights."); Lessoff, supra note
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Moreover, killing whales is consistent with the high value Japan
places on protecting its traditional coastal communities359 and with
the nationalism and sovereignty norms, the latter of which grants
to an exploiting state the right to exploit domestic and global nat-
ural resources. *
However, killing whales is not consistent with Japan's strong
support of an anti-animal cruelty norm.361 For example, Japan re-
quires that when an animal is used for "scientific purposes" the an-
imal should be subjected to minimal pain,6 2 and annually the bi-
omedical faculties at research institutions and universities hold a
memorial service for "the spirits of animals that have been sacri-
ficed for-medical research." 63 While there is no international wild
animal welfare norm3 6 and the majority of member nations at the
IWC, despite being concerned about the cruelty of whaling,365 have
been reluctant to stop whale hunting because of their equal desire
to preserve aboriginal subsistence hunting,36 Japan's strong do-
21, at 415 ("Japan has repeatedly denied the right to life of all species of whales, including
those most endangered by extinction, emphasizing their country's long history and im-
portant involvement in the whaling industry as well as the need for whale meat as a vital
source of protein for the peoples ofJapan.").
359. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 384 ("However, it is possible to perceive exploita-
tion as a good if it is in the service of a higher moral goal, such as the provision of a better
quality of life for the citizens of a state."); see also D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 54
("If we take whales' entitlement to life seriously, we cannot allow it to be defeated by any
lesser countervailing entitlement. However, if.a countervailing entitlement seems to be of
the same or greater magnitude, a serious problem in moral and legal judgment presents
itself.").
360. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 385 ("States have historically viewed their exploi-
tation of natural resources, both domestic and global, as a right and, in some cases, as a
good."); id. ("Exploitation of resources such as those examined in this Article-minerals,
whales or timber-has long been accepted as a corollary of state sovereignty, and part of
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.").
361. See Gillespie, supra note 16, at 18 ("[O]thers, such as in Japan, suggest laws are
necessary 'to engender a feeling of love for animals among the people, thereby contrib-
uting to the development of respect for life and sentiments of amity and peace.'").
362. Gillespie, supra note 16, at 32.
363. Id. at 18 n.12 7 .
364. Harrop, supra note 48, at 82 ("Legislation dealing predominantly with wild an-
imal welfare issues hardly exists at the international level."); id. at 83 ("[M]oral assump-
tions concerning the welfare of wild animals differ widely around the world whereas there
is some consensus about the anthropocentric concerns that are the basis for conservation
policy.").
365. Id. at 83 ("In the IWC a preponderance of delegates support the UK's conten-
tions [about cruelty of whaling].").
366. Id. at 84 ("The reason for the opposition to welfare goals in this context is not
derived from a sadistic desire to see wild animals suffer but instead from a desire to protect
the right of rural communities and indigenous peoples to carry out traditional, and as they
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mestic anti-animal cruelty norm might be deployed to support a
whale preservation norm in that country. Therefore, while a weak
animal-welfare norm has not been able to defeat a robust aborigi-
nal subsistence norm at the IWC,367 Japan's strong domestic anti-
animal cruelty norm, given the cruelty in whale hunting,36 might
overcome any cultural dissonance threatened by adoption of the
anti-whaling norm if it is seen as consistent with the higher animal-
welfare norm.39 While Japan's norm profile illustrates the com-
plexity and challenge of achieving wider diffusion of an anti-
whaling norm, it does not make such norm change impossible.
The homogeneity of the populations of individual whaling coun-
tries like Japan, Norway, and Iceland might also make adoption of
an anti-whaling norm by those countries easier. 370
Given the low salience of the whale-preservation norm in whal-
ing countries and that the only benefit for the country that adopts
an anti-whaling norm is reputational, it is unlikely that norm con-
version will happen spontaneously in those countries. 371 Thus
argue, currently necessary, subsistence hunting."). But see Stoett, supra note 2, at 170
("[W] hen does a traditional hunt end and a modern one begin?").
367. See Harrop, supra note 48, at 84 ("The conflict provides a graphic illustration of
the contradictions between traditional cultural approaches to wildlife management and
contemporary animal welfare and animal rights ideals."). It remains to be seen if the
threat of extinction of the bowhead whale would overcome the conflicting norm of pre-
serving traditional whaling cultures. Stoett, supra note Z at 166 ("Nonetheless, the threat
of human-induced extinction would, for most observers, constitutes [sic] reasonable
grounds for the application of situational ethics.").
368. See Harrop, supra note 48, at 85 ("The hunting of whales has long been conten-
tious, not only because of the drastic reduction of population sizes by relentless whaling
activities, but also because a large whale in a cruel sea is not an easy quarry for hunting
and necessarily the killing of these animals will fail to conform with contemporary welfare
expectations."); see also Stoett, supra note 2, at 1753 ("We stared our own cruelty and self-
ishness in the face, were repulsed by the image, and (with notable exceptions) reinvented
ourselves. Any return to even small-scale whaling with possible commercial applications
would be a digression, a step back toward an ugly past.").
369. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 447 ("[T]hese leading norm teachers need to
focus on domestic populaces in the recalcitrant states and need to suggest to their citizens
that preserving whales is not an insult to traditional customs and practices but rather is a
sign of a culture's maturity.").
370. See id. at 380 ("Jackson argues, 'the international sphere, like most spheres of
human conduct, is fraught with normative tensions, anomalies and conflicts .... '"); see
also Anne E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1235 (2001) (identifying "lack
of homogeneity" as a barrier to norm adoption).
371. See Molenaar, supra note 80, at 37 ("In view of this lack of logic and immediate
benefits, and in the absence of a threat to extinction, a duty not to kill whales becomes a
matter of principle on which States are not likely to agree soon. Even if a customary rule
would emerge, some States would not be bound as they have persistently objected to its
emergence. It is more likely that States will agree on an international minimum standard
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while changes to incentives structures that are motivating whaling
nations to hunt whales might change individual preferences, 72 it is
unlikely that countries like Japan will use their laws expressively to
change their citizens' preferences by informing them about what is
good or bad behavior.373 Examples of expressive use of law by the
government include penalizing or subsidizing certain actions. 374
For example, Japan could encourage behavioral change in its citi-
zens' taste preferences by not subsidizing its whaling industry3 75 or
by rewarding restaurants that do not offer whale meat through fa-
vorable publicity and penalizing those that do.376 The economic
unimportance of the whaling industry might make this possible,
and, as more people engage in the right behavior by not demand-
for the treatment of animals in order to avoid 'unnecessary suffering.'"). Paradoxically, a
decision by a state to adopt the whale preservation norm undercuts the moral arguments
of NGOs about the repulsiveness of whaling. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 414 ("One view
is that it was in the interests of these non-whaling states to join because it was an easy way
to acquire the kudos of being a good 'green' international citizen without suffering any
economic costs. However, doing so ignores the work done by ENGOs to convince both
state leaders and domestic populations that whaling was morally repugnant.").
372. See Ellis, spra note 24, at 3 ("[Rational choice] begins with the assumption that
actors' behaviour can be understood in light of their preferences; changes in behaviour
can be brought about through changes to incentives structures."); see alsojames C. Nicho-
las &Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based Approaches to Environmental Preservation: To
Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 837, 838 (2003) ("Since
new techniques used to protect the environment have obvious costs, the key in establishing
a program to better preserve our environmental interests is to structure economic decision
making so that the 'invisible hand' guides resources toward protection of the environment
through economic incentives to protect the environment."); id. at 848 ("[Miaking the de-
sired end, in this case environmental protection, in somebody's economic interest, mean-
ing that someone must profit from environmental protection.").
373. Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 148 (discussing the various
ways that the government can use laws and initiatives expressively to change how people
perceive a particular action and thus change norms and related behavior). But see id. at
149-51 (pointing out some of the problems with relying on the government to change
norms or create a new norm).
374. See id.
375. Moffa, supra note 43, at 209 ("[T] he Japanese government... , now very heavily
subsidizes the whaling operations underJARPA II.").
376. See Babcock, A New Environmental Nonn, supra note 18, at 140-41 (discussing re-
wards and sanctions to induce norm activation); see also Ellis, supra note 24, at 36 ("When
sanctions constitute a credible threat and are carefully crafted, they can have a significant
impact on incentive structures and on the behaviour of actors."); id. at 18 ("[P]unishment
strategies should not be aimed solely at isolated incidents of rule violation but also at creat-
ing incentives ... for respect for the panoply of rules and measures . . . ."). But see Bab-
cock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 154 (discussing problems with shaming);
Ellis, supra, at 36 ("[R]ational choice approaches encounter difficulties in explaining how
to convince relevant actors to put incentive-shifting punishment strategies in place to
begin with.").
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ing whale meat and internalize the desired new norm, a new anti-
whaling norm might emerge. 77 However, given the traditional
non-responsiveness of the bureaucracies in whaling nations like
Japan to whaling concerns, it is unlikely they will take these steps
and be a force for norm change.378 Alternatively, domestic non-
governmental organizations might function as norm leaders to
drive norm change in their countries.379 But the ineffectiveness of
domestic anti-whaling groups in whaling countries like Japan38o has
prevented the creation and diffusion of an anti-whaling norm in
those countries,381 and the continuation of problems at the IWC
makes it unlikely that the body will play any role in changing
norms in whaling countries.382
377. See Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 138 (discussing how
internalization of a norm happens when the individual's community reaches a consensus
about "the desirability of particular behavior").
378. See Hirata, supra note 60, at 148 ("As the decision-making mechanism is highly
centralized with over-whelming control by the Fisheries Agency and MAFF, the prefer-
ences and interests of the bureaucrats in these agencies prevail. If the antiwhaling norm is
to be empowered domestically, these bureaucrats will either have to embrace the new
norm or have power over this issue stripped away from them."); id. at 145 ("Japan's ad-
herence to its whaling policies also can be explained in terms of the country's domestic
political structure that prevents environmentalists from taking part in decision-making
processes. The political structure over whaling policy is highly centralized with strong bu-
reaucratic leadership, thus creating obstacles to the promotion and diffusion of the
antiwhaling norm.").
379. See Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 18, at 14 (discussing the concept
of a norm entrepreneur); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 406 ("[It was] not until
Greenpeace, an organization founded on a 'biocentric philosophy that challenged the
idea that humans were the supreme beings on the face of the planet,' became involved in
the mid-1970s that a preservationist normative position was put forth. For environmental-
ists, whales became a potent symbol of the entire environmental movement's commitment
to save the planet and bring about a more ecologically aware society.").
380. See generally Hirata, supra note 60, at 144-47* (describing the problems anti-
whaling groups in Japan have and their resultant lack of effect on public opinion and pub-
lic policy); id at 144 (noting that because of their ineffectiveness "[m]any Japanese envi-
ronmental NGOs have avoided the whaling issue altogether").
381. Id. at 141; see also id. at 148 ("Two major factors-the lack of congruence be-
tween the antiwhaling norm and domestic cultural values, and the hegemonistic control
over decision making on this issue by prowhaling government agencies-have prevented
antiwhaling advocates from influencing whaling policy."); id. at 145 ("Japan's adherence
to its whaling policies also can be explained in terms of the country's domestic political
structure that prevents environmentalists from taking part in decision-making processes.
The political structure over whaling policy is highly centralized with strong bureaucratic
leadership, thus creating obstacles to the promotion and diffusion of the antiwhaling
norm."); id. at 146 ("Japan has virtually no legislative advocates for the antiwhaling cause
and no legislative supporter of antiwhaling activism.").
382. See Stoett, supra note 2, at 157 ("[It] remains an article of faith that the status of
the IWC might empower the antiwhaling normative shift that occurred there, enticirig the
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Thus, it will fall to international environmental nongovern-
mental organizations to secure norm change in whaling countries.
These groups have been extremely effective in mobilizing world
opinion against whaling. 8 They played a major role in moving the
IWC to more of a preservationist position.384 International ENGOs
organized the first international effort to stop whale hunting,
which abruptly ended the 2011 Japanese whaling season in the
Southern Ocean.685 Their attendance at IWC meetings," 6 where
they often outnumber members,387 has enabled them to make
statements opposing whaling on a global stage.3 Their presence
also puts the members on notice that they are watching how the
IWC performs.389 Their immunity from political pressure frees
them to use tactics like consumer boycotts to put pressure on non-
compliant states and industries.390 It also makes them effective at
prowhalers with a postconsumption relationship with cetaceans."). Alison Rieser suggests
allowing the resumption of commercial whaling to enlist Japan's help in protecting the
krill population, but doubts that such a proposal will result in anything more than "extrac-
tions" from the marine environment. Rieser, supra note 2, at 428; see aLbo Babcock, A New
Environmental Ninwi, supra note 18, at 147-49 (discussing the role of governmental institu-
tions in changing norms).
383. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 388 ("ENGOs have been the prime norm entrepre-
neurs."). On the topic of norm entrepreneurs generally, see Babcock, Global Climate
Change, supra note 18, at 14.
384. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 406 ("Any understanding of the shift in the IWC's
operating norm must account for the role played by ENGOs, who in the 1970s pushed a
preservationist agenda both within the IWC and to the global society in general.").
385. Moffa, supra note 43, at 209 ("The Sea Shepherds' active harassment of the Jap-
anese whaling fleet in the Southern Ocean brought an early end to the 2011 whaling sea-
son."); id. at 202 ("[N]ews of the abrupt end of the Japanese whaling season demonstrates
that environmental NGOs now have the ability to compel compliance with International
commitments through unilateral action."); see also Ruffle, note 6, at 669 ("NGOs are cred-
ited with initiating the first worldwide campaign to stop the slaughter of whales.").
386. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 647 ("[T]he IWC's Rules of Procedure allow non-parties
and intergovernmental organizations to attend the meetings and to be represented by ob-
servers . . . ."); see alvo Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 410-11 ("ENGOs, building on their suc-
cesses in domestically altering the whaling policies of states like Australia, Argentina, Uru-
guay and the Netherlands, were determined to translate their policies into action in the
global sphere. By 1979, ENGOs were able to attend IWC meetings officially in the dual
roles as observers and in some cases as delegation members.").
387. Harrop, supra note 48, at 85 ("Indeed, at many meetings of the IWC there are
more than twice as many NGO's present as state members.").
388. See Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 406 ("[T]he decision by the IWC in 1970 to allow
ENGOs to make statements opened the door for the more forceful articulation of envi-
ronmental positions to the IWC members.").
389. Id. at 407 ("By the early 1980s, over fifty ENGOs were represented at the IWC in
an effort to influence debates, either by persuasion, by direct action, or by putting states
on notice that the constituents they represented were watching.").
390. On the topic of consumer boycotts, see generally Alker, supra note 32, at 556-63
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enforcing international norms.39'
Through information392 and direct action campaigns393 that
publicize the cruelty of whale hunts,394 international ENGOs like
(describing the effectiveness of the 1990 tuna boycott). Alker notes, however, that the boy-
cott was successful because of the large market for tuna, which is not true for whale meat.
Id. at 560-61 ("Powerful market actions such as this one work well in an industry like tuna
fishing, in which there is a product being brought to market in large volume, in which very
few parties control access to the market ... and ... the public is willing to take the conse-
quences (consumers decide they can live without tuna, or are willing to pay higher prices
to keep from harming dolphins). This was a solution driven by consumer demand. Thus, if
the market approach is to work in other areas affected by the MMPA, consumers must be
at the forefront of the demands for change."). Alker also notes that while the boycott re-
duced dolphin deaths it did not completely solve the problem and was not without costs.
Id. at 560 ("Although the market solution was very effective in reducing dolphin deaths, it
was not without costs, and it has not ended all problems in this area.").
391. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 669 ("NGOs may also be effectively utilized in the moni-
toring scheme. Unlike member states who may be concerned with retaliation, NGOs are
politically independent and, as a result, more aggressive enforcers of international
norms.").
392. Goodman, supra note 193, at 1313 ("[Sunstein and Leslie] advocate the use of
voluntary and mandatory disclosure policies to mobilize a market response against animal
cruelty."); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 406 ("ENGOs ... were able to tap into, artic-
ulate, and publicize the Western public's horrific response to whaling. Their tactics were
to use mostly peaceful protests and public information campaigns to highlight the brutali-
ty of whaling and its impact on whale species and persuade the global populace to end
whale hunting and reframe the debate from one of exploitation or conservation to one of
preserving all whales in perpetuity."); id. ("Their aim was to put pressure on the regime
states to change their expectations, behaviors, and identities."). See generally Babcock, A
New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 165-70 (discussing the effectiveness of public in-
formation campaigns).
393. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 669 (noting "the ability to put direct public pressure on
a state, organize a boycott or take direct action against violators since they are not subject
to political pressure from the noncompliant state"); see alsoAlker, supra note 32, at 562-63
("Therefore, because the problems in public display, recreational boating, and recrea-
tional fishing affect fewer marine mammals than in tuna fishing, and because the prob-
lems are not widely publicized, it must be recognized that it is less likely a consumer boy-
cott would gain sufficient public support to bring about a change in these areas. However,
just as environmental groups were able to rally support for dolphins killed in tuna nets, a
strong effort to increase public awareness (particularly if coupled with video footage of the
problems) could generate enough attention to bring about real results. These industries
are all susceptible to consumer action, in that consumer boycotts could severely harm or
even shut down these industries, and the threat of a boycott could be enough to force a
change."); Moffa, supra note 43, at 207 ("[Opposition to] whaling includes typical protes-
tor tactics: consumer boycotts, public demonstrations, and awareness campaigns.").
394. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 671 ("[E]fforts of non-governmental organizations to
publicize Japanese whaling hunts should be applauded. The pressure of public opinion
may eventually devastate the already controversial whaling industry."); see also Alker, sulna
note 32, at 557 ("Environmentalists had been working for years to educate the public and
the government about the large number of dolphin deaths occurring in the Pacific Ocean
at the hands of fishermen. Their work received little exposure, however, until they were
able to provide video footage that graphically depicted hundreds of dolphins dying in a
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Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd have been changing the utility cal-
culus that favors whaling.395 Their shrill and apocalyptic 396 cam-
paigns have "corner[ed] the emotional marketing of the issue"
and have shaped the global perception of whaling.397 When it ap-
peared that certain species of whales were not going extinct, their
campaigns changed the focus of the debate from science to one
about morals. 398
fishing net. Now the problem was no longer represented as data on paper that could be
ignored or explained away; instead, it was on the nightly news in living color. People were
dismayed to find that the government had allowed this activity, through lack of enforce-
ment of the MMPA and through establishment of generous quotas that made killing the
dolphins legal."); Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 447 ("ENGOs have shown them-selves to be
adept at conducting public education campaigns."); id. at 407 ("ENGOs conducted a
campaign that focused on brutality, capturing images that promoted their view that whal-
ing was barbarous and should be ended. They linked their arguments to higher values that
highlighted the intelligence and uniqueness of whales and argued that they therefore de-
served to live unhindered. Framing their approach in this way helped their arguments res-
onate with the global public in a way scientists, up until that point, had been unable to
do.").
395. Ruffle, supra note 6, at 670 ("If pro-whaling states determine that continuous
international objection to their whaling activities outweighs the potential economic bene-
fit of harvesting the animals, they may likely abandon their current practices."); see also
Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 144 (discussing how norm entrepre-
neurs use persuasion to "change how other actors 'maximize their utilities'"); Moffa, svpra
note 43, at 209 ("The Sea Shepherds' active harassment of the Japanese whaling fleet in
the Southern Ocean brought an early end to the 2011 whaling season."); id at 209-10 (re-
ferring to Sea Shepards and saying they "harassed Japanese whalers by ramming their ves-
sels, throwing bottles of foul-smelling butyric acid onto their vessels, temporarily blinding
whalers with a laser device, deploying propeller fouling devices to disable vessels, an even
boarding moving whaling vessels.").
396. Stoett, supra note 2, at 152 ("Stressing the approach of ecological ruin has be-
come a common technique, and denying it has been a central theme of those opposing
radical transformations in human-nature relations."); id. ("[I]t can be argued that the
voice of the alarmist is as necessary as it may be misleading, as the tendency toward denial
and passivity needs to be challenged for problems to receive attention.").
397. I. at 161 ("How we choose to describe certain activities, carried out by humans
and nonhumans alike, will influence our perception of those events. The success of
preservationist groups is at least partly attributable to their ability to corner the emotional
marketing of the issue, referring to killing instead of harvesting seals, whales, and terrestri-
al wildlife. Although prowhaling groups are sure to call themselves conservationists, and
they focus on, the sustainable utilization of natural resources, this lacks the exciting conno-
tations of the preservationist vocabulary, especially in the nondiplomatic context of envi-
ronmental activism, where reference to 'whale slaughter' or 'killing' not 'utilization' or
'harvest,' became familiar."); d. .(comparing the anti-whaling campaign to the anti-fur
campaigns, and stating, "The implication-that whale meat is murder-is not just a prop-
aganda tactic").
398. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 407 ("[W]hen nations like Japan were able to argue
plausibly that there was no threat of extinction of certain speties (such as minke whales),
anti-whaling states and ENGOs shifted ground to argue that it was simply unethical to kill
whales."). According to Nagtzaam this was largely due to the division of opinion in the sci-
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The specific tactics international ENGOs use can have a direct
effect on whether norm change will occur in targeted countries.39
For example, Moffa finds that Greenpeace's information cam-
paigns and boycotts rarely change behavior because they do not
have sufficient force,400 though others find them effective. 401The
direct and violent tactics of groups like Sea Shepherd 402 could be
counter-productive in a country like Japan where it might appeal
to the country's nationalism norm to support whaling. 403 Also mili-
entific community. Id. at 410 ("The rift [between cetologists] was so wide that cetologists
were unable to function as a coherent lobby group between 1974 and 1982, opening the
door for ENGOs to become the primary normative advocates on whaling issues."). Indeed,
in the case of whales the cries about impending doom turned out to be fairly accurate.
Stoett, supra note 2, at 152 ("Whaling is an issue-area in which, it can be argued, the
prophets of doom were in retrospect quite justified.").
399. Moffa, supra note 43, at 202 ("[T]he lawmaking function of activism and the
effect it has on international behavioral norms change depending on the model em-
ployed."); id. ("[T]wo types of environmental campaigns have targeted the whaling indus-
try. One approach, employed by Greenpeace, utilizes consumer boycotts and protests to
encourage divestment from the industry. The other approach, taken by the Sea Shep-
herds, uses a fleet of ships to directly intervene in and obstruct whaling operations in the
Southern Ocean.").
400. Id. at 209 ("[P]rotest activism, though it serves law promotion and prescription
functions, ultimately lacks sufficient force to effectively change behavior.").
401. Alker, supra note 32, at 559 ("[The tuna boycott] example supports the propo-
sition that a strong market-based solution can sometimes be more immediately and com-
pletely effective than years of legislation. Here, because of public outcry and threats of
boycotts, the entire canning industry voluntarily adopted a policy that government, howev-
er well-intentioned, was unwilling to require of them. And by completely shutting down
access to the U.S. markets, the tuna canneries left fishermen with no choice but to change
their ways. It did not take long for the fishermen to find workable alternatives to setting on
dolphins-fish in different waters, fish for species of tuna that do not travel with dolphins,
or fish with hooks and poles as was done for decades before purse seining.").
402. Moffa, supra note 43, at 210 ("Interventionist techniques ... involve direct, of-
ten violent, confrontations .... "); id. at 210 ("[The Sea Shepherds] harassed Japanese
whalers by ramming their vessels, throwing bottles of foul-smelling butyric acid onto their
vessels, temporarily blinding whalers with a laser device, deploying propeller fouling de-
vices to disable vessels, and even boarding moving whaling vessels.").
403. Hirata, supra note 60, at 149 ("Militant action against the Japanese government,
through the physical block-age of whaling vessels or shaming campaigns, may backfire,
strengthening the nationalist sentiments of the Japanese public and policy makers."); see
also Stoett, supra note 2, at 161-62 ("It is predicated on the twin assumptions that whales
are special and that past folly will be repeated if whalers are not strictly controlled-
eradicated, in the case of commercial whalers-by antiwhaling forces. One is an assump-
tion premised by a Western acceptance of species hierarchy; the other assumption is based
on the idea that history repeats itself in the absence of regulatory intervention. Both are
problematic, if popular, themes that, regrettably, force whaling states such as Japan, Nor-
way, and Iceland to harden their positions in self-defense of not just their pride but also
their morality. It is at heart an ethical challenge, regardless of the power politics accompa-
nying it.").
2013] CHANGING NORMS TO PROTECT WHALES 83
tating against the use of direct action tactics is the trope that two
wrongs don't make a right,40 4 and the risk that the use of illegal
tactics might undermine the rule of law. 405 But the reluctance of
countries to prosecute those groups for violations of international
law may indicate a calculation that the benefits of contribution of
the group's tactics towards achieving the goal of stopping whale
hunts outweigh their cost.4 06 Moffa supports the extreme tactics of
these groups precisely because they have helped stop a practice
that the international community largely condemns, but has been
unable to curb.407 Regardless of what tactics they employ, interna-
tional ENGOs' campaigns that highlight the horrors of whaling
have the best chance of changing people's preferences in whaling
countries and move those who have been neutral on the topic to a
404. Moffa, supra note 43, at 212 ("Nonetheless, the counterargument goes, inter-
ventionist activism suffers from the ethical fallacy that 'two wrongs do not make a right,'
and thus its existence undercuts the international rule of law."); see abso Callicott, supra
note 76, at 21 ("Lawless behavior begets lawless behavior.").
405. Moffa, supra note 43, at 209 ("Because many interventionist tactics themselves
violate international law, their continued use threatens to compromise the international
rule of law."). But see id. at 212 ("Cooperative international legal efforts could become in-
creasingly rare, or at the very least much more difficult to undertake, due to a lack of trust.
From this perspective, to the extent that the larger goal of international law is to establish
a world order that can regulate the global commons, equivocation as to interventionist ac-
tivism may be a step in the wrong direction. This counterargument, though theoretically
appealing, ignores the reality of the situation in many circumstances in which internation-
al laws are significantly under-enforced, such as the case of whaling in the Southern
Ocean.").
406. Id. at 211 ("The general reluctance of any nation to prosecute the Sea Shep-
herds for violations of international law suggests that the benefit of interventionist activism
outweighs its costs in this case."); id. at 212 ("It is quite possible that the global communi-
ty, at least as evidenced by citizen and government action in Australia and the United
States, recognizes that by giving real force to international law, the Sea Shepherds and
other interventionist activist organizations are performing the costly, and often unfunded,
invocation and application functions arising from obligations to international conventions.
By allowing interventionist activism to continue, either by explicitly recognizing its legiti-
macy or by refraining from condemning the activists' illegal tactics, countries utilize pri-
vate funding to monitor and enforce conservation laws, thus saving themselves considera-
ble amounts of tax money and government resources.").
407. Id. at 213 ("[I] nterventionist activism should be supported and permitted to
continue if for no other reason than that it is the best possible actualization of the interna-
tional community's environmental commitments. Interventionist activism has helped to
stop a practice in commercial whaling that the global community has long condemned but
that formal legal disapprobation has done nothing to curb."); id. ("As the events in the
Southern Ocean demonstrate, nonstate actors can and do use informal pressure to per-
form international lawmaking functions, often with greater success than state actors work-
ing through traditional channels."). Moffa finds the tactics of the interventionists particu-
larly justified as the victims of the behavior they are trying to change "have no seat at the
international bargaining table." Id.
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position that favors a whale preservation norm.
One other factor favoring norm change in whaling countries,
like Japan, is that their whaling industries are very small.408 There-
fore, the adoption of an anti-whaling norm by the governments in
those countries would yield international reputational benefits of
being perceived as a good environmental citizen by most other
countries at little cost.409 Change within whaling countries brought
about by non-government actors might also moot the negative re-
action of countries that might otherwise see the pressure to adopt
the anti-whaling norm as an attack on their national identity.
In sum, carefully orchestrated campaigns by international
ENGOs focused on the cruelty of whale hunts could change peo-
ples' preferences in whaling countries. External factors like ho-
mogenous populations and a decrease in the economic im-
portance of whaling in those countries, plus the robustness of the
international whale preservation norm, the movement of the IWC
toward a preservation norm, and the strength of the anti-animal
cruelty norm in a country like Japan create a "backdrop of shared
understandings and social institutions," 41 0 in which norm change
might occur. Although changing norms is a slow process, once it
starts it is hard to reverse. 411 It also offers none of the ethical infir-
mities of the Nature commentators' approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whole rivulets of ink have been exhausted, and the virulence of
both parties enormously augmented. Now it must here be under-
stood that ink is the great missive weapon in all battles of the
408. See Hirata, supra note 60, at 130 ("The Japanese whaling industry, which em-
ploys only a few hundred people and generates at best marginal profits, is too small and
weak to influence government policy."); id. at 140 ("Whaling is a minor industry in Japan
today, with only the slightest impact on the Japanese economy: The coastal whaling indus-
try is dwindling, and the scientific whaling programs are not-for-profit, as the money gen-
erated from the sale of whale meat under the programs is used to cover the cost of the re-
search."); id. at 138 ("The business sector has only marginal influence over the decision-
making process regarding whaling.").
409. Nagtzaam, supra note 4, at 418 ("[Tlhe interest many states had in being seen
as a good international citizen, however, with the concomitant reputational advantage to
states of being perceived as good global environmental citizens.").
410. Ellis, supra note 24, at 39.
411. See Babcock, A New Environmental Norm, supra note 18, at 145 (discussing how a
"norm cascade" changes majority preferences, eliminating any need for external pressure
to adopt the norm).
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learned, which, conveyed through a sort of engine called a quill,
infinite numbers of these are darted at the enemy by the valiant
on each side, with equal skill and violence, as if it were an en-
gagement of porcupines. 412
Whales are "ecopolitical mammals" who "exist in an incredibly
complex ecological and, whether we like it or not, political con-
text."413 This Article has recounted the failure of one political in-
stitution, the IWC, to protect whales, and the reasons for that fail-
ure. That failure motivated three academics to propose a market-
based alternative authorizing the killing of some whales to save
others. This Article has suggested that such a proposal is ethically
dubious because whales have an entitlement to life based on their
similarities to humans, their capacity to feel pain, and our ecologi-
cal co-dependence with them, among other reasons. Although nei-
ther a theoretical right to life nor the revulsion of most nations to-
ward whaling gives whales a legal right to survive,414 it does support
an anti-whaling norm, albeit one that is not yet universal.
International ENGOs, using a mixture of public education,
boycotts, and direct action tactics focusing on the cruelty of whal-
ing, offer one approach to induce whaling nations to adopt a
whale preservation norm as whaling becomes less important in
those countries. Changing norms is not easy or quick, but once
change starts, a tipping point may occur as more people believe in
the new norm until behaving in concert with it is the norm. The
early end of the 2011 Japanese whaling season indicates that inter-
national ENGOs are having some success in changingJapan's cur-
rent utility calculus in favor of whaling. If a major whaling nation
like Japan stops killing whales, then the IWC might be able to be-
come more proactive in protecting whales and moot the need for
ethically infirm market-based rejoinders to its ineffectiveness.
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413. Stoett, supra note 2, at 171.
414. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 47, at 22 ("Neither the present opposition to
whaling of an overwhelming number of states nor the ethical reouuhion of many people
throughout the world protects whaks from the whale-hunting minority of states or gives them an in-
ternational legal entitlement to survive.").
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